08-F-0847 Doc 19

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO November 18, 18, 2003 FOR: I RATOR (b)(6) FROM: Acting Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation SUBJECT: Hajj Flights Risk Assessment Background. The CPA Executive Secretary tasked the Ministry of Transportation to prepare an assessment of Iraqi airports that could be used for limited Hajj 2004 charter flights, starting in late December 2003 through mid-January 2004, including recommendations on which are the most suitable, taking into account technical, logistic, political and security considerations. The following information responds to this request. Security Assessments for Hajj Flights for Iraqi Airports • Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). If security was not an issue, then Baghdad International would be the best airport to conduct Hajj flights. It is central to the densest population in Iraq, and it has the passenger terminals that can handle the most passenger traffic. Security remains an issue, however, and we must consider that for the foreseeable future, the CPA and military will be cautious about bringing large commercial aviation carriers into BIAP. Some argue that once the decision is made on the Hajj flights, the insurgents will go to wherever we decide to set up the service. Others argue that the insurgents would not try to disrupt the pilgrims and keep them from fulfilling one of the Pillars of Islam. This being said, we should make sure that we effectively balance the security concerns with the other considerations. • Basrah Airport. The best airport for the Hajj, in the estimation of the MoT, is Basrah International Airport. Basrah has the surrounding terrain that enables reasonable security, and MoT and the UK military are so confident in the safety at Basrah that we allow wide- body jets to carry troops and passengers in and out of Basrah. Basrah has the terminal facilities that can support such a task, and the runway can support large aircraft. It is the most readily accessible airport in southern Iraq that can handle wide-body jets, and there is an existing plan on how passengers are to be handled. • Kirkuk and Mosul Airports. In northern Iraq, there are two airports, Kirkuk and Mosul, that can technically handle larger aircraft (they currently handle C-17 and IL-76 aircraft). One consideration is that they are located within close proximity to urban areas, and insurgents may be able to launch attacks from those areas more easily than they can from desert areas. CJTF-7 and CENTAF may have other issues regarding troop rotations and other logistical matters. • Qayyarah West Airport. One airport that is in northern Iraq and is located in a remote location is Qayyarah West. Currently, the Ministry of Transportation knows little about this outpost, and would have to be given an evaluation from the military. MoT knows 31111111113 UNCLASSIFIED 1 UNCLASSIFIED that AN-12s and AN-72s takeoff and land there, but these aircraft are short takeoff and landing aircraft, so that leads us to believe that the airfield is limited to smaller aircraft. Further Time for Coordination is Required. • Iraqis Preparing Their Own Plan for Hajj Flights. The Ministry of Transportation (MoT) has tasked the DG of Iraqi Airways to come up with a plan for the Hajj that includes proposed airports, aircraft, security of the passengers to the airports, certification of aircrews, country clearances, etc. The suspense for this plan is 8 December 2003. The idea was to put the entire planning effort in the hands of the Iraqis, so that the success or failure of the project is entirely in their hands. The Iraqi Airways DG has already been advised to keep BIAP out of the plan because of security concerns, and he whole- heartedly agreed. The Iraqis are anxious to get this plan going, and from the assessment of the Ministry of Transportation, they are capable. The Ministry of Transportation's plan is to help facilitate the plans that the Iraqis put together. This will, of course, include coordinating with the military, and other ministries. • CJTF-7 Requires a Formal Tasking to Respond. CJTF-7 representatives have stated that they require a formal Request For Information (RFI) to provide coordinated input. On November 181h , the Ministry of Transportation submitted an Action Memo for the Administrator's approval tasking CJTF-7 to provide this input. Once provided, the Ministry of Transportation's assessment can be reviewed if necessary. • CPA Ministry of Interior Requires Additional Time for Coordination. Mr. Edward Burley, the CPA Ministry of Interior point of contact for this matter, is currently out of town. His input will be provided separately upon his return. RECOMMENDATION: The Ministry of Transportation suggests that we give the Iraqis a chance to come up with their plan (due December 8th), The Iraqis have organized Hajj flights every year for the last 50 years. The additional time would also allow CJTF-7 and the Ministry of Interior to provide their input. