08-F-0847 Doc 18

Page 1 of I (b)(6) From: (b)(6) Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2004 10:26 PM To: Jones, Richard H. (AMB) Cc: (b)(6) Subject: 5/13 Importance: High Amb Jones, I have finished the draft concept paper for missing persons/hostage coordination and have started to staff it with applicable members of CPA. It is intentionally broad in its application with the intent of garnering support at that level prior to getting into detailed planning. Without waiting too long, I intend to incorporate the Coalition Partners' comments before giving it to you. At his request, the Canadian Representative asked to meet with me this evening. Earlier in the day he had sent me a paper he had sent to his government regarding a possible negotiation to gain the release of their remaining hostage. He has had personal meetings at the convention center with a person who has an affiliation with the Muslim Cleric Association. His contact claims he is in communication with the -people who "know people" who can possibly gain the release of the Canadian hostage,(b)(6) The catch of course is that he would be released in exchange for a terrorist who is currently in our custody, (#54 in the deck of cards), and someone who was worth a $1 million reward. He solicited my advice on how to proceed after he had already spoken to his government, including one of their professional negotiators. I advised caution, and to proceed slowly, since we did not have the luxury of trained negotiators. He agreed, indicating that his contact was not directly involved, and was "several degrees of separation" from the hostage takers. Again, I cautioned him not to presume they were speaking the truth, and thus he did not really know the true identity of his contact. He understood. reminded him that there were only two desired outcomes from this endeavor; either as released due to the negotiations and the possible behind-the-scenes work of local power s rokers, or we gained information through the negotiations and he was recovered by other means. No one would be released from jail. He concurred. I am reaching out to our own USG (FBI) negotiators this evening to get their take. I will also check with MOI to see if there are any non-USG negotiators (UK/Aussies) in Baghdad who may also have some technical insight on negotiations. I will keep you informed as further details are known. 111111111111111 5/14/2004 (b)(6) From: Sent To: Subject (b)(6) Wednesday, March 17, 2004 3:38 AM 11- .111 FW: Mosul Murders At approximately 1720 hours on 03/15/2004, a white toyota landcruiser was attacked by small arms fire in Mosul. Inside the vehicle were five US civilians employed by the Millenium Relief and Development' a Non-Government Organization providing services to the Jaber Rubber Factory. According to media reports the Individuals were Baptist missionaries. Three of the individuals were killed outright, and a fourth died enroute to a US military hospital. The fifth victim Survived and is in a local Iraqi hospital pending transfer to a US militar medical facility. The deceased are identified as: (h)(61 and (h)(6) in guarded condition. (b)(6) survived the attack and is Following the attack,an off duty Iraqi police officer, )0(6) allegedly came upon the damaged vehicle and summoned assistance. The victims were subsequently evacuated to the Al Razi hospital in Mosul. The vehicle was transported to a local Iraqi police station. Investigation has determined the victims had met with military personnel assigned to Task Force Olympia earlier in the day and characterized themselves as being an advance party coordinating their actions with coalition forces. None of the meetings were pre-scheduled and the group was traveling in an unescorted, single, unarmored vehicle. FBI Special Agents in Mosul accompanied the bodies to the BIAP and have taken into their possession as evidence some personal effects seized by the Iraqi Police. Other planned investigative actions include the following: 1. Attend the autopsies of the victims and obtain evidence recovered from their bodies. 2. Process the victim vehicle for evidence at a US military base on 3/17/2004. 3. Attempt to locate and interview Iraqi police officer0)(6) and any other identified witnesses. 4. Coordinate with Legat Germany o interview the surviving victim, [h)(6) as soon as (Ill( condition permits. 5. Arrange for transport of evidence to the US for analysis by the FBI laboratory. 6. Contact local CPA employees to determine what if any knowledge they have of the victim's activities prior to their murders. UNCLAS SECSTATE 91364 Las en: ACTION: EXEC INFO: IPC COS DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1 CHARGE: PROG APR 2 4 2504 VZCZCBG0819 00 RUEHGB DE RUEHC #1364 1150012 ZNR UUUUU ZZH 0 240011Z APR 04 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHGB/CPA BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0787 INFO RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 9228 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5973 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5142 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9461 BT UNCLAS STATE 091364 SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER, PREL, CASC, ASEC, IZ SUBJECT: POINT OF CONTACT FOR IRAQ HOSTAGE ISSUES ,_./ --k. () - 1 --- M \ (b)(6) REF: (A)DOHA 582, (B)CPA BAGHDAD 320, (C)CPA BAGHDAD 298, (D)DOHA 600 1. +:01W.). THE DEPARTMENT HAS DESIGNATED S/CT AS ITS 1 PRINCIPAL POINT OF CONTACT FOR IRAQ HOSTAGE ISSUES. ADDRESSEES CAN CONTACT IN S/CT'S OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE Al (b)(6) OR (b)(6) 2. E1.13IN ADDITION, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CPA AS MUCH ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE ON HOSTAGE ISSUES, S/CT WILL SOON SEND 11,v) - ONE OF ITS MOST EXPERIENCED COUNMRTERHORISM AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT OFFICERS, TO BAGHDAD. 3. •(1.94M6PINIMIZE CONSIDERED. POWELL BT #1364 NNNN UNCLAS SECSTATE 91364 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD Administrator's Weekly Report Security April 3 to 9, 2004 HIGHLIGHTS -- Armed uprisings throughout western and southern Iraq have prompted the initiation of two offensive operations, OPERATION VIGILANT RESOLVE and OPERATION RESOLUTE SWORD. -- Appointments were announced for Minister of Defense, Director of Iraqi National Intelligence Service, Minister of Interior and National Security Advisor. I. Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment Assist in the Establishment of Basic Law Enforcement; Complete the Neutralization of Destabilizing Threats and Influences; Assist in the Establishment of Iraqi Armed Forces — Field and Equip ICDC and IAF; Maintain Territorial Integrity of Iraq; Eliminate Munitions Caches, Unexploded Ordinance, and Excess Military Equipment; Maintain Freedom of Movement along Commercial and Military Lines of Communication • Recent military operations have focused on controlling armed sedition west and south of Baghdad. Coalition forces began preparations for offensive operations following the March 31st killings of four Coaltion Provisional Authority (CPA) contractors in Fallujah, and five coalition soldiers near Habbaniya. In addition, on April 4, peaceful demonstrations to protest the closing of the Al-Hawza newspaper and the arrest of Muqtada al-Sadr's lieutenant turned violent in Najaf and Baghdad. This was following al-Sadr's call to arms, directing his militia to attack the democratic foundation of the country, including government buildings, Iraqi security forces, and police stations. • OPERATION VIGILANT RESOLVE: In Al Anbar governorate, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) initiated OPERATION VIGILANT RESOLVE to confront hostile elements near Fallujah. Offensive operations included targeting foreign fighter and terrorist positions in and around the city. A ceasefire, however, allowed citizens to leave, and humanitarian supplies to enter the city. DRAFT FRE-RELEA3E • OPERATION RESOLUTE SWORD: In the center and southern regions of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have commenced OPERATION RESOLUTE SWORD to destroy the militia forces of Muqtada al-Sadr. The militia has coordinated ambushes and attacks on local security forces, coalition forces and CPA positions in the Center South, including in Najaf, Karbala, Al Kut and Hillah, indicating some level of basic military experience. • The following chart depicts significant insurgent activities reported throughout Iraq. Significant activities (SIGACTS) include reported attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and improvised rockets. This does not include small arms fire, hand grenade attacks, and other hostile activities. This chart includes those actions affecting coalition operations reported and documented through CJTF-7 command. The dark line indicates daily totals, while the red line indicates the seven-day centered moving average, which "smoothes" the trend. SIGACTS have increased in the past week as a result of the actions of former regime elements and Al-Sadr's militia. Significant Acts cure of Saddam Total SIGACTS 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 re \ 41' 9) Ae , 19 1> 4 ) e 0 Date Sources: CPA Office of Policy Planning and Analysis; Regional Security Coordination Center • Iraqi Armed Forces are being actively recruited and trained to provide Iraq with defense capabilities from external threats. The Iraqi Armed Forces are serving Iraq as part of the Coalition. Coalition partners are training the new service members, and several Iraqi officers and officer candidates are enrolled in training programs abroad. 2 rRE RELEA • The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) is actively participating in joint operations with CJTF- 7. In the past week, the ICDC has responded to uprisings in western and southern Iraq. ICDC performance in combat situations has been mixed. The ICDC will continue to gain personnel, training, and equipment to the target of 45 battalions (40,000 personnel) by early June. • Four battalions of the Iraqi Army are operating as part of multinational brigades throughout the country. On April 1, nearly 140 senior members of the Iraqi Army graduated from brigade and battalion command and staff courses. • The chart below represents the status of Iraqi Armed Forces personnel as a percentage of each branch's authorized strength. Current authorized strength for each branch is listed on the left side of the chart. These numbers will change depending on assessment of domestic and regional security issues. Iraqi Armed Forces Personnel (As Percentage of Authorized Strength) Army (35,000 Authorized) Civil Defense (40,000 Authorized) Coastal Defense (409 Authorized) Air Force (500 Authorized) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% M Assigned Duty II Assigned Training OTo be Recruited Source: Office of Security Coordination • The Iran-Iraq border has been restricted to three ports of entry, manned by the Iraqis, in order to conserve manpower and funnel visitors through controlled areas. Iran has been cooperative in closing ports of entry other than the designated three. r epa ed by '10 1,14413... 3 LL1LUL VII vIcuLa6G111,111. DRAFT FR) RELEA E II. Public Safety: Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order Develop and Apply Consistent Vetting Policies and Processes; Establish Governance Framework for Internal Security; Create an Effective and Accountable Police System; Create a Facilities Protection Service; Form the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps; Reconstruct Civil Defense Organization and Establish Mine Action Programs; Develop Effective Border Security; Develop Emergency Management Command and Control System for Iraq that can Coordinate Police, Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Medical Assistance in the Event of a Natural or Manmade Disaster • On Friday, April 9, CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer, III, appointed a new Ministry of Interior. Samir Shakir Matunood Sumaiday, formerly a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, will be responsible for overseeing Iraq's domestic security forces. • The Iraqi Police Service (IPS), Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), and Facilities Protection Service (FPS) are the lead civilian agencies for maintaining order within Iraq. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior is responsible for training all law enforcement personnel, and for operations of the IPS and DBE. The FPS, created under the management of the Ministry of Interior, will transition to be managed by each Ministry. Currently, this transition is about 85% complete. The chart below shows the status of Iraqi civilian law enforcement personnel as a percentage of authorized strength. Civil Sector Law Enforcement Personnel Status as Percentage of Authorized Strength 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% II Assigned Duty Attending Training El To be Recruited IPS: Iraqi Police Service DBE: Department of Border Enforcement FPS: Facilities Protection Service * IPS Personnel exceeds current authorized strength; percentages based on total police force Source: Office of Security Coordination coup 4 U..:l DRAFT rRE RELE 10E • The IPS is currently authorized 75,000 members, based on a ratio of 1 operative per 300 citizens. Updated recent population estimates may increase the authorized police force. Not all operatives on duty have received sufficient police training, or are fully equipped to be mission capable. For example, Baghdad is the only area that currently has a city-wide radio system. Performance of IPS in confrontational situations has been mixed, due in part to lack of training and equipment. • The CPA advisors to the Ministry of Interior established a tips hotline to assist the IPS in the summer of 2003. Tips from sources throughout the nation have been submitted through telephone and email communications that have led to investigation of crimes, insurgency, weapons caches, and other illegal activities. Nearly 30% of the tips received are considered useful, and passed to the IPS for investigation. The chart below depicts the number of total tips received by month. Use of the tips hotline has generally increased, except during periods of technical difficulties. 7" fP'r . ' • 1:1;_ , Aiw-r" -4 ".. ,37- , 0-77 • . 600 Tips Received v.„ _. 0 soo o. P ,- 400 0 1... CD .a300 E 3 . . _I .. - , -4 - 60 T , c No phone tips in October due to Z 200 ' 'X technical FA — problems — _ 100 - , ,,,1 t EA r • 1 .: 4 ,'' a. 74 s . , AUG 03 SEP 03 001 03 DEC 03 JAN 04 FEB 04 MAR 04 M Email Tips 1 M Phone Tips Note November 2003 data not available due to office reorganization Source: Ministry of Interior Tips Hotline Intelligence Cell — 14 4913*-- 11— DRAFT rrtu TIELEAEll III. Build Justice Establish Independent Judiciary; Reform Judicial System; Improve the Penal System; Establish Commission on Public Integrity; Solidijt Real Property Rights • The Judicial Review Committee has preliminarily vetted all 860 judges and prosecutors from the former Ba'ath regime, and made several reappointments or new appointments. This process reviewed personnel records and other intelligence for indications of corruption, or high-level links to the former regime. Recommendations for removal and appointment are based on this vetting. The chart at right depicts the results to date of the vetting process. Judicial Review Committee Vetting 869 Officials 90 BO 700 600 500 400 300 200 10 • Of the 176 judges and prosecutors removed through the vetting process, 167 have appealed. Those appeals are now being considered. Former Regime Officials include only incumbent judges and prosecutors; excludes former regime special court personnel Source, Ministry of Justice Advisors Sines April OS 1:10fficials Re-appointed who had been Improperly Removed by Saddam C New Officials Appointed • Officials Removed tg Vetted Officials from Former Regime • The Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) was created as a model court for Iraq, to try cases of national importance and to showcase new rights accorded criminal defendants. The CCCI investigates and tries cases referred to it by the CPA. Since its creation in July 2003, the CCCI has completed 63 investigations of 134 cases referred to it. Before transitioning to sovereignty, the CCCI is expected to handle up to 10 investigations and 5 trials per week. Officials of the CCCI have been targets of assassination attempts. This week, an attack at an investigating judge's house killed one of his guards and a bystander, and wounded others. • New criminal defendants' rights include the right to defense counsel at all stages of criminal proceedings. Courts in Salah ad Din and Kirkuk report that more than 80% of defendants are represented by counsel at investigative hearings. • CPA advisors have worked with the Ministry of Justice to improve the former regime's Prisons Department. Improvements have focused on rebuilding facilities (which were looted to the last nail in the aftermath of the war), extensive staff training, inmate tracking systems, transportation of prisoners to and from court, and prison conditions. • Current correction facilities have sufficient beds for the inmate population. However, many facilities are not yet compliant with United Nations standards. Supplemental funds and the Iraq Correctional Service (ICS) budget have funds allocated to renovate existing prisons throughout Iraq and construct several new facilities. The new facilities will add more than 10,000 beds to the system that meet international standards and create many new jobs. +13e1.1= , rlcpalCd liy diu I1i1,5114d IvIataust DRAFT PRE RELEACE 6 • Military police units have redeployed from all Iraqi prison sites except the former Abu Ghraib Prison Complex in Baghdad. They have been replaced by recently trained Iraqi Correctional Officers (ICOs) and civilian trainers. • To date, approximately 3,100 ICOs have graduated from the Corrections Training Academy, with approximately 300 officers graduating every two weeks. This represents more than 60% of the goal for ICS staff. Concerns about the quality and experience of the new officers have prompted curriculum reform at the academy, which will be expanded in May to include more comprehensive training. IV. Develop Iraqi Defense Capabilities and Oversight Mechanisms Develop National Security System; Develop National Defense Institution; Build Iraqi Defense Capacity; Develop Ministry of Defense Headquarters Infrastructure; Enable Ministry of Defense Standup; Consult with Iraqis for Ministry of Defense Standup; Support State Department Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Activities; Plan for Post-CPA Transition • On April 4, CPA created the Ministry of Defense, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), and the Ministerial Committee for National Security. These institutions are designed in accordance with the Transitional Administrative Law, which establishes civilian control over the military. • Authority over the military will flow from the Prime Minister, to the Minister of Defense, both of whom will be civilians, to the military chain of command. Ali Allawi, who was formerly the interim Minister of Trade, was appointed as the interim Minister of Defense. He is a financier with degrees in engineering, planning, and management. • The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) published the charter of the INIS in order to fully disclose its authority to the Iraqi people. The INIS does not have authority to arrest anyone, and is forbidden from reporting on domestic political issues or involving itself in the political process. Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed al-Shehwani is the interim Director General of INIS. He is a former Major General of the Iraqi Army who was forced into exile by Saddam Hussein's regime. • On Friday, April 9, CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer, III, appointed a new Iraqi National Security Advisor. Dr. Mowaffak Al Rubaie, formerly a member of the IGC, will be responsible for providing balanced, impartial advice and coordinating among the ministries and agencies charged with national security-related responsibilities. • Refurbishment of Ministry of Defense facilities continues. Offices in the Ministry of Defense Annex were occupied in late March. Cleanup from previous bomb damage is continuing at the main building. 41€1, 144"' .4a.e..11,, U..:t DRAFT PRE RELEACE V. Enable Iraq to Become a Responsible Member of the International Community Develop Iraqi Foreign and National Security Policy Options; Build Iraqi Foreign and National Security Policy Capacity; Reform Iraqi Diplomatic Representation; Resolve Refugee and Internally Displaced Person Issues • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is helping establish a new foreign policy for Iraq. The Ministry already has restored diplomatic representation in over 40 countries. Since the fall of the Ba'ath regime in April 2003, Iraqi delegations have been recognized at the Arab League and the United Nations. Iraq is on target to resume full consular operations in key posts by May 2004. Regionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working to restore relations with the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Hoshyar Zabari, the Interim Minister of Foreign Affairs, has submitted recommendations for new heads of mission to the IGC. cpa&u LJy tilL, lliiullllatliinl 1v1u11u5L,nhlt.4IL VIII TtE ELEAfir Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) From: Sent: To: (b)(6) Sunday, April 04, 2004 10:59 PM hl(h) Jones Richard f (1-11(1 11,111 Cc: 0:0(6) ); Bremer, Paul; Steele, James (SES-5)(11)(6) (b)(61 (h)(61 Subject Sadr City Update (Contr.); Neumann, Ronald E. (AMB); Kelly, Terrence (SES); .6ENCFNI;Iallild•T*01019 1 15StREE0 Re: the situation in Sadr City, we've heard the following from District Council members and IRDC Advisors this evening. Note: all of the following is reported at second or third hand, but from generally reliable sources: Paramilitary actions: Jaysh al-Mandi members were seen buying up all the weaponry available in Sadr City markets today, including Kalashnikovs, grenades and RPGs. They have also been recruiting new members all day; -- Two (possibly three) Sadr City police stations were taken over by Moqtada Sadr activists. There have been persistent allegations that elements in the Sadr City police have been cooperating with Moqtada Sadr activists, so these takeovers may or may not have been wholly hostile; Jaysh al-Mandi took over many of main road entrances into Sadr City, erecting barricades in some places. Some of the barricaded positions may have IEDs place forward of them, possibly meant to function like landmines. Sadr Bureau activists conducting a demonstration in the Karada business district pulled back to Sadr City in an organized fashion around mid-afternoon. -- Some late-model, expensive cars that are not local to Sadr City have reportedly been observed in rapid drive-by shootings, targeting local residents, Sadr Bureau personnel and sites associated with the Coalition; -- The Jaysh al-Mandi strategy is to disperse when they see Coalition forces coming for them. Political Goals: -- Two District Council members --(b)(6) and (h)(6) (please protect) -- visited Sadr Bureau HQs late this afternoon. They reportedly spoke to Baghdad Sadr Bureau head Mohammed al-Tabtabai and religious guide Sheikh Ibrahim. According to the Council members, the Sadr Bureau demanded the following: a) the release of Yacoubi; b) compensation for those killed or injured in the Coalition action against Yacoubi; c) a formal apology for Yacoubrs capture. Local Reaction: -- The residents of the District on a whole are frightened by the events. There has not been a mass outpouring of support for the Sadr Bureau, but all Jaysh al-Mandi and Bureau activists available are out on the streets. There have been incidents of looting, lawlessness, etc.; -- There have been significant casualties. In general, the hospitals are not able to cope with the number of wounded that are arriving; -- Most District Council members have left Sadr City temporarily, for their own saftey and are staying elsewhere with friends and family; Wajdi Hussein, the director of Baghdad FPS, has committed to increase FPS coverage for water, sewer, and other infrastructure sites in Sadr City, plus the District Council Hall; -- The consensus of District Council members is that the Coalition should, as soon as possible, turn to negotiations rather than armed response. 4/5/2004 Page 2 of 2 Baghdad Central Actions: I have instructed all IRDC and RTI personnel to pull out of Sadr City temporarily for their safety, and have recommended to District Council members that they discreetly leave the District temporarily, or keep a low profile if they must stay there. One RTI personnel is still unaccounted for and we have advised RTI that we have not been able to reach her. I have not authorized anyone to negotiate either directly or indirectly (through the local council) on behalf of the coalition with Sadr Bureau or Jaysh al-Mandi personnel. is working up a sitrep/cable with this and other information. (b)(6) Governorate Coordinator 5t'f'f3I'Flat/ Original Message From: (111(61 Sent: Sunday, April 04, 2004 5:53 PM To: Cc: (111(61 Subject: Situation at Sadr City (b)(6) 011(61 is informing that the security situation at Sadr city is deteriorating and is flared due to recent incidents in Najaf and nasiriya, Karbala and some areas in Basrah. The Sadr bureau has declared emergency status at the city. Its members are collecting guns, rifles and RPGs for possible confrontation. Two police stations (Qayarah and Daghil) were occupied by the bureau this afternoon (h)s suggesting a meeting between the CPA, military unit at the city and IRDC members with the Council members to discuss and evaluate the situation. Urgent reply is required. Thanks (b)(6) Original Message From: (h)(6) Sent: Sunday, April 04 2004 5:31 PM To: Cc:! (b)(6) \ Subject: Sadr City Update - 4 April - Sadr Bureau occupy Police Station in Sadr City Shortly after 5pm IRDC rep (h)(61 called in a report from the former DAC Chair (b)(61 Sadr Bureau has taken over a police station in northwest Sadr City (Sadr District #8). that A second call revealed that the police station in question is the Al-Ratadeen Station.(b)(6) also reports that Sadr Bureau has positioned armed members at intersections throughout the city and says they do not want Americans in Sadr City. (b)(6) also said that the Bureau is actively recruiting new supporters. No additional details are available at this time. (b)(6) Sadr City District Advisor CPA/Baghdad Central CelldLsliK1 Email.(3)(6) 4/5/2004 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD DECISION MEMO DATE 14 April 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: Ambassador Andrew Bearpark, Director of Operations and Infrastructure THROUGH: Chief Operating Officer INFO: Chief Policy Officer SUBJECT: Najaf 1. the Najaf Governate Coordinator, has requested on numerous occasions increased and enhanced CJTF-7 support to his compound to provide the capability to suppress mortar, rocket and small arms attacks. The CPA Najaf compound has received sporadic attacks, of varying intensity, for ten days. 2. Following the recently formalized request procedure, a request for a capability to suppress mortar, rocket and small arms attacks was transmitted from the office of the Chief Operating Officer to the Chief of Staff, CJTF-7 last night. Mit-, CJTF-7 Deputy C-3 (Fwd) replied this morning that CJTF-7 will not support the CPA request due to CPA Najaf being located within a combat exclusion zone established to reduce the risks of inflaming a highly charged environment. 3. Given the CJTF-7 response to our request, I recommend the immediate withdrawal of non- combatant personnel from CPA Najaf. Should there be a desire to keep CPA Najaf, temporary staffing composed of military Civil Affairs officers can be considered. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: COALIT EON PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO DATE 14 April 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: Ambassador Andrew Bearpark, Director of Operations and Infrastructure INFO: Chief Policy Officer ,/1 Chief Operating Officer CJTF-7 Chief of Staff FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION SUBJECT: Evacuation of Non-combatant Staff from CPA Najaf 1. As requested, I spoke with the CJTF-7 Chief of Staff after the 0800 15 April 2004. The Chief of Staff confirmed that CJTF-7 is unable, in the current circumstances, to provide the necessary protection for CPA Najaf. 2. Unless I am specifically ordered to the contrary in writing, it is my intention to order the evacuation of non-combatant staff at 1000 today, 15 April 2004. Cirrs COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD 4, 01( 4 11 1 April 11, 2004 FOR: Ambassador Richard Jones FROM: (b)(6) / SUBJECT: Access to Al-Rasheed Pool Sir: As per your instructions I have tasked my Physical Security Officer (PSO) to survey the Al Rasheed pool for options to minimize the obvious risks. The RSCO PSO has been performing physical security inspections on hundreds of facilities throughout the world for the Department of State. The below statements are based on his experience. He stated to me that this is the first time in his career that he was asked to do an assessment of a facility that is known to be dangerous and potentially deadly to utilize. As to what it would cost to get the facility up to standards that would afford protection for swimmers, we would next have to have a KBR engineer on site and get a professional estimate from him. It might very well be extremely cost prohibitive. The Assessment: 1. In order to open up the pool, the surrounding squatter population must be relocated. 2. A nine foot wall must be erected on the boundaries of the property that abuts the Red Zone. This wall must be anti-ram, anti-climb, topped with outriggers and concertina wire. 3. Design and install anti-mortar/anti rocket cover for the pool. 4. Provide mortar and rocket shelters in several places throughout the pool complex. UNCLASSIFIED 5. Provide a mobile guard force to patrol outside the pool area in the Red Zone which, as I said before the pool, abuts the Red Zone. FURTHER: The Al Rasheed stands only a few meters from the pool. Its face is marred by impacts from rockets on the pool side. It is a testament to just how difficult it would be to secure the pool. Even if we could build a fence (RPG Screen) around the pool that is as tall as the Al Raheed, that would only help deter rocket attacks. Mortars work differently. They go up and then come down. As a factual matter there is no manner in which to ensure that there won't be another attack on the Rasheed and no practical way to protect people once the attack is begun. It is the opinion of the PSO, and I strongly concur, that based on past experience (MSG Det commander in Beirut during the bombing) and the fact that the Al Rasheed has been hit several times causing death and injury.., and on my belief that it will be hit several more times in the future, that opening up the pool would be an unwise decision. To address other points of argument, the fact the Al Rasheed has only been hit at night or in the early morning, I would suggest that fire could be adjusted to suit any circumstance, as it can be direct fire from the red zone and not actually stand off. Hand grenades can also be thrown over the wall at any time of day, due to the close proximity of the wall to the Red Zone and the pool. The Rasheed is used for many events, including in the evenings. While this is true the unique structure of the hotel is ample protection against rockets and mortars on the lower floors. The pool area is extremely more dangerous, as there is absolutely no cover from direct or indirect fire. Open the pool sporadically; to do this would require scheduling. The schedule would have to be posted. Intelligence indicates that at a "normal" post, 20% of the FSN population report back to hostile intelligence. I believe that this figure is incredibly optimistic. But whatever the case, the schedule would be known to the enemy at the same time it is published. Captain (b)(6) oncurs and states that: Because the Al Rasheed is a known enemy target and is in hand grenade range from the Red Zone (with many over-watch positions), I highly recommend utilizing one of the different pools in the Green Zone. A basic force protection UNCLASSIFIED measure (or Infantry Tactic) is tuck soft targets into your defense, meaning not to put soft targets on your perimeter. If the decision is to use the Al Rasheed pool, then considerable construction must be done in order to minimize the death and serious bodily harm. I would include these two measures to the first 5 measures; destruction of the Red Zone's over- watch positions and hardening the perimeter wall and surrounding areas of the pool (IOT prevent a two VBIED attack). Again I emphasize that the Rasheed is on the "front line" of the Green Zone. The pool activities will be easily viewed by the enemy. He is getting smarter, are we? My views have not changed. This is a dangerous concept for any number of reasons, but primarily the proximity to the Red Zone and the number of anti- personnel rockets that have impacted the Rasheed and the vicinity, causing death and injury in the past. Rockets designed to kill troops caught out in the open. We cannot secure the ground against rockets or even thrown grenades. It would only be a matter of time before there is a catastrophic incident. I also have other concerns. Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights at the Rasheed have become extremely problematic. There have been fights, car accidents, abuse of Iraqi worker and Force Protection, all caused by alcohol abuse. I believe as do other Force Protection personnel that it is only a matter of time before there is a serious incident involving alcohol and loaded guns. It is my opinion that one of the reasons to open the Al Rasheed is the availability of alcoholic beverages and also the possibilities of acquiring a room for the night. This would only increase the already serious concerns I have with problem drinking. In any context, however, I can only strongly advise against the opening of the Rasheed pool. To further emphasize the risk, since I began drafting this response, the Rasheed has taken rocket fire another four times, hitting the parking lot and the overpasses. Two IED have been discovered there, a hand grenade wired to a cell phone in the parking lot and a magnetic IED that dropped of an SUV when it hit a speed bump, entering the Rasheed parking facility. As an alternative, to the pool at the Rasheed, and if we really need another pool, I ' would suggest that the Olympic size pool by the PX be renovated and made , available. UNCLASSIFIED COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD March 31, 2004 FOR: (b)(61 Acting RSO Force Protection FROM: Ambassador Richard H. Jones/ :), SUBJECT: Access to Al-Rasheed Pool It has come to my attention that the Al-Rasheed pool is fully serviced, staffed, and functioning but not accessible to CPA employees as are other recreational facilities on that premises. As the heat, work intensity, and stress levels will only rise between now and June 30. I would like your office to prepare a plan for use of the pool facility by badged CPA personnel beginning on April 15. Please forward me your guidelines on hours of operation and any other proposed security regulations or concerns by COB April 5. (b)(6) is the POC in my office on this issue. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD DECISION MEMO DATE 14 April 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: Ambassador Andrew Bearpark, Director of Operations and Infrastructure , THROUGH: Chief Operating 0 INFO: Chief Policy Officer SUBJECT: Najaf 1. (b)(6) the Najaf Governate Coordinator, has requested on numerous occasions increased and enhanced CJTF-7 support to his compound to provide the capability to suppress mortar, rocket and small arms attacks. The CPA Najaf compound has received sporadic attacks, of varying intensity, for ten days. 2. Following the recently formalized request procedure, a request for a capability to suppress mortar, rocket and small arms attacks was transmitted from the office of the Chief Operating Officer to the Chief of Staff, CJTF-7 last night. Col David Homer, CJTF-7 Deputy C-3 (Fwd) replied this morning that CJTF-7 will not support the CPA request due to CPA Najaf being located within a combat exclusion zone established to reduce the risks of inflaming a highly charged environment. 