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thus prolonging the maintenance of Iraqi consent.
Detail
The UK role
regional military headquarters will make the UK's role in the area pre-eminent.
The UK will have the greatest number of military personnel in the region and, as one of the two initial occupying powers, will be seen by other nations to have a leading responsibility for the Lower South Region. If there are difficulties in the Lower South region it will be the UK (and, immediately, the UK military) that will have to face them first.
Rehabilitation/Reconstruction progress in UK Area of Operations (AO)
2. It is in the UK's self interest (quite aside from, although coincident with, the interests of the Iraqis) that rehabilitation in this region proceeds smoothly and rapidly. Without rapid and visible rehabilitation and reconstruction it is possible that there will be an erosion of the consent to the presence of coalition forces...
This is a particular current concern of HQ 1 Div because reconstruction is off to a slow start. The UN and NGO community (and no doubt civilian contractors) still cite the precarious law and order situation to be a major impediment to rehabilitation activities.
ORHA Capacity
3. ORHA's central organisation is proving slow to mobilise (though this may change with the appointment of Bremer). We have concerns that their approach of conducting rehabilitation activities and reconstruction through large enabling contracts let to Bechtel and others may prove insufficiently flexible or responsive to meet needs. (But until the IFis/World Bank etc engage there are no other realistic options). Much of the funding on which the implementation of ORHA's plans depend has to make its way through a US Government bureaucratic process that even senior members of the administration admit is frustratingly slow. (This difficulty that has been evident in the past, e.g. in Afghanistan).
4. There will be a time - sooner than for most post-conflict nations - when Iraq is fully able to fund its own reconstruction and rehabilitation through the sale of oil.
However, there will also be a requirement for engagement by the IFls, World DECLASSIFIED
Mme Unever
Where is now a need to apply greater flexibility to funds' expenditure in order to address needs more effectively in the region. However spending UK funds without a coherent plan to multiply their effect by attracting greater engagement by the UN, civilian contractors and the IFis will render any improvements unsustainable in the long run. There is thus a requirement for the UK to engage in two ways:
• For immediate effect: allocate funding to projects which will contribute to an improved security environment.
• To support success in the medium term: enhance the operating capacity of ORHA Lower South; and Assistance to ORHA Lower South
6. It is important that the ORHA South organisation, working particularly with the UK military, is able to identify priorities across the region and has the management capacity to design projects, manage contractors, attract and lobby for US (and other) funds and ensure implementation of recommended projects.
7. ORHA Lower South currently has no operating budget of its own and relies on the military for its accommodation, communications, office and logistics/security requirements. To be effective it is vital that ORHA South is provided with the living and working conditions and tools conducive to carrying out its tasks.
ORHA Support Recommendations
8. Thus ORHA Lower South lacks both capacity to identify and address immediate needs and the flexibility of funding to enable it to move forward. These are gaps that must now rapidly be filled if the ORHA Lower South office is not to suffer from similar problems of inertia and ineffectiveness affecting ORHA central. It is thus recommended that the UK support Olesun's office as follows:
a. Help draw up a clear operational plan for rehabilitation in the region that is consistent with the wider ORHA plan. This plan can only be devised in theatre by ORHA Lower South in close consultation with 1 (or later 3) UK Division. It will need to set out MND(SE)"'s role, identify the role of the the UK
• Multi-National Division South East - the military formation that will be led in the Lower South region by DECLASSIFIED
contribution will be equivalent to a small scale military operation and will require a UK support and management structure equivalent to a military Operations Team. The PJHQ would be able to offer advice to the FCO on how such a team should be structured.
e.
Engagement with other coalition partners who will be joining the UK in the Lower South region to persuade them to deploy resources in addition to the military (i.e. funds, implementing personnel, subject matter specialists) to support rehabilitation.
UK Funds' expenditure
Quick Impact Projects
9.
In addition to supporting ORHA as outlined it is recommended that UK funds allocated from the reserve to the military for supporting IDPs (£20M) also be released to effect changes that are immediately visible to the Iragi people.
These funds should be used to support traditional hearts and minds quick impact activities (which by increasing ORHA's effectiveness will allow the military to devote more time to their identification and implementation) and to support other civil administration and rehabilitation projects. These funds should be managed through 3 UK Div.
10.
Until now the majority of 1 UK Div's non-warfighting effort has been directed at the provision of humanitarian assistance (and thus their expenditure has been from the £2.5m per week allocated for humanitarian assistance). It is only now that they are starting to engage in Quick Impact Projects of any scale for "hearts & minds". These are, and will continue to be, funded from a £10M call on the reserve specifically allocated to GOC 1 Div for spending on QIPs for "hearts & minds" reasons. These will have some positive visible effect at a local level and will reinforce other actions already underway (such as measures to encourage local governance).
However there is only so much that UK military forces can do; they are limited in both physical and technical capacity.
Wider Civil Administration and Rehabilitation Tasks
11.
There is more that could be done which will both address the concerns of the UN agencies, NGOs and commercial contractors and encourage Iraqis to begin to take charge of their lives. UK military capacity is stretched and ORHA capacity is similarly limited. Iraqis are highly competent, resourceful and well able to undertake a number of project activities themselves but there is a need for professional oversight at least in the early stages. It is thus recommended that UK funding is DECLASSIFIED
13.
All of these are, compared to the QIPs currently in the 1 Div programme, big ticket items which will have to be thoroughly reviewed and prioritised by ORHA Lower South and UK 1 Div, not least to ensure they are congruent with any plans being developed in ORHA. This underlines the need for an effective project management capability in the ORHA Lower South office. To be effective the process of review and prioritisation will have to be completed, contracts let and projects started over the next month to six weeks.
Ministers are invited to approve the concept and recommendations for ORHA support and project implementation as outlined above. We will report on details of mechanisms established, project costings and ORHA support in due course.
MOD/DID May 2003
DECLASSIFIED