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: ATTACHMENTS: NONE COORDINATION: CITF-7, C3 Air, Colonel( b)( Ministry of Interiort)(6) Drafted: Majo UNCLASSIFIED 2 UNCLASSIFIED!! ou:MFI,cn:DKMFIYFKZ001 ent: 00:04:22 10/28/2003 3: COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY(UC) Precedence: Priority abject: DS SUPPORT TO THE CPA essage Type: Other-Organizational )(tended Auth: 20:58:00 10/27/2003 (UTC) 23:58:00 10/27/2003 (Client/Local) This message has been digitally signed and encrypted rTUZYUW RUEHCAA2432 3002111-UUUU--RHMFIUU. VR UUUUU ZZH 272058Z OCT 03 VI SECSTATE WASHDC 3 HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD NICLAS STATE 302432 ROM AMBASSADOR FRANCIS X. TAYLOR TO AMBASSADOR PAT KENNEDY 0. 12958: N/A \GS: AMGT, APER, ASEC, HR, IZ JBJECT: DS SUPPORT TO THE CPA I) DURING THEIR RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD, DS ASSISTANT IRECTOR (h)(6) AND DS/IP/NEA REGIONAL DIRECTOR 11,111 BRIEFED YOU ON DS PROVIDING SECURITY SUPPORT TO CPA. HAS PREPARED A PROPOSAL FOR STAFFING THE CPA REGIONAL ECURITY COORDINATION OFFICE (RSCO) IN BAGHDAD WITH DS ECIAL AGENTS AND CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES. NEA, HR, AND M WE CLEARED THE PROPOSAL, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE EVIEWED IT. BEFORE WE BEGIN PREPARING ON AN URGENT BASIS TO rAFF THE DS CONTINGENT IN BAGHDAD, I WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM -IAT THE TIMELINE MEETS WITH YOUR APPROVAL. DS AND I STAND EADY TO SUPPORT CPA EFFORTS IN IRAQ. (b)(61 !432 TO- Information Memorandum Sensitive But Unclassified TO: Ambassador Francis X. Taylor October 15, 2003 FROM: DSS - (b)(6) SUBJECT: DS Presence in Iraq The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (CPA) and CentCom have agreed that DS should establish a presence in Iraq, under the auspices of the CPA. DS/1P representatives (b)(6) have met with DOD, DOS and CPA officials at CentCom and in Baghdad, and agree that DS should provide support to further both U.S. national security policy goals and DOS operational security goals in Iraq. Background In response to concerns of a security nature expressed by DOS employees operating in Iraq and to a request from CPA Chief of Staff Ambassador Pat Kennedy, DS/IP representatives traveled to CentCom to discuss the DOD/DOS Memorandum of Agreement on Force Protection in Iraq and to Baghdad to review the security situation of DOS employees. After extensive meetings with DOS employees, other agencies and Ambassador Kennedy, DS/IP recommends that DS immediately establish a presence in Iraq. Centcom Discussions between CentCom and DS/IP representatives on 9/30/03 resulted in concurrence from both parties that DS should establish a presence under CPA in Iraq. Findings 1. CentCom acknowledged its responsibility for security of CPA, including DOS, employees in Iraq. Operating through the CJTF-7 in support of CPA, CentCom has initiated security practices that comply with the intent of the DOD/DOS Memorandum of Agreement. 2. Locating a DS component within CPA would provide substantial increased protection of DOS employees assigned to CPA. Baghdad DS/IP representatives traveled to Baghdad via Kuwait on 10/8/03. In Kuwait, the team held discussions with .OW6) and In Baghdad, the team met with Ambassador Pat Kennedy, DS Special Agent DOS detailees to CPA(1-11(61 (b)(6) DOD authorities Col. (b)(6) and (b)(6) and other agency officials. Those interviewed in Baghdad expressed unanimous support for a DS presence in Iraq to address two goals: • Provide physical and protective operations oversight, guidance and instruction and assist the CPA in its effort to establish a secure environment for the new Iraqi government. • Provide the leadership, direction and oversight of a comprehensive coordinated CPA physical and personnel security program, integrating the diverse military and other government agencies' capabilities. Findings Kuwait 1. CPA, Working through contractor Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), provides some screening and coordination to CPA employees in Kuwait, prior to their departure for Baghdad. Services include airport assistance, medical services and limited force protection briefings. Many DOS employees claim not to have received these briefings or to have found them irrelevant to the actual security situation in Iraq. 2. Embassy Kuwait cannot provide additional support to CPA without acquiring substantial manpower, office space and resources (vehicles and communications equipment). Baghdad: 1. CPA is under DOD/OSD authority. CentCom is a supporting element of CPA. (Attachment B). All DOS employees assigned to Baghdad are detailed to CPA, and seconded to DOD. Responsibility for force protection belongs to CJTF-7; implementation for force protection currently is coordinated through the Regional Coordination Office (RCO) and the Regional Security Coordination Center (RSCC). 