3. Given the CJTF-7 response to our request, I recommend the immediate withdrawal of non- combatant personnel from CPA Najaf Should there be a desire to keep CPA Najaf, temporary staffing composed of military Civil Affairs officers can be considered. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: 4 w-e_ c—'s,ZLCS— G P4 w-t-J-t9 7t0t.- „ Usher, Ed (0-7) From: Usher, Ed (0-7) Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2004 9:58 PM To: Weber, Joseph F. MajGen (0-8) Cc: 011(6) Subject: FW: NAJAF: Renewed request for assistance in addressing mortar threat at Najaf Sir, Respectfully request that the below request be submitted to the C-3 for review and action. V/R (b)(61 Original Message From: Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2004 9:51 PM To: Usher, Ed (0-7) (1-11(61 Subject: RE: NAJAF: Renewed request for assistance in addressing mortar threat at Najaf BGen Usher Mr (b)(6) has repeatedly requested CJTF-7 support to suppress the continual mortar, RPG and SAF threat to his camp at CPA Najar. Please request appropriate CJTF-7 consideration of all necessary actions to accomplish this goal. CPA should respectfully request this assessment also be for Diwaniwah which has faced a similar and continuous threat. V/R (b)(6) (b)(6) Original Message From: Usher, Ed (0-7) Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2004 9:13 PM To (111(A) Cc: Weber, Joseph F. MajGen (0-8) Subject: FW: NAJAF: Renewed request for assistance in addressing mortar threat at Najaf (b)(6) Please take for action. BGen Usher Oriciinl Maccano From: (b)(6) Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2004 8:37 PM To: Usher, Ed (0-7) Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); 011(6) (b)(6) 4/14/2004 Original Message From: Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2004 10:37 AM To: Cc: (b)(6) (h)(61 Subject: RE: Military support to CPA Najaf (111(61 Many thanks for the prompt and clear response. We will now process our response per our conversation this morning. (b)(6) (b)(6) Orininal Mpccnnp / From:(3)(6) Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2004 10:35 AM To: Cc (b)(6) 11-,111 Subject: Military support to CPA Najaf (b)(6) You requested military support for CPA Najaf. CJTF 7 cannot support the request. CPA Najaf is within a 'combat exclusion zone'. The zone was imposed to reduce the risks of inflaming a highly charged situation. Unless the political imperatives of maintaining a forward CPA office outweigh the security risks associated with military operations around the compound — and this can only be d at the very highest level — CJTF 7 will not support your request. Deputy C3 (Fwd) CJTF-7 NIPR (1-11(1CENTRIX:(h)(6) DSN: (Iwo CELL \ I‘ Usher, Ed (0-7) From: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2004 1:15 PM To: Usher, Ed (0-7); Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9) Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB) Subject: FW: Najaf Support Andy should include this option in his paper. Scott Redd Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.) Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (C00) Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Baghdad, Iraq Original Message From: Jones, Richard (AMB) Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2004 1:11 PM To: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) Subject: Najaf Support (111(6 I understand you have a memo from Bearpark on your desk for LPB recommending that we pull our people out of Najaf due to CJTF-7's desire not to provide the requested support in a "combat exclusion zone". I think we should consider another option, to wit, redoubling the request at LPB's level. The people in Najaf want to remain and are not located anywhere near the holy shrines. Their presence not only makes a statement but provides us with a critically valuable listening post. Dick 4/14/2004 c3L7/3 - \ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO \ March 15, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINTRATOR FROM: (b)(6) Senior Advisor for National Security & Defense SUBJECT: Organizing Against Terrorism in Iraq You are aware of our plans to organize an Iraqi National Security Cabinet Committee (NSCC) and to assign it the task of developing an end-to-end multi-tier (strategic-operational-tactical) response to the fundamentalist terror threat in concert with the Coalition. In addition, we are asking Washington and London to nominate world-class counter-terrorism talent to reinforce the Coalition. RAND is prepared temporarily to involve b and )(6) (b)(6) and we have requests into the NSC and HMG. We will want to use gr and others strategically": • Advising Coalition leadership • Advising the Iraqi NSCC • Advising other Iraqis, from Kurds to Shi'a Islamists, ss ho want to see the Coalition and Iraq get pro-active against this threat, and will hcip us do so • Helping the urban working groups that we have created • Helping CPALorganizations concerned \xith Cif, e.g.. Mol. QUA ONSA • Acging CJTF7 „ The need for flexibility and wide use argues against bottling them up in one or another of our line organizations. Instead. we could assign them to you. Dick Jones,(h)(6) I or me, with the understanding that they would be engaged (a) strategically across the entire organization, and (b) cooperatively with those who have line responsibilities. One model is to form a group that includes (h)(6) 'part-time) and she other CiT experts that participate. The group could be attached to my shop, because of our role in creating and guiding the NSCC, but would be available to "users" throughout the Coalition and Iraqi sidesIrrwould facilitate jaxiolvciment auhe operational levelrlsould facilitate involvement at the policy level, including CIF advice to the National Security Advisor and staff. If you prefer to assign the group somewhere else, I would only ask that it work closely with my shop. RECOMMENDATION: That, in anticipation of the arrival of countcr-terrorism policy experts, we form a group assigned my office but available for use throughout the Coalition and with the Iraqis. APProN'el Disappro‘ Approxe with Modification: CCi • C UNCLASSIFIED Rough Translation of Alaawi Proposal to the GC (415/04) Issue an official communique from the GC calling for calm, respect for the law and expressing pinions in a peaceful manner and which is written in a strict tone. A . 4 1'4"\J V 14 Mt.\° • Call on the poHtial forces and the Marja'aat and legitimate(?) centers to support the communiqué. ,Acc1, 0 Participation by the GC in the MNSC linked with Amb Bremer in planning and execution. Participation by the GC and the MNSC in putting together the plan to contain the situation. Steps with the media to support the above. Page0366 of 1061 Foregn Language DRAFT TEXT OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT The Coalition has decided that it will cease offensive operations in Fallujah for a period of 24 hours beginning at 1200, April 9. This is not a cease-fire; Coalition Forces will respond to any military activity directed against them. During this period, Coalition Forces will allow further humanitarian relief supplies to be supplied to the people of the city. The cessation of offensive operations will also allow members of the Iraqi Governing Council to discuss with the leaders of Fallujah conditions under which calm, order, and the rule of law can be restored to the city. ( Possible Optional Sentence: If this gesture on the Coalition's part results in calm and progress, it is possible that the cessation of operations could be extended.) Conditions for Fallujah Things Coalition Willing to Provide • Willing to announce a 24-hour cessation of offensive operations • This is not a cease-fire; CF will respond if they face military action. • Coalition will allow additional humanitarian relief supplies into Fallujah. • Allow IGC representatives to enter Fallujah to discuss conditions below. Things for Falluians to Provide to Coalition • Identify and hand over the killers of the contractors. o If not from Fallujah, tell us where they're from. • Identify and hand over those who desecrated the contractors' bodies. • Identify and hand over foreign fighters in Fallujah. o If no longer in Fallujah, provide identities, location. • Remove the al-Jazeera reporter and camera crew from Fallujah. • Fallujans stop military action against coalition forces. • Provide identities of Iraqi security forces personnel who fought against us. We propose to parole (release) these people into the custody of local leaders. Suspension of Fallujah Offensive Ends (washingtonpost.com) Page 1 of 2 Helio dswashpostcom Edit Profile j Sign out washingtonpost.com NEWS I OPINION SPORTS J ARTS & LIVING I ENTERTAINMENT SEARCH: a News C Web by Coqgie washingtonpost.com > World > Latest Wires Suspension of Fallujah Offensive Ends The Associated Press Friday, April 9, 2004; 6:25 AM FALLUJAH, Iraq - U.S. Marines briefly halted offensive operations in Fallujah on Friday, but the suspension ended after only 90 minutes, a Marine commander said, apparently after negotiations with a city delegation fell through. PRINT EDITION Subscribe tote bit Discussions Photos & Video III JOBS I CARS I Top,20_E-mailed Artie' V ViriERTISIIIS Lt. Col. Brennan Byrne, commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, said his forces were given the go-ahead to esu i___L_ ne_ Aff ations. Postwar II - News From • General May Bolster Militias Kidnap a Doz. . Marines Try to Quell ' RenIS.tance! • Rallying Around an Ir • More News U.S. Military D, Faces o Portraits service have die the begi war, — The War As It Ha • Washington Post cow March-April 2003, includli videos, photos and opinio The halt was called at noon to allow a delegation from the city to meet with U.S. commanders, let humanitarian aid into the city and give city residents a chance to tend to their dead. Free E-mail New: • News Headlines • News Alert Byrne did not know why the suspension was called off but believed the negotiations with the delegation never took place. Moments after Byrne's comments, Marines could be heard firing into the city from their positions on the southern outskirts. Smaller-scale shooting continued even during the brief halt, as Byrne said Marines were responding to insurgent fire. 0 2004 The Associated Press Subscribe to wast E-Mail This Article Print This Article MOST E-MAILED articles ()Sept. 11 Allegations Lost in Translation (WPNI) O For Memorial Crew, It's More Than Just a Job (Post) O CrAnking Up The VciU(Ile.a On Genrne Bush (Post) o In Iraq, Without Options (Post) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63486-2004Apr9.html 4/9/2004 'OP tta7 POINTS FOR ABDEL-AZIZ AL-HAKIM • We are still in a very critical phase, and we are determined that we will succeed. We have too much at stake to back down, and so does Iraq. • We have a strong impression that many of our Iraqi partners have been less than enthusiastic about supporting our moves against Muqtada. We understand that our partners in the IGC and Cabinet may have criticism of some of our actions, but they also have to stand up for the overall project of the new Iraq. • We a re ready to do all the hard military work, and are doing it with the institutional Iraqi security forces like the ICDC. We do not want militia involvement — indeed, Muqtada's actions point our clearly how armed sub- national groups threaten Iraq's democratic future. • However, on the political front, we are frankly extremely disappointed by the failure of some IGC members and cabinet members to support our actions. !They cannot have it both wa while continuing t e a part of the systen;QWe may do their military work for them, but we cannot do the political work alone. We expect all our partners to support our efforts. • With regard to Muqtada, we will continue to fight his militia vigorously. Those who brandish arms against us will be combated and killed; those who abandon his militia would be wise. A peaceful resolution is far preferable, but we will not negotiate away our demands either the dissolution of the militia or the demand that Muqtada face justice for the Iraqi murder charges against him. • As to Muqtada personally, he must submit himself to the Iraqi justice system. He will be treated with dignity and respect. He has to make a choice whether he wants this dignified scenario or to face the full fury of what he has unleashed. • It's also very important that we as partners in the new Iraq assure the citizens that they will not be at the mercy of militias as we move toward elections. In this regard, we fully expect you to live up to the undertakings you have made to Amb. Bremer and Mr.(b)(6) regarding the Badr Organization. They must find another role, and you must lead them clearly and firmly along this path. • I know that you are concerned that we find a peaceful resolution to the current crisis. We would like nothing more than that. We are willing to give some time for efforts to find such a resolution. However, we must not allow Muqtada to gain in strength. Nor will we allow ourselves go down a path that takes us further from a genuine, lasting peace. Justice must be served. What is the status of your community's efforts to resolve this problem? tDW h d r , qp 4-064d cr,o/c17;-. 2 tei fry.(4 044- 0-J.t) (AA,(A.As 04440. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO 8 April 2003 FOR: Ambassador Jones (b)(6) FROM: (b)(6) land SUBJECT: April 8 Meeting with Abdul Aziz Hakim Tonight you will see Hakim to discuss the recent Sadr uprising and new appointments to Iraq's national-security team. In particular, we recommend you make the following points: 1. Hakim 's Comments. Since the Sadr insurrection began, Hakim has made comments that are quite unhelpful. He has not yet been rebuked for these remarks. The two most egregious statements are the following (full text attached below): "We also emphasized that shooting at demonstrators is a horrible mistake and killing and wounding hundreds of defenseless people and terrorizing innocent citizens like what happened in the city of Al-Najaf on Sunday morning cannot be justified in any way whatsoever. For all these reasons, we condemn these actions and call for punishing those responsible for them." "We deem those fallen dead at the hands of occupation forces martyrs." 2. Shia Caucus Plans. Today we heard about plans for the Shia caucus to issue a statement, and perhaps to coordinate a large delegation's travel to Najaf. You may want to ask Hakim about the status of these plans. In particular, you may want to ask about whether the Shia Caucus intends to open direct negotiations with Sadr. You may then want to reiterate the Coalition's basic approach \ and d view on the crisis and its resolution. 3. National Security Appointments. You may want to discuss Nonni Badran's resignation with Hakim. You can also tell him that tomorrow morning, we intend to make two additional appointments to the national-security team: Mowaffaq al-Rubaiee as \ National Security Advisor and (if he accepts the job) Samir Sumaidy as Minister of Interior. You should tell Hakim that Sumaidy has not yet been formally offered the position, and that these appointments should remain confidential until tomorrow morning. Iraq: Al-Hakim Condemns Al-Najaf Events, Calls for Protecting Public Property GMP20040405000066 (Internet) The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq WWW-Text in Arabic 05 Apr 04 [Statement by Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq on 4 April-- SCIRI Headline: "Statement by Al-Sayyid al-Hakim on Al- Najaf Incidents" Statement by AI-Sayyid al-Hakim] [FBIS Translated Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. The Iraqi arena is witnessing successive developments that portend very serious consequences. The faithful believers prepare to commemorate the 40th day after the death anniversary of the master of martyrs, Imam al-Husayn, may God's prayers and peace be upon him. At the same time, efforts are being made to close ranks and take the appropriate security measures to prevent the recurrence of the Ashura tragedy, in which the killer and criminal terrorists martyred or wounded hundreds. The holy city of Al-Najaf continues to experience the aftermath of the bloody Friday. Hundreds were killed on that day in the city during the assassination of Grand Ayatollah Al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and in the many criminal operations that took place in this holy city. The security situation in this holy city and in other Iraqi cities is now experiencing a serious setback. We previously outlined the erroneous policy of closing down newspapers, particularly what happened to Al-Hawzah newspaper. We said that the peaceful expression of viewpoints through the press or demonstrations is a legitimate right. We said that this is a basic condition for the establishment of quiet and respect for order and the law and that the unwarranted arrest of the ulema is a grave mistake. We also emphasized that shooting at demonstrators is a horrible mistake and killing and wounding hundreds of defenseless people and terrorizing innocent citizens like what happened in the city of Al- Najaf on Sunday morning cannot be justified in any way whatsoever. For all these reasons, we condemn these actions and call for punishing those responsible for them. We call on all the parties to safeguard security, stability, public order, and the law and to protect the various government departments and institutions for they are public property and belong to the people. We also call for the preservation of the headquarters and seats of the various political parties and the private property of people. May God have mercy on our pure martyrs who fell in these painful incidents and we ask God for the speedy recovery of the wounded. From Him we come and unto Him we return. [Signed] Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [Dated] 13 Safar, 1425 Hegira, corresponding to 4 April 2004 [Description of Source: (Internet) The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq WWW-Text in Arabic -- Homepage of a Shiite opposition group led by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim; URL: http://www.sciri.org] THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS. Source-Date: 04/05/2004 "We deem those fallen dead at the hands of occupation forces martyrs," said Abdel-Aziz Al- Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Hakim said he had earlier warned against "closing papers and muzzling" people in the country. 