Minute sheinwald to prime minister iraq meeting 1430 tuesday

want Kuarrey Desmond Bowen, CO Tim Dowse, CO IRAQ MEETING, 1430 TUESDAY You are meeting John Prescott, Jack Straw, Geoff Hoon, Hilary Benn and Paul Boateng. Mike Walker, Tim Dowse (John Scarlett has in effect left) and Richard Dearlove will also be present. You could start with an up-date on the security situation from CDS and Tim Dowse. We can expect the run-up to and after the transition at the end of the month to be rough. You will want to be up-dated on Iraqiisation. Kevin Tebbit and Paul Wolfowitz are visiting Baghdad this week. We are aiming for an Allawi statement at the end of next week setting out the broad parameters of his defence policy, including the development of Iraqi structures and capabilities. This could be the main part of an event in Baghdad with defence chiefs (followed by a Defence Ministers' meeting around the time of the NATO Summit). You might also touch on the prospects for a NATO decision on training. You should ask Geoff, just back from Basra, and CDS to lead. DEGLASSIFIED not de let unt september/Uctober, its influence may come too late. The attached short paper has been circulated to Ministers, which encapsulates the pluses and minuses of sending the ARRC. You should invite Geoff and CDS to update their recommendation from last time. Then you could call on Jack, Hilary and Paul. The first question concerns the effect of the ARRC. You should probe CDS, who seems to be saying both that it would be significant and that the reasons for doing this are political not military. Then, if the ARRC HQ is despatched, whether a brigade should be put on standby to follow in case of need or sent anyway to bolster the good effect the ARRC could be expected to have. The preferred option is the former - standby. The ARRC HQ and the brigade would be a very large addition both to our responsibilities and to our exposure. It would come close to doubling our forces on the ground in Iraq at a time when we are focussing on Iraqisation and full sovereignty for the IIG. You may want to probe the following areas: DEALASAIFIEN • The prospect of our gaining a measure of control over the US military campaign strategy; The conditions we would want to attach to deploying the ARR HQ, in particular the reporting chain inside the MNF; The need for Iraqi agreement. The final point to cover if you decide in favour of expansion is the timetable to an announcement. We would need to confer with the Iraqis, the US, the Poles and other potential HQ partners; and inform the NATO Secretary-General of our withdrawal of the ARRC framework for other purposes. This could be done quickly, enabling an announcement next week. Or we could delay and wrap up our announcement in the Iraqi/NATO announcements around the time of Istanbul. This would provide some cover, but the messages would need care - our reinforcement is not directly related to Iraqisation needs as such (training etc), but more to creating the right strategic environment for the transition in the South. But care will be needed to avoid denigrating the US/Polish etc effort. Nife Slivas NIGEL SHEINWALD DEGLASSIEIED readiness. • the deployment of ARRC and the concurrent deployment of a brigade. The paper seeks to assist Ministers in making the key judgement on military expansion: which course of action, is likely to bolster the chances of success in Iraq set against the risks and costs to the UK and its armed forces. Beyond success in Iraq for its own sake, there is also the wider importance of the Coalition, and more particularly the US, leaving Iraq in due time with its reputation intact and a continued willingness to engage internationally in case of need. The paper also seeks to reflect the changes that have taken place in Iraq since the US first asked us to consider expansion and the Defence Secretary's advice of 25 May. In recent weeks, the formation of the IIG, and the adoption of UNSCR 1546 have been real steps forward in the political process. With the transition of power to a fully sovereign Iraqi government approaching, the focus of the international community, and the IIG, is on the Iraqisation of security tasks, albeit with a realisation that Coalition support will be needed for the foreseeable future. In the South, the security picture has also changed: the Spanish, and Latin American, contingents have been replaced by US troops; the US have, at least for the moment, successfully reorganised their command and control arrangements and adopted more effective tactics on the ground; and the crisis we faced in Fallujah and Najaf has stabilised for the moment. But significant problems remain. The arrangements in Fallujah and Najaf are NFIDENTIAIN 1 JEULASS DEU The US appeal for our help came in the midst of the Al Sadr and Fallujah crises. The Administration, particularly the military, reportedly remain committed to the request and are optimistic we will respond positively. However, they have been careful to give us time to consider the request and have not sought to pressurise us. This suggest an Administration which sees a positive UK response as desirable, but not critical. No expansion Advantages: • Reduces risk of domestic/international perception that a sovereign Iraqi government and moves to "Iraqiisation" are tokenistic; • Avoids UK military liability for a wider area, and command responsibility for US and other untried multinational forces; • Enables us to concentrate our development effort in MND(SE), the area we know best, while the US would continue to give MND(CS) priority for its Supplemental resources; • Current MOD plans not affected, and serious over-stretch of the Army avoided (deployments, training, degree of operational redundancy for unforeseen events, and longer-term impact on retention). Disadvantages: • failure to respond to a US request for assistance at a time when the US military is over-stretched; 2 BEGLAGGIFIED Deployment of the sane will a bagade dera on met teachess Advantages: • We would gain credit with the US; • Our commitment may buy us a stronger voice in strategic discussions in Baghdad - both because we have increased our military commitment and because the ARRC will lead MNF action in the South (this effect will be enhanced if the ARRC reports direct to Commander MNF(I)). This could be important for overall success in Iraq, in that we know that UK interventions have, in some instances in the past, reined back the US and thus achieved a more nuanced approach; • The presence of the ARRC, even in a national capacity, may encourage further troop contributions, particularly NATO partners, and may ensure existing contributors do not pull out; • The ARRC is an extremely capable HQ, which would bring coherence to the approach to security across the South. This would mean that the majority Shia areas, with the exception of parts of Baghdad, would come under a single command. This would make it easier to engage with the Shia political/religious leadership both politically and in terms of delivering security across the South as a whole; • Having the brigade in hand to reinforce where necessary would give welcome flexibility if the situation on the ground changed. However, set against these potential gains is CDS' assessment that there is no overwhelming military operational requirement for such UK reinforcement. 3 against the wider national developments that will continue to be outside our control; • The ARRC will continue to be dependent in MND(CS) on delivery by US troops in Najaf and Qadisiyah and the Poles/ other Eastern Europeans in the rest of the sector. This will limit the difference we can make on the ground and the degree to which the local population perceive that things have changed; • A revised US command and control system has just been bedded down. An ARRC deployment would mean some upheaval in these arrangements; • The Armed Forces are already overstretched. In the short-term, the cost will be to our ability to deploy to other areas (e.g. Afghanistan). In the medium- term, we will lose some capacity to response to emerging crises (e.g. ESDP battlegroup missions or UN requirements). In the long-term, reduced tour intervals and a reduction in training will inevitability reduce the preparedness of the Army as well as its ability to retain and recruit. This latter point is also likely to be picked up by the press at the point of any announcement; • An announcement to extend deployment close to the announcement of the 2004 Spending Review outcome for the MOD, and plans for restructuring measures for the Armed Forces is likely to attract domestic criticism; • There will be resentment among some NATO members, notably the French, that we are withdrawing the ARRC from NATO use. Deployment of the ARRC to Iraq will also preclude a deployment to Afghanistan. We have, thus far, supported the principle that NATO should focus on Afghanistan and, while 4 BEOLASSIFIED Deploying a brigade concurenty with the sire Advantages (largely in addition to those for ARRC deployment alone): • Providing a Brigade as well as the ARRC would be a very robust response to the US request for assistance. This should gain us additional credit with the US; • The ARRC would be commanding British forces in the majority of its area of operations. We would expect this to act as a multiplier on the effectiveness of the ARRC; • The local population, and IIG, may welcome the replacement of US forces by British forces - our reputation in MND(SE) is good. This may help us deliver security, consent and successful elections to the Shia areas, but it will still not change the wider national political context. Disadvantages (largely in addition to those for ARRC deployment alone): • Deploying the brigade would exacerbate disadvantages seen in the deployment of the ARRC alone: on impact of the Armed Forces; on the political message in relation to the transition to Iragi control; and on the risk of reduced US commitment to providing development assistance in MND(CS). • We would effectively double our troop numbers in Iraq (approximate figures are that we currently have 9000 troops, the ARRC only option would add up to 2700, and the ARRC plus brigade would add up to 6,800). This will be presentationally difficult domestically and in Iraq, especially given our public emphasis on Iraqiisation; 5 DECLABSIFIED BEGLASSIFIED