2. Iraq is a phase three military environment, according to military authorities there. The security environment in Baghdad and throughout Iraq is characterized by low-intensity armed conflict, including assassinations, vehicle bombs, rocket attacks and sniper attacks. Large scale demonstrations with strong potential for violence occur daily throughout the country. 3. CPA estimates DOS and all other government agency personnel, including military, to number 3000. No one at CPA can give an accurate account of where these personnel are stationed. 4. The likelihood of serious losses or casualties among the CPA community is accentuated by the total lack of security awareness. This is the result of an ineffective briefing process and the lack of daily security updates being provided to all CPA personnel, American citizens and business representatives. As a result, personnel are making decisions that can ultimately place them in harms way. Various elements of CPA maintain and provide threat information but lack of coordination and adequate dissemination methods stymies the effectiveness of CPA efforts. 5. CJTF 7 provides protective security to DOS personnel, mostly through motorcade support. In reality, DOS personnel rarely use the CJTF7 motorcades because they perceive themselves to be at increased risk. Instead, they hire private Iraqi drivers (not vetted) and travel throughout Baghdad and Iraq in non-secure transportation with limited means of communication. 6. Other government agencies are establishing large presences in Iraq. Those who develop threat information advised that they receive information on an hourly basis; however, no mechanism exists to facilitate the analysis and implementation of a response to information pertinent to CPA operations. 7. Subsequent to the bombing of the Baghdad UN headquarters and the assassination of one member of the Governing Council, CPA began an ambitious program to safeguard all council members, ministers and ministries. Special assets of the military conducted 45 comprehensive vulnerability surveys of ministry buildings and municipal offices. At the same time, contracts were let with over 10 international private security firms to provide personal protection to council members. In the rush to provide these services, little attention was paid to the skill sets necessary to perform; this has resulted in uneven levels of protection. Recognizing the importance of safeguarding all ministries and Council members, the CPA has embarked on an ambitious training program whose goal is to produce 1500 protective agents in the next year. Even with the vulnerability surveys in hand, there is a total lack of expertise within the CPA or Iraqi council that can transform the findings into action. 8. Processes and procedures normally associated with a comprehensive overseas security program do not exist. There are no secure working areas, no technical protection measures, no vetting processes, 44 different access badges with foreign nationals from several countries administering access control, varying access procedures for each CPA controlled facility and no centralized guard system. Physical security for the Al-Rasheed Hotel within the Green Zone is a combination of army artillery and Gurkas while perimeter security for the palace is military police. Each unit has separate operating orders and access procedures may vary by shift and the officer in charge for that shift. There are no existing operational agreements for emergency response elements who are called upon in the event of an emergency at any of the CPA locations. 9. It is anticipated that up to 12 additional governance positions will be established in the three regional sectors outside of Baghdad on/about January 2004. Each of these sectors will replicate essential CPA operations within their region, necessitating a coordinating security representative. 