6660404 of 1061 °rug', Language Conditions for Fallujah Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) From: Schlicher, Ronald (SES-5) Sent: Friday, April 09, 2004 11:36 AM To: Neumann, Ronald E. (AMB);(b)(6) (b)(6) Subject Conditions for Fallujah Jones, Ric ar b)(6) Conditions for Fallujah Things Coalition Willing to Provide • Willing to announce a 24-hour cessation of offensive operations • This is not a cease-fire; CF will respond if they face military action. • Coalition will allow additional humanitarian relief supplies into Fallujah. • Allow IGC representatives to enter Fallujah to discuss conditions below. Things for Fallujans to Provide to Coalition • Identify and hand over the killers of the contractors. o If not from Fallujah, tell us where they're from. • Identify and hand over those who desecrated the contractors' bodies. • Identify and hand over foreign fighters in Fallujah. o If no longer in Fallujah, provide identities, location. • Remove the al-Jazeera reporter and camera crew from Fallujah. • Fallujans stop military action against coalition forces. • Provide identities of Iraqi security forces personnel who fought against us. We propose to parole (release) these people into the custody of local leaders. 4/9/2004 4 ,7t Begin Draft Remarks: Overview: Thanks to the joint efforts of CPA and the MND, the five Shi'ite provinces of the South Central AOR remains the most stable in the country. In al-Anbar, the successful policies of Gen. Swannack and the 82nd Airborne have led to an impressive reduction in the insurgency, which is now largely limited to the city of Fallujah and the nearby town of Khaldiyya. The First Marine Expeditionary Force should be able to build on this situation to make further gains. Application of the "no better friend and no worse enemy" principle enunciated by Gen. Mattis and applied successfully in the South over last summer is definitely the way to go. Considerable progress has been made in developing local police forces, once again through joint efforts by CPA, the MND, and the 82nd Airborne. Much remains to be done in terms of providing training and equipment, but the solid achievements made to date have created sufficient stability and order to permit an economic revival to begin. While South Central, especially the five Shrite provinces, is still a very poor region, everywhere signs of economic growth are evident. Although precise statistics are lacking, anyone who drives across the region frequently can see the signs of growth everywhere: traffic jams where there used to be no traffic, many recently imported cars, satellite dishes, computers, and other appliances for sale in the markets, brick kilns belching out black smoke, new houses and shops under construction. Protect Soendino: Thanks to Ambassador Bremer, we have received enough funding to undertake over 600 economic and social investment projects since June 29 of last year, when I took over as Regional Coordinator. Between that date and December 31, we invested $61 million in project spending. Since then, we have begun the process of investing $9 million in LGF and $37 million in R3P and DFI moneys. All of this money will have been obligated by early April, and all of our projects will be completed by June 30. Our total investments in the South Central Region over the course of a year of work will thus come to nearly $110 million by the end of June. We began by investing heavily in social infrastructure: rebuilding schools and hospitals, strengthening local police forces, and repairing water and sewage systems and irrigation canals. We then expanded our efforts to address the political dimension in South Central. Building Democracy: Six months ago, we began to establish a network of 19 democracy centers in the Region. Our plan was to establish a women's rights, human rights, and tribal democracy center in each one of our six provincial capitals, in addition to the Regional Democracy Center in Hilla. We have also worked to create local NGOs to staff these centers, and have built links between them and Western NG0s, in cooperation with USAID and the Democracy Team here in Baghdad. These efforts have been very successful. There is a tremendous thirst for democracy in South Central's population, particularly among the heavily oppressed, traditional segments of the population, such as the tribes. Our centers are helping the people to learn the ABC's of democracy and civil society, in preparation for the coming elections. In concert with RTI, NED, and IRI, we have already begun democratic education efforts focusing on basic democratic concepts and building political parties. We are using the "train-the-trainer" method to create hundreds of grass-roots democracy teachers drawn from all over the region. The process of PC refreshment has worked relatively well, producing councils that are far more reflective of the people's will than before. In performing this task, we built on the solid foundation laid by the 1 MEF and their CA teams during their occupation of the region last year. We also benefited enormously from RTI's efforts to organize local councils in the districts and city neighborhoods. The Iranian Threat: In many ways, one can say that the Region is headed in the right direction and experiencing real progress. Nevertheless, all of the gains we have achieved are threatened by the persistent interest in the Region shown by the Iranian special services and their Iraqi surrogates. The Iranians -- in particular, the IRCG and the MOIS -- are working closely with three q5-40.0 groups opposed to the democratic future we are seeking to help the Iraqis achieve: SCIRI, the Da'wa Party, and Muqtada al-Sadr's organization. All three organizations can be called Islamic Fascist parties, since they have an anti-democratic agenda and use private armies to buttress their position and intimidate their opponents. I know that SCIRI and Da'wa claim to be normal political parties, and that their leaders play important roles on the GC. Out in the provinces, however, they look less like parties and more like terrorist organizations or Mafias. They receive both funding and guidance from Iran. They engage in the intimidation of political rivals, using threats of bodily injury and death. They attack shopkeepers for selling "un-Islamic" goods such as CDs and harass women judged to be "immodestly" dressed. These three organizations seriously distort the political process in South Central. SCIRI, for example, has engaged in widespread, mafia-style intimidation, most notably in Najaf of late. They try to usurp the functions of the stare by setting up illegal armed checkpoints. They seize control of public property, such as state-owned gas stations and hospitals, and public buildings, such as government offices and mosques. The Problem of Sadr: Muqtada al-Sadr represents a special case, since, unlike SCIRI and Da'wa, he has refused even to participate in the democratization process. His tactics remind me strikingly of the early Bolsheviks, since they are almost entirely based on intimidation and terror. It is a mistake to estimate his strength in terms of his popularity. He does not seek popularity; instead, he tries to build influence by instilling fear in the population. Since last summer, his Mandi Army militia has grown from 500 to perhaps 6000 members. Sadr's forces have arrested policemen in Kufa and Najaf. He has invaded the Mosque of Ali in Najaf. He operates an illegal shari'a courts there. His men regularly kidnap, beat, and torture his opponents and anyone they judge to be insufficiently "Islamic" in behavior or thought. His forces are active in all five of our Shi'ite provinces. Recently, they appear to be expanding their presence significantly in Babel and Karbala'. Arrest Sadr Now: It is common knowledge in my AOR that Muqtada al-Sadr personally directed the assassination of Abdu Majid al-Khoie last April 9. The crime was committed in public, in the Shrine of Ali itself, and was witnessed by many bystanders. A criminal investigation last summer produced signed warrants for the arrest of Sadr and his 12 henchmen. Our failure to arrest him so far has convinced the population in my Sh'ite provinces that we are not serious when we speak of equal justice for all and the rule of law. It has also pushed Ayatollah Sistani into an unholy alliance with SCIRI that has been very damaging to our position. Without question, we need to implement the warrants and arrest Muqtada al-Sadr and his henchmen as soon as possible, if only to restore our eroding credibility among the Shi'a and build support for the rule of law. Doing so will probably improve our relations with Ayatollah Sistani as well, since he will no longer fear murder at Sadr's hands. Disband the Militias: There has never been a successful democratic state in which political parties possessed private armies. Iraq cannot present an exception to this rule. The Badr Corps, Mandi Army, and Da'wa Party militia collectively represent a ticking time bomb under the still fragile foundation we are laying for Iraq's democratic future. Before June 30, we need to take energetic, vigorous, and decisive steps to disarm and disband the three Shi'ite militias in South Central. Otherwise, it is quite likely that the situation in our AOR will deteriorate rapidly thereafter. Already the people of Najaf and Karbala' are anticipating a power grab by SCIRI. As the three militias jockey for power in Najaf and Karbala', the likelihood of strife will grow rapidly. Before the year is out, Najaf and Karbala' could come to resemble Beirut during the Lebanese civil war. Should the militias begin to fight, the resulting conflict might draw in the tribes, which are heavily armed and possess far more fighters than the militias do. The worst case scenario could involve a very complicated, multifaceted civil war. We should act while there is still time to prevent such a downward turn of events. Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) From: Gayness, William Jr. (SES-4) Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2004 2:00 PM To: Ross, Christopher WS. (AMB); (b)(6) Cc: (b)(61 tX;4] Subject: Programme summary of Iraqi SCIRI's Voice of Mujahidin news 0700 gmt 3 Mar 04 Waiting for the signal to pounce on their enemy.... 0813 gmt: Political commentary: Tens of Thousands of people take part in Ashura celebrations. Slogans call for national and Islamic unity during the festivities. Five explosions rock the holy city, killing 182 people. Dozens are killed in AI-Kazimiyah in Baghdad. These incidents show that the challenges facing Islam and Muslims do not exclude any Muslims. 10./hArA arp thp I IS_nr British forces which entered the country to sgread libertyand democracy? The Iraqi Shi'i nis will not remain silent towards these actions...The Shi'is are wai ing for a i naffrom their reli ious authority to_pounce upsn eir enemy._ e uslims will not allow anyone to frighten them and they are determine to continue the path of Imam Husayn. (8 min) Source: Voice of the Mujahidin, in Arabic 0700 gmt 3 Mar 04 3/3/2004 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO March 3, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: Office of the General Counsel SUBJECT: Occupying Power's Security Responsibilities The security responsibilities of an occupying power are principally governed by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations 1907, which provides in relevant part that "the occupant. . . shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety[l" Although Iraq is not a party to the Hague Regulations, this provision generally reflects customary international law applicable to occupation. The caveats "in his power" and "as far as possible" have been interpreted as limiting the required steps to those that are practicable and consistent with the security and operating environment. The occupying power is therefore responsible for taking measures to ensure the safety of the inhabitants of the occupied territory. This would include Iraqis, foreign nationals, and NGO representatives. These measures would include: • Military operations to stop and deter acts of violence, as well as counter-insurgency operations; • The disarmament and disbanding of those Iraqi forces deemed to pose a threat to the security of Coalition Forces and to Iraq; • Internment and lawful detention of persons as deemed necessary for imperative reasons of security; • The reconstitution of a civil law enforcement capability; • Supporting the efforts of reconstituted law enforcement personnel in their efforts to maintain public order, such as conducting criminal investigations and prosecuting cases involving attacks both on inhabitants of Iraq and on Coalition Forces; • The reestablishment of a functioning legal system, based insofar as practicable on Iraqi law. March 10, 2004 TO: Ambassador Richard Jones FROM: (b)(6) avrtuir SUBJECT: Security concerns Dick, It has now been over 24 hours since our CPA colleagues in Hilla were murdered. Here in the north, we have received no report on this (other than an initial, sketchy "head's up" from Regional Ops), so we are relying on wire services, rumors and e-mail for details. None of that is sufficient for us to do an examination of our own procedures, at a time when we are groaning under the burden of multiple visitors, increased regional staff, and expanding demands from Baghdad, all of which require us to launch multiple trips each day. I know, too, that and his team had a narrow escape last week, but we have received no detai e rea -out from Baghdad about what happened and what lessons might be learned from that incident. I am deeply concerned by some of the exchanges that I have seen today that we, collectively (including Washington), are going to start engaging in a game of blaming either the victim or the victim's immediate supervisor in the field. But as a field supervisor, I urge CPA-Baghdad and Washington to use these murders to re-examine our profile and our mission here. If we faced the dangers that have been routine here in any other diplomatic posting, the staff would have been evacuated and the Embassy shuttered long ago. Given the critical nature of our strategic objectives in Iraq, that solution is obviously not an option for us. But we can and must scrutinize each one of our activities in light of the very real security threats that we face every day, and we must work harder to minimize risks by providing the staffs that we do deploy with the resources they need to do their jobs in as safe a manner as possible. CPA-Baghdad is failing in both keeping our mission focused on the essential and on providing the resources the field needs. Let me provide some examples from CPA-North, first regarding resource. Our teams in Diyala, Dohulc and Mosul still have no PSD. For Diyala, the team is in Baghdad, supposedly ready to go, but neither (b)(6) (GC in Ba'qubah) nor I (in my regional role) have been able, despite repeated inquiries, to get a straight answer from the security contractor or Regional Ops about the delay. In an another example, I have two armored cars in Arbil at my disposal — one provided for me under the Triple Cano y contract and an FAV Suburban provided by State (with another promised). (b)(6) has two additional FAVs, devoted to her movements. That is a relatively robust armored car fleet compared to other CPA Governorate Teams. Yet we have a GC and Arbi-based Regional staff of over 20 Americans, all of whom have reasons — or orders from Baghdad -- to travel. While Arbil itself is relatively safe compared to elsewhere in Iraq, our office supports the region, meaning our people must go on predictable routes to dangerous locations. Most must travel in unarmored vehicles. There are many more examples of where we have been asked to work in the most dangerous environment of any State Department posting in the world, yet without bare minimum of resources to deal with the threat. Making this more difficult is the diffuse nature and overwhelming number of the taskers we receive on a daily basis from Baghdad, almost all of which require us to leave the relative safety of our compounds to carry out. This includes visitors that do not seem to meet the threshold of essential functions. One potential visitor wishes to come discuss links with the Kurdish Boy Scouts. StratCom people expect us to identify exchange visitors and MEPI participants, types of activities which are important, yes, but which could also be put off until after the transition by simply reserving spots for Iraqis now, to fill in the names later. We now have new taskers about filling positions on the Commission of Integrity and distributing leaflets about its work, yet we cannot tell whether this is simply a good idea or an essential one worth risking our lives for. CPA-Baghdad is an enormous operation, with thousands of people working on a huge variety of issues. Each issue in isolation is probably important, and certainly the staff working on those issues can explain in great detail and with conviction why this tasker is critical or that visit essential to Iraq's success. But our teams (even our now expanded regional team) are small. We do not have the resources to jump to each of these taskers or support all of these visitors. Nor should we -- each time that we do so, we are putting our lives on the line. I expect CPA-Baghdad and my employees at the State Department to be much more discriminatory about a visit or tasker, determining whether it is absolutely essential to our mission or whether it is merely something that would be nice to have accomplished, if resources and security circumstances allowed. Now, everything proposed is reported to us as having "high level" support in Baghdad or Washington; we have not succeeded in turning off a single visit since I have been here, only to an occasional change in dates. If I am going to risk my life or — worse —risk the lives of my staff by sending them into the field, I want to know that the proposed activity or visit is vital to our Iraq enterprise. In general, I consider our interactions with Iraqis on the specifics of the TAL and the details of the transition to be that sort of activity, public outreach worthy of our scarce security