4. Deployment Schedule FP-01: Assigned/detailed by 11/15/03 (TDY coverage during interim) FP-02 and FP-03 Protection Security Managers and Physical Security Specialists: Assigned/detailed by 11/15/03 MSD Security Operations: Six officers TDY by 10/30/03 FP-03 SEO: Assigned/detailed by 12/15/03 GS-13 ITA Analysts: Assigned/detailed by 12/15/03 FP-02 and FP-03 Regional Security Officers: Assigned/detailed by 1/15/04 Office Management Specialist: Assigned/detailed by 11/30/03 FP-03 Logistician: Assigned/detailed by 11/30/03 FP-01 Special Baghdad Coordinator: Assigned to IP/NEA by 11/30/03 Assumptions 1. All positions will be detailed to the CPA. As CPA falls under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), all support requirements will be the responsibility of CPA. 2. With the exception of the MSD positions, all personnel will be assigned for one year. 3. The staffing plan described above addresses current CPA needs and is subject to change if those needs increase. CPA anticipates that their operations will cease on/about November 2004 at which time the security functions described above may/will be modified and assumed under Embassy Baghdad. Attachments: A — Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of State Regarding Details of Employees for Iraq Post-War Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance signed 3/14/03 B — Memorandum for Coalition Provisional Authority Commander, US Central Command dated August 11, 2003 C — CJTF-7 Mission Statement D RCO and RSCC Mission Statements E — Proposed Organizational Chart for RSCO Baghdad Cleared: DS/1P — (b)(61 Drafted: DS/IP/NEA b)(6) 03'0)-2-7 UNCLASSIFIED COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO November 13, 2003 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: r il li llActing Director, Office of National Security Affairs (ONSA) SUBJECT: Welcome Home It has been a busy week in the Office of National Security Affairs and the Office of the New Iraqi Army: Transitions. Activities this week have all been about transitions, in various forms. -Leadership.iilluzi_ has left. There is some chance that his replacement may be named and arrive in the first week of December. I can stay until 08 December—provides a measure of continuity as we implement the transition to the Chief Policy Officer/Chief Operating Officer organization. I can wear two hats: "Director, National Security Affairs" and "Director NIA" during this transition. We believe this will also smooth out the transition of CMATT to its new relationship with CJTF. I discussed this with Amb Kennedy and he supports this course of action. -Planning for ICDC Expansion/Impact on NIA Program and Related Issues. This is a complex issue: (1) Integration of ICDC into Iraqi Security Forces. Expansion of ICDC to 36 battalions is going to require us to address the question of the civil-military relationship between ICDC and the Iraqi government much sooner than we had intended. In accordance with guidance from CENTCOM, CJTF is pursuing a concept to develop battalion, brigade and possibly a division headquarters for ICDC, increase their mobility and provide some limited facilities and limited sustainment capability. As yet, we have not reached consensus on an employment concept for ICDC which will support both TOA of coalition forces and transfer of authority over ICDC to appropriate civil authority. Staff communication between OSA, CMATT and CJTF staffs is excellent and these issues can be resolved. CPA should not allow ICDC to be swept up into the CJTF chain of command and then left to stand alone after the MSCs complete TOA. ONSA, with CMATT has briefed an alternative concept to CJTF which was well-received at the staff level. This concept would use the NIA Joint Force Headquarters and NIA brigade headquarters to act at the "Iraq component" of the CJTF and would oversee and coordinate the employment of both NIA and ICDC during TOA. This would protect the CPA role as the political/policy "National Command Authority" over all Iraqi forces and put CPA in position to direct the future destiny of ICDC in a direction and at a pace compatible with the advance of Governance. UNCLASSIFIED C: \ Documents and Settingth)(6 ocal Settings \Temporary Internet Files \OLK224 \Bremer Welcome Home 031113.doc UNCLASSIFIED (2) Concept for Security Force Integration. We have reached a staff-level consensus between ONSA, CHF and MOI that a roles and missions framework for Iraqi Security Forces would be useful to guide these related transitions. ONSA has undertaken to prepare a first draft. Command Relationship between CMATT and CJTF. CITF is working from a premise established in a CENTCOM planning order that places CMATT under operational control (OPCON) of CHF. This is a significantly stronger command relationship than I believe Walt discussed with you, which was that CMATT would be TACON to CJIT and ADCON to CPA/ONSA. Doctrinally, none of these terms fits the current situation precisely. The attached memo elaborates. (3) Role of the NIA in Internal Security. ONSA is preparing a paper to go to General Counsel and will work with General Counsel to develop appropriate guidance (CPA Order, Policy Statement and/or NIA Regulation) to provide guidelines for "Use of the Military in Support of the Civil Authority". To support coalition forces TOA, both NIA forces and ICDC forces must be operationally and legally prepared to take on the full range of tasks currently performed by coalition forces. (4) Using NIA Funds from the Supplemental to Support ICDC Expansion. There are limits in the law on how much can be transferred without referring back to Congress. We are coordinating with PMO who is exploring all options. General Council view is that, once we identify how we want to shift the funds, Congressional notification will be required. Impact on timeline is undetermined at this time. (5) Senior Leader Selection and Development. Rapid expansion of both ICDC and NIA, together with what appears to be a requirement for NIA to accelerate development of its headquarters infrastructure means that we are facing an immediate requirement to appoint relatively senior leaders (colonels, brigadiers and major generals for the military, office directors and some senior directors for the civilian agencies). We may already be at the point where we need to consider appointing higher echelon commanders. ONSA has devised a system for vetting to address not only the concerns relating to the de-Baathification Policy but which also provides a means to obtain a measure of assurance that the subject individual is not either politically or criminally tainted. ONSA proposes to use this system as the basis for recommendations to appoint these persons. A policy letter describing this process is in progress. ONSA is also identifying training opportunities and preparing budget requests to support senior leader professional development for both military and civilian security sector. UNCLASSIFIED CADocuments and Setting 9:0(6 SettingsVfemporary Internet Files \OLIC224Hremer Welcome Home 031113.doc UNCLASSIFIED Original Message From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 1:17 PM To (b)(6) Cc Subject: Responsiblities for NIA/ICDC Here is the revision, based on our talk. Walt Points re CMATT — CJTF/CPA Relationship As decided last week in Washington, the implementation of the NIA training program and the development of the ICDC require some adjustments to command and oversight arrangements. In that connection: CJTF-7 will be executive agent for execution of the NIA training program. CJTF-7 will retain its responsibilities for training, employing, and supporting ICDC. CMATT will be TACON to CENTCOM/CJTF-7 reporting directly to Commander, CJTF-7. Commander, CMATT, will be dual-hatted as Senior Military Advisor to CPA/OSA for policy issues related to the NIA and ICDC and to the establishment of Iraqi national security institutions and procedures. CJTF-7 will have operational command of NIA and ICDC units after they complete initial training and will provide follow-on training for them.. CJTF-7 will coordinate its overall concepts for employment of the NIA and ICDC (but not detailed operational plans) with CPA. CPA will Serve as the national command authority for the NIA and ICDC, pending transfer of such authority to an Iraqi government. Appoint (include promotions as well as initial commissioning) all officers and enlisted personnel to positions in the NIA or ICDC. (Ambassador Bremer or Delegate) The power to appoint officers below the rank of Colonel in the ICDC may be delegated to Commander, CJTF-7. Other appointment powers may be delegated in accordance with the relevant CPA orders. UNCLASSIFIED C: \ Documents and Setting1h)(6 ,.,ocal Settings \ Temporary Internet Files NOLK2241Bremer Welcome Home 031113.doc UNCLASSIFIED Provide policy guidance and oversight to CJTF-7 for NIA and for ICDC, to include setting total force targets and equipment levels, basic functions assigned, personnel policies (to include disciplinary rules, recruiting/vetting standards, and salaries and benefits), and determine and manage budgets for financial support to ICDC and NIA programs. (OSA, OMB). In particular, any re-allocation of funds between ICDC and NIA (or other applicable accounts) will require action by CPA. Execute programs for providing basing facilities and equipment to NIA and ICDC units, including contracting and financial oversight. (PMO) Retain administrative control ("ADCON") of CMATT. Provision of logistical and administrative support to NIA and ICDC will be divided between CJTF-7 and CPA as previously