resources. The potential rewards in this case make it worth us taking the risks (while we still need sufficient resources to attempt to minimize them). On the other hand, I do not consider general, academic discussions on democracy to be of the same vital importance, particularly not in Iraqi Kurdistan where the locals have had an imperfect but nevertheless workable representative government now for more than a dozen years. Given our need to minimize risks, I would also like to ask CPA-Baghdad, and perhaps Washington, to cease with the "one-size-fits-all" approach to the 18 governorates. The town hall meeting is a case in point. The town hall initiative is indeed a worthy one in places where the idea that locals can interact with officials publicly, candidly and without fear of retribution is novel. But civil society in Arbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniya is far different, as civic fora and public debates on political and economic issues are commonplace. Yet we are being forced to devote scarce resources to what will, up here, be an artificial exercise, just so that someone can say that "all 18 governorates have had town hall meetings." We are exposing ourselves and our Iraqi panelists and guests to real dangers for limited benefit. If the purpose of the town hall was to get the message out about the TAL, the Parliament up here has already had a lively session, moderated by someone who was involved in the drafting. Moreover, as we know, the Kurds are, if anything, too enthusiastic about the TAL. We don't need the town hall meeting to build support for the TAL or to get the KRG residents accustomed to discussing their future. I would even go so far as to question why we have so many people in the field. The TAL has now recognized the KRG. Why, then, do we have a small team of three people risking their lives in Dohuk? In these last critical months before the transition, when we are facing dangers such as those that killed our Hilla colleagues, we need to minimize our exposure to only the most essential tasks and visits. We can minimize this risk by withdrawing people from our most vulnerable or less strategically important places, by minimizing the number of taskers that require travel, and by minimizing the number of visitors. All of us working in the field want to interact with Iraqis and want desperately to play an effective role in helping see that our objectives in Iraq are met. But we want to know that we are risking our lives for the essential factors that would go into that success, not for taskers and visits generated by an enormous, hard-working, and well-intentioned staff in Baghdad that either do not understand or choose to ignore the constraints on resources and risks we face in the region. I would like to make one more point. Regional Ops sent out a message, later modified to reduce the offensive suggestions, admonishing Governorate Coordinators and Regional Coordinators to keep in mind that they are ultimately responsible for the safety of their staffs. That is a reasonable enough burden to put on the shoulders of a career ambassador: The career ambassador has long experience to draw upon, as well as an RSO to advise him. Regulations and Emergency Action Plans will have been established, or a template in place to do so. Security resources would have been provided, and he (or she) will have the option to evacuate staff or refuse country clearance to visitors. But it is not a reasonable burden to place on GCs, who are in many cases 03 and even 04 officers and with no DS support. (This is not a criticism of (b)(6) al for whom I have nothing but admiration, butMloes not have teams or authority in the field.) In the immediate term, I would like to ask CPA-Baghdad to consider the following steps: • There must be high-level pressure put ont)(6) -I hop to get the PSD teams to all Governorate and Regional Teams immediately. Whatever needs to be done must be done to provide protection to our teams. Now. (ftY14 , 040,4 191 it)4 -Pr/ .414 6r5' s , CC, I@ 1j3 CAA5 Igrr" t - 2. Vu1 ofi? 241407q capAtit-) 9Wy • We need a hotline (probably by e-mail, since phone service is spotty) when the needs on the ground and the PSD contracts do not mesh. We had a problem here this week, for example, that Regional Ops did not address as quickly as we needed (although it was resolved), and we have not received answers to our multiple queries regarding the problem with the Diyala PSD team. As we gear up for the final stretch, we should not have to worry in the field about renegotiations of essential protective services. • CPA-Baghdad must provide more complete information and on a more timely basis to the field on incidents so that we may assess our own procedures. We have heard, for example, that there was a link to the Iraq police (or people impersonating Iraqi police) in the Huila incident, but do not know if there are ways to identify authentic Iraqi police checkpoints. We need a system for knowing when these attacks occur and an assessment within 24 hours, including recommendations on how to reduce our risks. • Proposed visits and taskers to the field either need a higher-level scrutiny before they are conveyed, or there needs to be someone higher level to whom we can refer questions about the importance of the proposed activity. • Ideally, we need a message from the Administrator as to what are our highest priorities — a limited number of them -- for the next few months. To us, it seems intuitively clear, but, with our provincial perspectives, we could be wrong. Moreover, as the Baghdad bureaucracy has grown, there is no clear sense of the priorities that we can discern out of the jumble of taskers and proposed visits. Presumably, activities that can await the establishment of the Embassy — e.g., IV programs and Boy Scouts -- should not require the devotion of time and resources now. • Messages conveying taskers and proposed visits to the region need to explain who generated the idea and how it fits into CPA's strategic goals for the period up to transition. • Regional Ops needs to devise a real country-clearance type procedure for people traveling to the field, to give GCs and RCs the opportunity to clear a visit before it is announced — and before people simply show up, as they often do here in Arbil. I accept risk as an unfortunate part of diplomacy today. You know from my previous tours that I do not choose easy and safe places in which to serve. But the risks here are far, far greater than anywhere else, which makes it that much more important that CPA-Baghdad and Washington start exercising more discipline immediately on what are our essential functions in this critical period. In essence, we need better definition of when to risk our lives, and we need better protection when we do so. CC: NEA — (b)(6) (b)(6) From: Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2004 5:53 PM To: Cc: (b)(6) Subject: Force Protection Survey Sir, -"" of it. V/R (b)(6) Military Assistant to CPA Director of Civil Affairs Room M117 Cell: (b)(6) Des DSN (b)(61 "lnveniam Viam Au! Faciam" 3/11/2004 Page 1 of I would do so himself, but does not Senior Advisors' Force Protection Questionnaire Results Force protection is a key aspect to the safe and successful accomplishment of the CPA mission. This questionnaire was designed to validate those issues which have greatest impact the ministry senior advisor teams. 1. Ministers are frequently hindered entering the Green Zone. Eleven senior advisors report that their ministers have been unduly delayed (nine report it has happened three or more times). 2. Translators delay impacts senior advisor mission every week. Eleven report a negative impact one to six times per week. (an interesting note: six of those reporting this were different than the eleven in number one above) 3. Of senior advisors reporting delayed translators, they say their translators spend, on average, 90 minutes from first approaching the entry point to clearing entry. 4. Eight senior advisors reported their translators receive verbal abuse while entering through security. 5. Ministry advisor teams, on average, report 14 trips outside the green zone each week. (total of approximately 50 per day - but see December survey or 2 BCT for more accurate data) 6. Ministry advisor teams report travel with military supplied escort, on average, about twice each week. (see December survey or 2 BCT for more accurate data) 7. Nine senior advisors report they are unable to complete their mission on average at least once weekly due to travel constraints due to non-availability of military escort. 8. Obtaining military escort — 14 senior advisors report having been turned down, eight do not report trying, one was five for five. On average they report successfully getting escort four out of five times. 9. 16 senior advisors reported weekly travel by their team outside the green zone with less than two vehicles with two shooters each (those 16 averaged about eleven such trips per week). 10.16 senior advisors reported travel outside the green zone with only one vehicle. (those 16 averaged about ten such trips per week). 11.Five senior advisors have a personal security detail available to them. Sources include the British government and Ministry funds Senior Advisor remarks: 1. The 48 hour advance notice request time frequently prohibits use of military escort. 2. Senior advisors need one point of contact for Force Protection issues. 3. There is inconsistent use of the procedure to allow senior advisors to bring their interpreters to the front of the line at security check points. 4. We do not provide the senior advisors the minimum armored car and bodyguard provided at other (often lower threat) diplomatic postings. 5. There seems to be a misunderstanding about who is authorized to carry a weapon in Iraq. Some think only military can. 6. Some senior advisor teams borrow ministry shooter teams for trips to, such places as the airport. 7. There is a general concern about the use of thin skinned vehicles with the growing IED threat. 8. The threat has changed (from angry mobs to IEDs) but our force protection tactics have not. 9. There is a concern by some senior advisors that using military vehicles as escorts highlights the thin skinned vehicle they are escorting. 10.There is confusion over gate (green zone) entry procedures. Proposed solutions: 1. Increase the number of convoy escorts available per day. 2. Establish special entry times/gates for translators to expedite their entry. 3. Provide more armored vehicles and personal security details for senior advisor team use. 4. Shut down senior advisor teams as able. 5. Police the conduct of gate guards, ensure consistent compliance with procedures, 6. Clarify: who the CPA POC for FP is and keep them visible, who is authorized to carry weapons, green zone entry procedures Jones, Richard (AMB) From: Sent: To: Subject: Ross, Christopher WS. (AMB) Thursday, March 11, 2004 4138 PM Jones, Richard (AMB) FW: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission is,"(4/A 1 dickjones.doc (41 KB) Dick, raises crucial points. Our civilian personnel in the provinces are the ultimate soft target. In the critical phase ahead, everything possible must be done to increase security resources for our regional staff, prioritize taskers and travel to keep unnecessary movements to a minimum, and improve the flow of information and lessons learned. Is there a "desk officer" for each province at CPA headquarters? Such a "desk officer" could be required to clear and thereby prioritize) all taskers to the province from CPA and Washington agencies, clear (and thereby prioritize) all requests for travel to the province, keep GCs informed of significant developments at CPA headquarters and in other provinces, and lobby for the GCs' essential support requirements within the CPA structure. Chris Oriainal Messaae From: Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2004 10:32 PM To: Jones, Richard (AMB) Cc: /1 1 1(1 Subject: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission Dick, The attached is long, but, in light of the murder of our Hilla colleagues, I feel obliged to put down on paper what I think we need to do to minimize what are unacceptable risks and to focus on the essential. Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee when you click here. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963 1 Jones, Richard (AMB) (t3 From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Bearpark, Andy Amb. (C IV) Thursday, March 11, 2004 7:35 AM Jones, Richard (AMB); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2); Schlicher, Ronald (SES-5); (b)(6) RE: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission There are seven recommendations in bullet point form. My comments are as follows. 1. It is pointless to put pressure on my shop with regard to the security contract. Successive dedicated staff have done everything they could to make it work quicker and better. The problems are financial and technical and lie in Washington. It is as simple as that. 2. I will investigate, but suspect that it is a sub-set of one. 3. Fully agreed. If CPA could find a way of getting such information to me/Regional Ops we would be able to disseminate it. If they do not give us the information we cannot help. 4. We have a system in place and have recently reminded all concerned of how it should work. The system is consistently ignored by much of CPA at ALL levels. 5. Excellent idea. 6. Indeed they should. And we consistently ask for that information. 7. We would be delighted to do so if allowed. The only general point I would make is that we are dealing with a fundamentally flawed system. Most of the problems that exist are a function of that and have defied resolution since the outset of CPA. Andy Original Message From: Jones, Richard (AMB) Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2004 11:00 PM To: Bearpark, Andy Amb. (CIV); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2); Schlicher, Ronald (SES-5): Subject: FW: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission Gentlemen: I would appreciate your reactions to the recommendations in the attached as soon as possible. Thanks. DJ Original Message From: Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2004 10:32 PM To: Jones, Richard (AMB) Cc:VuA(K\ Subject: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission Dick, The attached is long, but, in light of the murder of our Mille colleagues, I feel obliged to put down on paper what I think we need to do to minimize what are unacceptable risks and to focus on the essential. Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee when you click here. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid.3963 1 From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Carpenter, Scott (SES-2) Thursday, March 11, 2004 1:06 PM Jones, Richard (AMB); ch)() 'Jeffrey Feltman'; BearparK, Andy Amb. (C;IV); Schicher, Ronald (SES-5) Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) RE: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission Regarding point number 1, when we originally established the GCs and linked them to Baghdad, Governance's regional team was suppose to clear all CPA- related requests to the GCs so that we could both assess priorities and do follow up for the GCs so that they wouldn't have to trek into Baghdad. This worked for awhile (we didn't even provide GC email addresses to the rest of CPA so that they wouldn't have direct contact) but broke down when we had staff difficulties. That problem is now solved. Currently, we have three people working for Dean (and soon will have a fourth) that would allow us to return to this system if we made clear to the rest of CPA that this is how it would work. One issue we should also discuss is what the role of the Regional offices is vis-a-vis the GCs and how that affects security. CPA/N should function much more like CPA! SC in my view which is to say that decision-making about who enters the AOR and what trips can be supported should lie with the individual GCs. S. ****************************************************** (b)(6) Director of the Governance Group Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad, Iraq Tel: (b)(6) Cell: ***** k*********************** Original Message From: Jones, Richard (AMB) Sent: Thursda March 11 2004 9:14 AM To: Cc: Schlicher, Ronald (SES-5); (b)(6) Bearpark, Andy Amb. (CIV); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2); Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) 1 Subject: RE: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission Agreed. Your office should take action on issues 2, 3 and 4. We'll discuss no. 1 at this evening's meeting. Thanks. DJ Original Message From 1(61 (b Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 7:56 AM To: Jones, Richard (AMB); Bearpark, Andy Amb. (CIV); Carpenter, Scott (SES- 2); Schlicher. Ronald (SES-5); (b)(6) (FS-1) (b)(6) Cc Subject: RE: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission Some suggestions: 1. Require all taskers, proposed visitors to funnel through a single office - Office of Provincial Outreach? RCO? Other? - to make certain taskers/visitors are on mission, not frivolous. 2. Should be simple to establish (if it doesn't already exist) and email collective, similar to "executive secretary", for example, to easily send notices of all kinds, including reports of security incidents, to the GTs. 3. Establish a "provincial visit clearance" process that involves, DS and others as appropriate. 4. And, of course, do our damnedest to get more force protection, hard cars, PSDs, and other resources. (b)(6) Chief of Staff Director of Administration and Logistics Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad DSN:(b)(6) Commercial: (b)(6) Original Message From: Jones, Richard (AMB) Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2004 11:00 PM To: Bearpark, Andy Amb. (CIV); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2); Schlicher, Ronald (SES-5); (111(61 2 Cc: (b)(6) Subject: FW: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission Gentlemen: I would appreciate your reactions to the recommendations in the attached as soon as possible. Thanks. DJ Original Message From: (b)(6) Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2004 10:32 PM To: Jones, Richard (AMB) Cc(b)(6) Subject: Minimizing our Security Risks, Focusing our Mission Dick, The attached is long, but, in light of the murder of our Huila colleagues, I feel obliged to put down on paper what I think we need to do to minimize what are unacceptable risks and to focus on the essential. (b)(6) Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee when you click here. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963 3 (b)(6) Please pass the following message to Coll from me 1. He is not to deal with Haji Hassan. I have explicitly and in writing excluded him from political life 10 days ago. Coll is to rescind his "order" of last night and so inform Haji Hassan immediately. 2. We will not allow militia, regardless of provenance, to take control of cities. In this respect, Najef cannot be allowed to be under the control of SCIRI's Badr Corps any more than under Sades army. 3. Under no circumstances is Coll to negotiate through any channels with Sadr. His actions have placed him beyond the pale. He is a criminal and usurper and will be dealt with as such. 4. As the Ministry of Interior made clear in its statement Sunday, Yakobi was arrested in response to a long-standing arrest warrant issued by an Iraqi judge for his role in the murder of Ayatollah al Khoie. He is in custody of the Iraqi police and will stand trial for murder. Under no circumstances will the Coalition cut any kind of a deal to short cut Iraqi justice in this matter. Coll is not authorized to imply any other outcome to anyone. 5. He will have my full support for plans to reassert Coalition authority throughout his AO. If he needs reinforcements in order to regain control over the areas under his responsibility, he should make those needs known through appropriate military channels. Oniliina I Meccaap From: (b)(6) t Sent: y, tpui u, a. rx To: L. Paul Bremer Cc: (b)(61 (1-,111 James (SES-5); (h)(61 Ronald (SES-5); (h)(61 011(61 (1-,111 1: Steele, ; Schlicher, Neumann, Ronald E. (AMB); Kelly, Terrence (SES); Jones, Richard IAMB): (h)(61 Executive Secretary; (b)(6) Carpenter, Scott (SES-2); (b)(6) Subject: RE: Conversation with Gen. Coll Sir, Per your instructions, I spoke this morning at 7:40 AM with Gen. Coll, commander of the Spanish forces in Najaf. I asked him on your behalf to rescind his decision to appoint Hajji Hasan "provisional governor." He replied that he recognized your objection to his action in appointing Hasan "provisional governor" of Najaf. However, he asked me to request officially your permission to conduct negotiations via Hasan with Sadr and other elements in the city, with a view to restoring order. I promised to pass this request on to you. He said he is dealing with Hasan as head of SCIRI, not head of Badr. His primary goal in so doing is to get Hasan's assistance in "bringing back" the IPs. Gen. Coll urged that we immediately begin an I0 to explain to the Iraqi people why al-Ya'qubi was arrested. He also urged that he either be tried quickly or released quickly, so as to avoid a further build-up of emotions on the streets. He also provided the following crucial intelligence: Sadr has given the Coalition until 10:00 AM today to release al-Ya'qubi. -- Unless he is released by then, Sadr's forces will resume their assault. -- Armed fighters are visible beyond the perimeter at Camp Golf, but they are not firing at this point. They appear to be waiting for instructions and standing by. -- The IPs in Najaf have "disbanded," abandoning their equipment, weapons, and facilities to the Mandi Army. -- The city is "in the hands of the Mandi Army." -- The situation in Diwaniyya, by contrast, is relatively quiet. "The governor and IPs are with us there." Recommendation: I recommend that you repeat your prohibition on dealing through Hajji Hasan. We cannot restore order by handing the city over to one militia instead of another, which is what we will be doing if we deal with Hasan. That said, Gen. Coll clearly finds himself in an untenable position. His forces are sufficient to hold out for a while, but not to take down Sadr or retake the city. He needs reinforcements. He is trying to deal with Hasan because he finds himself besieged and in a weak position. The only way to retake Najaf is by attacking Sadr's HQ in Kufa and attempting to arrest him and his key lieutenants. We need to re-introduce significant US forces into Najaf and demonstrate our ability to restore order. Once we act decisively, at least some of the IPs will return to duty. The vast majority of Najaf s residents are not taking Sadr's side; they are waiting out the storm at home and hoping we will take action to restore order. I fully concur with Gen. Coil's recommendation that we immediately begin an JO operation to explain to the Iraqi people that al-Ya'qubi is an accused murderer arrested in connection with the murder of al-Khoie last April 10. We need to show the people that we are acting to enforce Iraqi law, not merely engaging in an arbitrary use of force. Most importantly, we need to demonstrate resolve and clarity of purpose. The Iraqi people will respect such a stance. We should state unequivocally that Sadr by his actions has placed himself beyond the political realm and shown himself to be the leader of a criminal organization. He must be arrested, not treated as a negotiating partner. Thanks, MG. Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Small Business $15K Web Design Giveaway - Enter today In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most merciful The Governing Council Baghdad -Iraq Monday April 5th, 2004 Press Statement No. 148 In light of the critical and sensitive situation our country is passing through, the Governing Council of Iraq calls upon all factions and all national and religious forces to adopt patience and wisdom in dealing with these abnormal conditions, by means of abiding by the law in resolving conflicts and problems through peaceful means and not by resorting to violence. As well as committing to peace and quiet and avoiding shedding the blood of innocent people and through respecting the peaceful activities of the citizens and their freedom in expressing their views by peaceful means whereby the freedom of all people as well as their rights are respected. It must be known to all, that there may not be one person or a group in the new Iraq who is above the law. At the same time that the Governing Council announces its condemnation of the use of violence, that may lead to the death of innocent people, in resolving conflicts, it calls upon all those concerned with the interests of the beloved people of Iraq, be they religious authorities, or hawzat, or political parties, tribes and professional associations, to necessarily call for resolving this current situation peacefully, as well as for the prevention of the spilling of blood of innocent citizens and for safeguarding by all, the religious sanctities of the holy shrines and mosques. The Governing Council also calls for the return of properties and equipment and to the surrendering of weapons, and the immediate withdrawal from sites belonging to the state and the public interest, that were seized through the use of force, and to return to security and the evacuation of the holy shrines immediately and in full cooperation with the authorities. Our benevolent people of Iraq, in all their patriotic forces and currents, are called upon to stand firm in the face of those conspiring against their political future and to prevent the enemies of Iraq and those lying in wait for our dear people of Iraq, who are in the process of building the new democratic experience for all components of the Iraqi people. The Governing Council firmly and strongly rejects all types of instigation against the stability of the country emanating from any side, and calls upon our people to actively participate in the project of building the new Iraq and provide the opportunities for stability and construction of a pluralistic, federal and democratic Iraq that respects the will of the people by sharing in the new national transformation. Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) From: (b)(6) Sent: Monda A ril 05, 2004 8:56 AM To: b)(6) L. Paul Bremer(b)(6) Cc: (b)(6) Kelly, Terrence (SES);(b)(6) Subject: Coll Letter to Administrator PLEASE FORWARD AS NEEDED: Text of letter from BG Coll to Administrator: EXCELLENCE The day after Mustafa Al Yakubi detention there was a large demonstration in front of Al Andalus detachment to ask for his release, threatening Coalition forces if he was not freed. Those attacks have taken place today (April th 4th) with the result of two coalition soldiers KIA, one ICDC KIA and fourteen soldiers WIA, there is also thirty two IZ,s KIA and two hundred WIA. From the very first moment the institutional system missed the governor, vicegovernor, the police chief (in Baghdad) and what is worse all police force was not taking any actions to resolve the problem and handed over police stations, equipment and weapons to Mandi Army activists. As a consequence the city has no institutional representation and there is a complete lack of power that needs to be filled in order to get the situation under control; that is the reason why I made up my mind to find a SCIRI representative to act as a mediator to fill the gap, temporarily, to employ all government assets to c! ontrol the situation and get back to normality. This decision was made with CIMIC and GST assessment that marked Mr. Hadji Hassan as the most moderate speaker to solve the situation. That is why I negotiated with Mr. Hassan, who requested to be appointed as provisional governor to have all the government assets available and more authority to calm things down. In spite of his records, Mr. Hassan, is having a good behaviour lately and I think that this way should be kept open to avoid a general confrontation that could bring a large number of civilian and coalition casualties as well as the complete Shii world de-stabilization, so I request to you to take this option into consideration, option that has been already approved by the Acting Spanish government. The aim of this action is to achieve a working Law and Order system gradually, avoiding the specific acts that could lead to not desired situations. That is why the management and solution of this subject requires quick solutions, such as the interrogation of Mr. Al Yaqubi and his hand over to Iraqi judges if found guilty or his release if not. signaturell Watch LIVE baseball games on your computer with MLB.TV included with MSN Premium! 4/5/2004 Message • Acb $c-- ‘14 Page! of 1 (b)(6) (b)(6) Seoviaj From: Sent: Monday April 05 2004 3:12 PM To: (b)(6) Cc: Schlicher, Ronald (SES-5); (b)(6) (b)(61 Subject: PC Slides Importance: High (b)(6) PC. (b)(6) Superintendent, CPO Immediate Office Baghdad, Iraq mobile: (b)(61 Attached is the Amb Bremer approved version. Please forward to the NSC for the Life is an echo. What you send out comes back! 4/5/2004 REGAINING THE INITIATIVE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ Overall Situation • Sadr's Jaysh al-Mandi staged attacks across south of country. • Takeovers of civil installations in Najaf, Karbala, Kufa, Diwaniyah, and Qadisiyah. Unrest, demonstrations in Baghdad, especially Sadr City. • Sadr's Jaysh al-Mandi in charge of TV, radio in various locales. Apparently in charge of city of Najaf. We have offered additional security to Sistani and Howza so far they have refused. Sadr control of Holy City has profound negative implications. Is Sistani effectively a hostage? Totality of provocations represents "coup attempt" in Shi'a heartland. . .Triggered by arrest of Sad`r lieutenant Yakubi. But clearly Why So Important • Represents fundamental challenge to Coalition, Iraqi Government authority in South Central Iraq. Also clear challenge to unity of international Coalition. • Sadr must be countered, situation reversed to show who rules Iraq now. • If Coalition does not respond forcefully, other militias and tribes will protect their interests by taking up arms against factional rivals or the Coalition. We want them to proceed with "transition and reintegration" instead. They are watching to see how we react. If not reversed, there is little chance of dismantling other militia, orderly transition on June 30, stable electoral process continued involvement of the UN. Lack of vigorous response will exacerbate chances of civil war. puicl hardLy be higher. Political and Diplomatic Responses • Lay down marker with Hakim, other militias on importance of staying out of situation. • Contact tribal leaders echoing same message. • Make sure Iraqi "power ministers" and IGC are shoulder to shoulder with us. • Offer security enhancements to key religious leaders, including Sistani and other leading Shi'ite clerics. • Seek political, clerical figures' public statements denouncing Muqtada's aggression and challenge to legitimate authority and rule of law. On international front, State Department contacts Coalition allies to outline gravity of threat, the strategic stakes. Expect support publicly rd on the ground. Approach to }ran. Information Operations • CPA establishing rumor monitoring mechanism to feed into StratCom and IMN. • 10 themes: — Sadr is attempting to block road to democracy and free and fair elections. — Arrest of Yaqubi for murder of al-Khoei is justified by the evidence. Matter in hands of Iraqi courts. — Yaqubi should be tried in Iraqi courts under Rule of Law, not with violence in the streets. — Sadr actions designed to sow strife (fitna), intimidate Iraqi people and officials, provoke violence, hijack (ghasab) the political process. Approach 1)Work with carefully selected Iraqis to deliver private demand to Sadr to abandon Najaf. 2) Take prompt action to defeat, disarm and dissolve Mandi's Army wherever we find them outside of Najaf. 3)Prevent Mandi reinforcement of Najaf. 4) Wait out Arba'een in Najaf to see if 1, 2, and 3 produce peaceful departure. se) Move on Najaf with Iraqi MOI and MOD forces and Coalition Forces as soon as pilgrims leave. Take down the Mandi Army. Enabling movement — force protection Security Steering Group 1 April Guiding principles • Measured assessment of threat • Risk management • Joint and multi-national concept • Prioritization • Flexibility Force protection process Risk Assessment Risk management 4v — CForce protection Security measures Enabling movement - force protection framework Design People Means Pre-emptive Expression of up-to-date knowledge Preventative Understanding of knowledge Management Equipment, infrastructure and training Leadership and motivation Testing and rehearsal Reactive Application of knowledge Leadership and determination TTPs Design - expression • Accumulation of knowledge: — Lessons from other theatres — Lessons from Iraq theatre — Fusion point or forum for experience I\ • Currency and availability of knowledge • Written word/schematics/overlays: — Policy — FRAGOs — Risk analysis — SOPs • Briefings Design - understanding • Reading • Instruction • Imitation • Nurture a culture Design - application • Generically • Prevailing conditions • Prevailing circumstances People — management of resources • Human: — 'Protected' • Pre-tour orientation, education and training • On arrival orientation, education and training • Continuation education and training • Validation — 'Protecting' — ditto above plus: • Licensing • Regulation • Standardization • Verification People Leadership, motivation and determination People Leadership, motivation and determination seizing the initiative Means — infrastructure, equipment and weapons • Infrastructure: — Command and control — Movement control Strategic Reconstruction Operations Centre (SROC) CPA/US Mission MNF „-- SROC Iraqi National Authorities \\\ MSC cmoc Regional Ops ? Iraqi Provincia Authoritie JCC i 7 )cf. Ocf , Le, Strategic Reconstruction Operations Centre (SROC) ovilcat „ CPA/US Mission ove 60, T MNF Iraqi National Authorities Regional Ops ? \\„, ----- ----- ----- Iraqi 21V10(' Provincia Authoritie JCC ‘2, c 61 ,1- ( grfl-J J `fitid ,1 ft0 LA"( MIA , 4 '1)9 plA4 , 1 h01-j(45 La a" 6 . . Means — infrastructure, equipment and weapons Infrastructure: — Command and control — Movement control Equipment: — Vehicles: • Profile • Mobility v protection — Personal equipment: • Protection • Communications • Profile • Emergency bags • Weapons: • Type • Profile Testing and rehearsal • Check of: — Design — People — Means • Briefings and 'war-gaming' • Rehearsal • Training TA T\Ps • Contact area • Governorate area • Movement control • CPA/CJTF 7 Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) From: Sent: To: (b)(6) (b)(6) Thursday, April 01, 2004 12:59 PM Cc: Subject: FIN: Possible Situation Gentlemen: FYI/action as appropriate Updates to follow Thanks (b)(6) Deputy, Regional Operations Directorate of Operations and Infrastructure (C) 11,11 1 DSN: (b)(6) COM Oriainal Messaae From: 'b)(6) Sent: I hursday, April 01, 2(J()4 10:42 AM To: (b)(6) Cc: Subject: Possible Situation All, Approximately 40 minutes ago, our bomb sniffing dog came up with a positive hit for a possible explosive on a sewage truck coming into our compound. They confirmed it and immediately began implementing their SOP's. In a nutshell, here is what happened: --Our CPA compound was immediately locked down; no one comes in or out. --The truck was moved away from the compound and is under guard; the crew of the truck have been detained and segregated. --The Italian LNO notified the Italian brigade and requested assistance; we are expecting an EOD team here shortly. --CRG notified their higher headquarters, as did Triple Canopy. --Security was beefed up; all personnel were made aware of the situation. One additional thing: one of the Triple Canopy personnel on the roof noticed 3 vehicles approximately 300 meters away that appeared to be observers. Upon seeing the truck get detained, they immediately left. I may have some of the facts wrong; point is that there is suspicious activity. (b)(6) if you can find a way to notify Ambassador Bearpark's party of the situation, it would be appreciated. This may turn out to be nothing, but I wanted to let everyone know of the situation. We are following our SOP's and, in my opinion, have been doing everything right. At this time, we do not need anything from higher until after the EOD team arrives on sight and gives us their assessment. A full report will follow, of course, and will have a wider disbursement. If anyone has immediate questions, my Iraq phone number is (b)(6) 4/1/2004 .. Page 2 of 2 - V/R, (b)(6) Deputy Governorate Coordinator, Dhi Qar Coalition Provisional Authority 4/1/2004 Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) From: 1. Paul Brerner Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2004 9:06 AM To: (b)(6) Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2), (b)(6) Subject RE: Breaking the Siege of Karbala' Dick Jones has passed your Information to CJTF Original Message From:I(b)(6) Sent: Monday, March 29, 2004 8:08 PM To: L. Paul Bremer Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2) Subject: Breaking the Siege of Karbala' Dear Mr. Ambassador, I. I wanted to advance some proposals for your consideration that could ameliorate the security situation in Karbala', which is currently desperate and likely to become even worse in the near future. Implementing them would be relatively simple and could allow us to exploit what I believe to be a strategic political opening created by GC ip(6) 2. Karbala' today is a city under siege, from within and without. Under the Marines it was the quietest of the five cities in the Shi'ite Heartland. Since their departure in September, it has been beset by a worsening series of terrorist incidents, most recently the bloody bomb attack on Shi'ite worshippers during 'Ashura. As a result, the situation in the city has become very tense and fragile. Within the city, the forces of Muqtada al-Sadr, local terrorist Sarkhi al-Hasani, and Sistani representative Abd al-Mandi al-Karbala'i are maneuvering against each other in expectation of another test of strength in the near future. From without, Karbala' is beset by a terrorist threat stemming from the neighboring provinces. The external and internal threats are directly linked and mutually reinforcing. The future looks grim for the holy city. 3. I have been attempting to learn how the terrorist militias in Karbala' are linked to the broader terrorist community in Iraq. While not yet complete, my researches indicate that a strong link, a sort of "terrorist transmission belt," runs from Falluja in al-Anbar Province through several terrorist centers in North Babel to Karbala'. I believe that we can dramatically improve the security situation in Karbala' by eliminating the resistance in Falluja, as the Marines are now doing, and cleaning out the large terrorist cells that have established themselves in North Babel. 4. My sources indicate that terrorists operating out of Falluja are in close contact with their colleagues in several main towns in North Babel: al-Mahmudiyya, al-Iskandariyya, Jurf al-Sakhr, and al-Musayyib. The terrorists in both Falluja and North Babel are of the Wahhabi sect. They appear to share common tribal ties as well. Many are members of the Albu Alwan and al-Janabi tribes. Those in Falluja apparently often infiltrate into North Babel, bringing with them both weaponry and expertise. Through their efforts, the terrorist presence in North Babel has grown much stronger of late, especially since the departure of the Marines from the Shi'ite Heartland last autumn. Hence the string of painful attacks which I listed in a recent message to you. Most importantly, my sources indicate that there is substantial and growing coordination and cooperation between the Sunni terrorists in North Babel and Falluja and the Iranian-backed m! ilitias in Karbala'. While differing on points of theology and belief, they concur on the need to fight the common enemy -- the Coalition. 3/30/2004 Page 2 of 2 5. The Marines' current efforts to break the resistance in Falluja are therefore of the greatest importance for North Babel and Kabala'. Their victory will weaken both the terrorists in North Babel and their allies among the militias in Karbala' itself Moreover, if the Marines, who now are formally responsible for North Babel, launch a similarly vigorous assault against the terrorists in the four cities of North Babel, they will dramatically reduce the threat to Karbala'. I therefore strongly recommend that they begin such a campaign as soon as possible. 6. Once the terrorists in North Babel have been humbled, we will need to move quickly to reinforce the IP presence there, preferably under the supervision of the 1-MEF. I would be happy to support them with targeted project spending, but since my program funds are already allocated, I would need a small additional allocation. $5 to $10 million would suffice, I believe. 7. These measures, salutary in and of themselves, acquire 2reater urgency when seen against the background of the remarkable political reforms GC . OD)(6) lhas been achieving in the holy city. Armed with a deep understanding of the city's politics, he has astutely managed the political process, so that Karbala' now has a highly competent, strongly pro-Coalition governor and a very able, democratically minded Provincial Council with the highest level of female partipation of any in Iraq. This new government, formed as a result of the process of "PC refreshment," is under pressure from the Iranian-backed militias. Were the militias in Karbala' to lose the base of support afforded them by their allies in North Babel and Falluja, I believe that the survival chances of the new Karbala' government would improve dramatically. 8. Finally, there is the matter of securing the city in the longer term. The limited rules of engagement under which the MND's troops operate cripple their ability to combat the threat Karnbala' faces. Simply put, they cannot engage in offensive action. Since the time of the Romans, offense has been the best defense. The Marines understand how to go on the offensive. They also understand civil affairs. Their administration of Karbala' was wise and just, and they gained the trust and affection of the people. In the last analysis, the Marines are the finest fighting force in the world. The security situation in Karbala' is desperate, and strong medicine is required. I therefore recommend that the MND forces in Karbala' be supplemented by 1000 Marines. 9. In sum, I recommend that the Marines supplement their good work in Falluja with an equally intense effort in North Babel, in order to break the terrorist siege of Karbala'. I also recommend that the MND forces in Karbala' be supplemented by a force of 1000 Marines. We are currently completing a study of North Babel. I will be delighted to share it with the Marines once it is complete and offer them any other assistance in my power. Sincerely, Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Finance Tax Center - File online. File on time. 3/30/2004 Request Page 1 of 1 Jones, Richard (AMB) From: L. Paul Bremer Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2004 6:39 AM To: Jones, Richard (AMB) Subject: FW: Request Let's discuss this am Original Message From: Livingood, Bill 011(61 Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2004 2:22 AM To: L. Paul Bremer Cc: (111(61 Subject: Request Dear Ambassador Bremer, After being being informed that there will no longer be CID/PSD support provided for CODELs, I have discussed this drastic change with Assistant Secretary Powell Moore who advised that CIDIPSD assets would not be available to support CODELs in the near term. He advised that DOD has passed responsibility for all of the CODEL protection to CENTCOM for the near term. My strong concern is that in Baghdad because of the number of vehicular movements, CENTCOM may not have armored vehicles, follow-up vehicles, and trained personnel to drive and react with appropriate protective procedures to provide for the maximum protection of Members. In addition, without CID there would not be a trained cadre of protective trained personnel to provide for close-in protection and to advance the sites. Until this matter is solved by DOD, I am requesting that for the Rogers CODEL, you provide adequate CID/PSD support to allow the House of Representatives and DOD to discuss this matter further without lessening support for the CODEL. After discussing the situation with the Rogers CODEL I was asked by the Members and the Speaker's office to appeal to you directly and request CID/PSD support for this one CODEL. We realize what a difficult time this is for all of you and appreciate all of your efforts. Thank you for considering this request. Sincerely, (b)(6) Sergeant at Arms U.S. House of Representatives b)(6) From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: b)(6) Tuesday, March 30, 2004 10:10 AM Jones, Richard (AMB) (Mt Al (h)(61 Draft LP13 Gable to SecDet tor Authorization and OK by above addressees Cable LPB-SecDef re PSDMar04.d... Please provide your comments/changes, towards a final authorized and cleared text to give LPB soonest. Please provide CG, CJTF-7 with copy for his review. Suggestions welcome. Many thanks, Counselor for Legislative Affairs cell 011(61 desk/land: (b)(6) 1 UNCLASSIFIED PROG: 03/30/04 DRAFTED: CPA)(13)(6) AUTHORIZED: CLEARED: CJTF-7/CDALE EXEC CPA BAGHDAD SECDEF WASHDC WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC INFO CJCS CDR CENTCOM CDR CJTF-7 Illtftivrf PERSONAL FOR SECDEF RUMSFELD FROM AMBASSADOR BREMER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ SUBJECT: CPA 0811: (1) Adequacy of non-PSD personnel for CODEL Security, and (2) DoD funding of DoD's approval of contracting for VIP Security 1. (U) This is an action request. See para.2. 2.•( 4 31344-)-Begin text: Mr. Secretary, While I do not yet have a response to my last message to you requesting DoD funding of the additional security assets required here for the three groups described in that message -- senior CPA staff going into the red zone to carry out the June 30 transition and the reconstruction, the UN teams here now and those to arrive in the days ahead (including a possible new one for OFF investigations), and CODELs -- I understand that CENTCOM's proposal to provide non-PSD-trained military personnel to protect CODELs is supported by some in DoD. I do not agree that CODELs are adequately protected in the absence of trained PSD personnel, as I described in my last message. However, if you determine that non-PSD-trained CENTCOM personnel are acceptable to protect CODELs, I will reverse my decision to cancel CODELS and proceed instead with those resources. Since CODELs are arriving in the immediate days ahead (one is departing Washington on this coming Friday and needs to be told soonest that their trip is no longer cancelled once I have your determination), please provide your determination as soon as possible. In addition to your determination on that point, I need your decision on DoD funding of your approval for our contracting out to private companies our additional PSD security needs for the three groups described above for the three month period ahead. That amount is $7.2 million for a three month period. CPA does not have those funds. Without DoD funding, we can provide security to only one of the three groups, as I have previously detailed. Sincerely, L. Paul Bremer End Text Bomb kills five U.S. soldiers west of Baghdad BAGHDAD (AP) — A bomb exploded under an American military vehicle west of Baghdad on Wednesday, killing five U.S. soldiers, the military said. Several people, possibly foreign nationals, were killed in a separate attack in the area. The explosive device that killed the Americans blew up when their vehicle ran over it, U.S. Army Col. Jill Morgenthaler said in Baghdad. The attack occurred in Anbar province, which encompasses Fallujah, Ramadi and other towns where anti-U.S. insurgents are active. In an apparently unrelated attack Wednesday, gunmen in Fallujah attacked two civilian cars that residents said were carrying up to eight foreign nationals. The occupants of the cars were killed and their vehicles were set on fire. Footage from Associated Press Television News showed a charred body of one of the slain men, and the targeted vehicles in flames nearby. Some of the slain men were wearing flak jackets, said Safa Mobammedi, a resident Another resident, Abdul Aztz Mohammed, said angry crowds dragged the bodies through the streets, dismembered them and hanged some of the mutilated corpses. The people of Fallujah hanged some of the bodies on the old bridge like slaughtered sheep," Mohammed said. "I saw It myself." The identities of the stein men were unclear. One resident displayed what appeared to be dog tags taken from one body. Residents also said there were weapons in the targeted cars. Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) ' From: Sent: Holman, John C. (AMB) Thursday, March 25, 2004 12:27 PM To: Cc: 011(61 #';AkeisteMINtOtid (AMB) 5 .cAti d) (b(6 Subject: RE: Request for Security Assistance to Save Lives Dick, As I stated at this morning's staff meeting, the Traositkon.T.isam in coordinakon.with(b)(6) RSO shop is beginriing a ortiptcliiinge hl(61 is the _ intaning RS nd I have t t al be moved up to pril o that he can help develop the security framework that he will administer after eaves. This morning I chaired a meeting with the security leads from the various elements of CPA to let them know our intentions. The main walls to get started now, which we are doing. I'd like to discuss this and other issues with you in the next darer tWO. ibM Original Message From: 011(61 Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2004 10:02 AM To: Holzman, John C. (AMB) Subject: FW: Request for Security Assistance to Save Lives John: FYI. The way we deal with the RSO kind of security issues now and after July 1 — a whopper, and I'd like to brainstorm with you a bit is deeply into — of necessity - the operational side of RSO work — training, assignment of hard cars, FE teams, perimeter security planning, access controls, DS rules for handling and storage of classified material. Maybe he needs a "policy" guy on his staff—to integrate planning/thinking — sort of an BAC viewpoint that not only integrates all the players in the security area in Iraq, but — maybe - works all the time, not just when an EAC meeting is called? (b)(6) Chief of Staff Director of Administration and Logistics Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad 01 DSN. )(61 Commercial: (b)(6) Original Message From: L. Paul Bremer Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2004 9:54 AM To: Jones, Richard (AMB); Its\ Cc: 11-..11 4. 1 Subject: FW: Request for Security Assistance to Save Lives Dick We need to deal with the general issue of security in a more comprehensive way than just dealing with (b)(6) legitimate concerns. Can you work with (b)(6 and (b)(6) to see what can be done. We also need to think about how this will be dealt with after transition. LPB Original Message 3/25/2004 Page 2 of 2 From (b)(6) Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2004 9:41 AM To: L. Paul Bremer Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2); Bearpark, Andy Amb. (CIV) Subject: Request for Security Assistance to Save Lives Dear Mr. Ambassador, I am writing to request your help in assuring that my regional headquarters gets the security coverage we need to continue doing our job until June 30 while avoiding, if possible, additional casualties. Specifically, I need to ask you for twenty (20) security personnel to assure the safety of the many convoys we dispatch to our six provinces every day in order to implement CPA policy and assist the GCs and their teams. I apologize for addressing you with this concern. I do so only because I am certain that, unless it is met, we will suffer substantial new casualties in our ranks in the near future as a direct result of the degradation in the security environment caused by the rising strength and activity of the terrorist militias in our region, to which I referred in my earlier message. My team and I have been seeking such a reinforcement for several months, with the assistance of Regional Operations, but to no avail. We have found various ways to cope in the mean time, but these temporary solutions will no longer work in the face of the growing threat confronting us. In other words, the increasing danger we face from the militias is having very real consequences for us and will soon claim more lives unless remedial action is taken in time. We have requested reinforcements from the MND in accordance with the relevant FRAGO. They have turned us down, in writing, citing a lack of manpower. We have also requested reinforcements from the Marines in our AOR. They have also turned us down, on the grounds that Huila is outside their AOR. We have asked the MPs for assistance, and they have refused us as well, citing lack of manpower and mission restrictions. Faced with this impasse, I am left with no alternative but to ask for your help. The easiest solution would be to assign 20 additional men from Blackwater Security to our HQ. Not wishing to trouble you with details of this sort, I will instead say only that lacking these small but crucial reinforcements, and faced with a threat from the militias that seems to grow dailly, I am certain that we will soon lose more of our people on the roads of this region. Before this happens, I wanted to state the problem for the record and make a formal request for your intervention. Sincerely, Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Finance Tax Center - File online. File on time. 3/25/2004 Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) From: Sent: To: L. Paul Bremer on behalf of Bremer, Paul Tuesday, March 23, 2004 2:36 PM Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.); Bremer, Paul; Jones, Richard (AMB); (ri-or) Cc: Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9), (b)(6) Subject: RE: PSD's Good Scott. Keep me informed Original Message From: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 10:45 AM To: Bremer, Paul; Jones, Richard (AMB); 011(61 Cc: Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9) (1-)1(1 Subject: FW: PSD's We'll see. Steve, I assume we've plumbed the depths of DS? Scott Redd Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.) Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (C00) Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Baghdad, Iraq Original Message From: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 10:45 AM To: Paul Wolfowitz (b)(6) Cc: (h(6 Subject: PSD's Paul, I need to highlight a situation here which has reached a critical state and with which you may be able to help. Subject is security, specifically Personal Security Detachment personnel. As you know, the support to the UN is of highest priority for us right now. The role we want them to play in assisting with the elections is a key, and that requires them staying in the game, and in the country. The only way we can do that is to provide them protection. While CJTF-7 provides the big picture security for the UN elements, the close in, PSD protection is the responsibility of CPA, and we do it with the snarse assets we have on hand. understand there's a history to all this, but the bottom line is that when thqb)(6) Election Assistance Mission, which will be in country from 26 March to 16 April, arrives, it will consume ALL our PSD assets. When Brahimi comes in, we will have to force Ms. (b)(61 teams to stand down so we can support Brahimi. CPA will be essentially locked down, because no one except AMB Bremer will be able to move outside the Green Zone. No CODELS, no Cabinet members. Short term fixes are inherently difficult. In addition to moving people, there's the issue of situational awareness. However, there are people who've been out here and if were possible to put together roughly two teams (about 24 additional CID people), and TDY them out here for 6 weeks, it would get us through this period. Letting a contract may be too slow, and has the additional down side of utilizing new personnel who are not yet familiar with Iraq. We do need a contract, but we have to have some immediate assets, or the move toward transfer of sovereignty will be hampered. I 3/25/2004 - Page 2 of 2 Thanks for taking a look at this. (b)(6) Scott Redd Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.) Deputy Administrator and Chef Operating Officer (C00) C061(61 (CPA) Baghdad, Iraq (b(6 (1,111 (b)(6) 0,1(61 3/25/2004 cvii5 From: Sent To: Cc: (b)(6) b)(6) Sunday, March 14, 2004 9:13 PM Subject: FW: Current Situation - CPA -N FYI - NFTR - updates as required. POC is undersigned or Captain IrS)(6) Deputy, Regional Operations Directorate of Operations and Infrastructure (C) DSN (b)(6) Original Message From: 1-11(1 Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 8:47 PM To: Cc: (b)(6) ChltAl Subject: Re: Current Situation (b)(6) - Situation is fine. - r\ ' is fine. A little shaken but fine. - We are confident of our security situation. The attack was in Mosul. Unfortunately, just another day in Mosul. This was a target of opportunity drive by (3 "coalition" vehicles stopped on the side of the road). - Comms to MND-N is not a problem. When the decision was made to request Med help from TF Olympia for the seriously injured guy in the hospital, we were able to immediately contact them and pass the request. - The gentleman who died was named ...II Don't know his last name. He was a Kurd employee of the KRG Ministry of Health here in Irbil. - The second individual who was wounded was Ck)() jdriver. Current reports are that he was treated and released from the hospital in Mosul. We will not be able to get better clarity on full ID for these guys til the AM. - No other info to follow at this time. LTC, CoS, CPA-North Original Message From:11 ;1TM. Date: Sunday, March 14, 2004 1:42 Subject: Current Situation pm > Sir, > We • 're trying to get a handle on what your current situation is up > thereright now. > Could you let us know what the current status of > is? Do you all feel confident of your current security situation? Do you all feel confident of you ability to request a QRF from MNB- Northand have the communications means to contact them if you need to do so? Do you know who the gentleman who died was? A security guard or employee of a ministry? Do you know the status of the second individual who was wounded and who they are? Any other information you may have at this time would also be much appreciated. I have not had a chance to access SIPR in a while, but I will do so as soon as I can after sending this message. Thank you. Capt (b)(6) CPA Office of the Directorate, Operations and Infrastructure Regional Operations Officer North Pm P235 (b)(6) > DSN (b)(6) (b)(6) 2 (b)(6) From: Sent To: Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6) Sunday, March 14, 2004 9:15 PM al ••••• /ON 1.1,11 1,•11 .111`. • Subject: RE: Current Situation - CPA -N (b)(6) Deputy, Regional Operations Directorate of Operations and Infrastructure (C) (b)(6) DSN: FYI - below - additional info. (b)(6) Message is being delivered as we speak. There is no change in our alert status. We have nothing to indicate that this was anything other than a pure target of opportunity drive by shooting. There are 4-5 attacks daily of some flavor or another in Mosul. This incident in Mosul does not have implications beyond that city from our foxhole. (b)(6) LTC, CoS, CPA-North Original Message From: Date: Sunday, March 14, 2004 8:16 Subject: A Couple More Questions Pm > Sir, > Please notify DrEla > directed to do s • > now. that he is not to move from the Khanzad until A headquarters. Working to arrange RW assets > • What is your current alert status at the Khanzad and throughout CPA > North? MEMORANDUM THRU: (b)(6) CPA Office of the Directorate, Operations and Infrastructure Regional Operations Officer North FOR: Joe Adamczyk, CPA Office of the Directorate, Operations and Infrastructure Regional Operations Office SUBJECT: Serious Incident Report 1. At approximately 1000 hours (local time) a convoy originating from this location took small arms fire from a location in and around Mosul (grid coordinates 394245) in the Karama District. 2. Convoy consisted of 3 "soft vehicles" heading towards Mosul with a representative from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (b)(61 There were 3 occupants in lead vehicle including Field Coordinator from Baghdad, driver and bodyguard. Second car was main vehicle and had 4 occupants. And the final vehicle had 4 individuals. 3. Purpose of convoy was to coordinate activities with the Iraqi Ministry of Employment at the former Military Employment Center in Mosul. . 4. Vehicles stopped at the above location to ask directions. One individual from the lead vehicle got out of his vehicle in order to communicate with the r d vehicle. Two vehicles (White Mitsubishi and blue Volkswagen) traveling in the wrong direction on the opposite side of Route 2 opened fire with small arms fire (AK-47's). One member of the attacking force dismounted and opened fire and was wounded by Coalition fire. Residents from the local housing area were seen retrieving his body and taking it inside one of the houses. Local police station was approximately 80 meters away and supposedly refused to render assistance even when asked. Upon further investigation, alleged police were really security personnel for electric company. 5. Attacking force described as 3 youths, unmasked in Mitsubishi and 2 (including dismounted) in Volkswagen providing covering fire. Minus dismounted individual, vehicles continued in direction of Mosul with continuing fire from both friendly and attacking forces. 6. Coalition forces moved into protection posture and provided security for 0,1 (111(6 Once secure at nearby police station (10-15 minutes), 2 Coalition vehicles returned to Arbyl. Lead vehicle was seen to be on fire and wounded were being evacuated in local Taxi to local hospital. Two wounded and one accompanying. 7. Calls were made into Mosul where it was reported that two local ministry individuals were in Saddam hospital. One of the coalition personnel is currently described in critical condition and is in surgery. All friendly personnel are apparently accounted for. 8. Continuing mission "scrubbed", with Washington via Amman. (b)(6) asking to return early to 9. Lesson learned: (a) Lack of communication between all vehicles (b) Vehicles stopped and one individual dismounted (c) Lack of clear directions to location (d) Failure to get CI involvement early on CHARLES A. DEBNEY (b)(6) CF: Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) From: Sent: (b)(6) Sunday, March 14, 2004 3:20 PM To: (b)(6) Subject: FVV: Security Importance: High ( 4cmAi (b)(6) As we discussed at lunch, I think we have to take some serious stepsabout the unlocked trailers — and, in general, the access controls to man camps outside the palace grounds old me a few minutes ago that CJTF-7 is pulling some force protection assets tomorrow (which are not being replaced) and we still haven't heard from CJTF-7 on our Jan 28 request for force protection. I think that we also need a Town Meeting — anc(b)(6) said we should set one up asap — with Ambassador Bremer participating. I think there is a perception in the community that we are indifferent to their security concerns— something we need to take action quickly to address. Let's meet later today to map a way forward. Say 4:00? (b)(6) Regards, (b)(6) Chief of Staff Director of Administration and Logistics Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad (b)(61 DSN: Commercial: (b)(61 Original Message From: Van Rest, Judy (SES-2) Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 2:52 PM T0:(1,11A1 Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2); (b)(6) (h)(6 Subject: Security Importance: High Dear (b)( I know I'm not the only one whelseasummed about what happened last night, and I know you all are working nonstop on security issues. However, I have now become exceedingly anxious about the security around the trailers where I am located on the north end, the section against the wall, where trailers 7 & 8 are located. I'm in 7/07. This area clearly has been overlooked. Not only are there no sandbags around this section, but we are completely isolated, basically hidden behind some dilapidated old buildings. In addition, none of the entry doors to the trailers lock or if they do ; we aUn't hese keys. The doors to the trailers face the watt Like my other colleagues, I work very late and until today have felt perfectly sabrwalking to my trailer at 11 p.m. or later even though few people are out then. I feel differently now. Walking in pairs might histi but doesn't lend much in the way of protection against determined intruders. I've been here since May, withstood two Rasheed hotel attacks, etc., and am willing to take certain risks, but for some reason this incident has really unnerved me. My question is: can we at least have some guards posted around that area? 3/14/2004 Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) From: (b)(6) Sent: To: All Hands Sunday, March 14, 2004 3:29 PM Subject: Security Notice: Assault In Riverside Arena SECURITY NOTICE NO. 03-S005 DATE: 14 Mar 2004 ********************************.*********** Assault In Riverside Arena During the evening hours of March 13, there was an assault in the Riverside Arena trailer camp. The victim, a military member of the CPA, was attacked as he walked back to his trailer in the Riverside camp. The officer suffered serious stab wounds to his torso, head, and neck. Other occupants of the camp heard the scuffle and called 112, the emergency number for Force Protection. The officer was transported to the 31st CSH and is in stable condition. The attacker has not been identified. In an attempt to ensure that the attacker posed no further threat to those in the trailer camps, the trailers were individually checked to make sure that the occupants were safe, aware of the threat, and had appropriately secured their residences. This incident emphasizes the need to lock your interior doors to the sleeping areas of your trailers. You should also travel to your trailers utilizing the buddy system. If you are in your trailer and there is an incident outside, please stay in the trailer and defend your space. By trying to clear the area you may become embroiled in a friendly fire incident. In the event of an emergency, please call Force Protection (b)(6) Regional Security Coordination Office 3/14/2004 Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) (b)(6) From: Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 4:58 PM To: (b)(6) Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB) Subject: Today's ambush (b)(6) Sorry to both you about this again, but there is something I think Ambs Jones and Bremer m of the security la* tome that Ante Jones is chairing. As you probably noted from the copy et was chased for nearly forty-five minutes by the shooters after the first car was destroyed and Alfere OA light email, his car t in the head. After learning the facts, we think it possakthat,thi.s.rnission may have been targeted for ambush. as been particularly outspoken and activerireteformingtorininistry, establishing employment centers, and rooting out corruption. He has been our supersrl 11,V Al A nur highest ranking Kurd; he is the Ministry DG for the Northern provinces. 4 * was supposed to be with)(6) (b on this mission but cancelled when I received notice of my presentation at today's Exec. Committee meeting. (b)(6) 3/14/2004 Page! of 1 (b)(6) (b)(6) From: Sent: To: Cc: Sunday, March 14, 2004 4:53 PM Jones, Richard (AMB) (b)(61 Stibiet* , Seettrity (b)(6) I convened a rump group of (b)(6) and others to deal with the reaction to last night's assault. We focused on things to do tonight — andln the very short term; we'll convene tomorrdw about longer term approaches. Here's what we'll try to do tonight: (1) add roving a roving Gurka or two to those man camps outside the palace; (2) add mobile lights to the camps without adequate lighting; (3) schedule a Town Meeting on security with Ambassador Bremer as soon as we can. Tonight we'll set up a group to walk the perimeters tomorrow with KBR and check all the camps and get KBR to finish the T barrier installations around all the camps and have a look at lighting, sand bags, and soon. (4) the intermediate term force protection issues we'll deal with early tomorrow morning, but the drawdown of CJTF-7 and the CJTF-7 silence on your Jan 25 memo requesting them to provide internal security forces for critical coalition provisional authority facilities and installations — including the palace and the man camps — is disquieting to me personally — I've em a couple of times asking for the status and I know they are still assessing their tequirements and resources. More on this later, of course. Regards (b)(6) Chief of Staff Director of Administration and Logistics Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad DSN (b )(6) Commercial: (h)(61 3/14/2004 L 02 APRIL 04 NAJAF SECURITY UPDATE POLICE CEDE KUFA STREETS TO MAHDI ARMY; POLICE COLONEL MURDERED BY ASSAILANTS UNKNOWN SUMMARY: At the end of a Friday in which the Najaf police permitted Mandi Army to dominate the streets of their Kufa home base, Kufa's long-serving IF chief COL Saeed was assassinated by assailants unknown. The list of suspects is long, but Mandi Army must be at the top. End Summary. Mandi Army Outmuscles Police On the morning of Friday 02 April, U.S. and Salvadoran troops observed approximately 200 Mandi Army personnel on the streets of Kufa, some running traffic checkpoints. In contrast to past practice, none were displaying arms - in accordance with a deal reached with the Governor and IF chief BG Al-Yasiri that unarmed Mandi Army personnel could "support" the police. However, unlike the previous Friday - when the IPs had a strong presence in Kufa - there were almost no IPs on the street. After instructions from CPA Najaf, the acting police leadership and deputy governor for security Ali Atshan (their bosses being in Baghdad and abroad respectively) deployed a modest number of reinforcements. During the day U.S. MPs observed Kufa IF chief COL Saeed (whom BC Al-Yasiri had recently identified for transfer to a staff job) making an effort to establish dominance. At one point, MPs observed Saeed engaging in a "heated discussion" with Mandi Army personnel at a traffic checkpoint, asking them to withdraw. Saeed interrupted the discussion to ask the MP mounted patrol to leave, as their presence was "disturbing" Mandi Army. The squad leader repositioned slightly without leaving the area (COMMENT: in our view, a good move: standing his ground while giving the Mandi Army guys a chance to save face; end comment) and the IPs took over the checkpoint. COL Saeed's Last Pitch During a late afternoon stocktaking meeting with police officials and Spanish Brigade, GC asked why the police presence had been so light. In a long round of finger-pointing, Saeed blamed: (1) the absent Al-Yasiri for being too accommodating toward Mandi Army and for providing unclear ROE; (2) Najaf's political leadership for lack of courage in confronting Mandi Army and for providing inadequate political direction; (3) CF for provoking Mandi Army by maintaining too large a presence in Kufa; and (4) CF for encouraging Mandi T eit1LIv e U1.1 a 2 Army by maintaining too small a presence in Kufa. He also said he had not needed more men because Mandi Army had been unarmed (sic) and urged decisive action to crush Mandi Army. GC, saying he wanted everyone to be clear on ROEs and that it was vital that the people of Kufa see the police providing security, directed the IPs to maintain a strong presence in Kufa every day with a minimum of 100 IPs every Friday, regardless of Mandi Army's posture. (GC later repeated this instruction to the three deputy governors, and will reiterate to BG Al-Yasiri upon his return.) COL Saaed's Murder Twenty minutes after parting from Saeed, as GC and POLAD arrived at the governorate for a meeting with the deputy governors, we learned that Saeed and his driver had just been shot by unknown gunmen in an ambush near Saeed's home. Atshan assured GC that he would direct a serious investigation. We later passed word to U.S. elements in town to pulse their contacts. COMMENT: The list of suspects is long. Like many IP officers, Saeed had some alleged skeletons rattling around in the closet - rumors of corruption, rumors of womanizing. Was he killed for being too confrontational with Mandi Army? We will do our best to find out, but are not optimistic we will learn the truth. Whoever the culprit, we expect Saeed's death will have the effect of strengthening Mandi Army's image of reckless fearlessness - a useful recruiting tool for the disaffected. If Mandi Army can be shown convincingly to have been responsible for COL Saeed's murder, that will increase pressure for a decisive showdown with the group. Meanwhile, we will seek to ensure that the IPs sustain a strong presence in Kufa. L -I.