agreed. In general, CJTF-7 will provide such support for ICDC units, and CPA (through DSA) will provide it for NIA units under agreements to be reached. NIA and ICDC will, to the maximum extent feasible, use common programs for acquisition and support services, when doing so serves efficiency, interoperability or economy. TEXT BREAK (3) These are the official definitions, paraphrased to reflect the sense of Walt's memo: OPCON authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command ... TACON = ... limited to the detailed direction and control ... necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned ... ADCON = ... authority ... in respect to administration and support, including organization ..., control of resources The underlying issue is our vision of how the responsibility for security will be transferred from the CJTF to proper Iraqi authorities and the role of CPA and CMATT as these transitions advance. CMATT envisions creating a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) as the top echelon of command of the New Iraqi Army forces, to be joined with a future ministry as a single institution, similar to the British system. We envision the JFHQ as becoming the headquarters of the Iraqi component of the coalition command, directing the actions of all Iraqi armed forces under direction of the coalition commander, while the CPA provides the National Command Authority resources and policy inputs to enable the forces to execute their missions. This configuration directly supports transition. As the CJTF and its' MSCs continue to draw down, NIA units, augmented by ICDC, assume the MSCs' mission. Although it will not be easy to execute, this approach UNCLASSIFIED CADocuments and SettingMocal Settings \Temporary Internet Files\01K224 \Bremer Welcome Home 031113.doe UNCLASSIFIED leads more directly to Iraqi control of Iraqi forces, to Iraqi responsibility for the overall security situation and to coordination between the military and civil chains of authority as governance advances. UNCLASSIFIED CADocumenis and Setting al Settingffemporary Internet Fites10LIC224113temer Welcome Home 031113.doc D'ZI/ UNCLASSIFIED COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO November 14, 2003 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: b)(6) Acting Director, Office of National Security Affairs (ONSA) SUBJECT: Welcome Home It has been a busy week in the Office of National Security Affairs and the Office of the New Iraqi Army: Transitions. Activities this week have all been about transitions, in various forms. - Leadership. Walt Slocombe has left. There is some chance that his replacement may be named and arrive in the first week of December. I can stay until 08 December — provides a measure of continuity as we implement the transition to the Chief Policy Officer/Chief Operating Officer organization. I can wear two hats: "Director, National Security Affairs" and "Director NIA" during this transition. We believe this will also smooth out the transition of CMATT to its new relationship with CJTF. I discussed this with Amb Kennedy and he supports this course of action. - Planning for ICDC Expansion/Impact on NIA Program and Related Issues. This is a complex issue: (1) Integration of ICDC into Iraqi Security Forces. Expansion of ICDC to 36 battalions is going to require us to address the question of the civil-military relationship between ICDC and the Iraqi government much sooner than we had intended. In accordance with guidance from CENTCOM, CJTF is pursuing a concept to develop battalion, brigade and possibly a division headquarters for ICDC, increase their mobility and provide some limited facilities and limited sustainment capability. As yet, we have not reached consensus on an employment concept for ICDC which will support both TOA of coalition forces and transfer of authority over ICDC to appropriate civil authority. Staff communication between OSA, CMATT and CJTF staffs is excellent and these issues can be resolved. CPA should not allow ICDC to be swept up into the CJTF chain of command and then left to stand alone after the MSCs complete TOA. ONSA, with CMATT has briefed an alternative concept to CJTF which was well-received at the staff level. This concept would use the NIA UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Joint Force Headquarters and NIA brigade headquarters to act at the "Iraq component" of the CJTF and would oversee and coordinate the employment of both NIA and ICDC during TOA. This would protect the CPA role as the political/policy "National Command Authority" over all Iraqi forces and put CPA in position to direct the future destiny of ICDC in a direction and at a pace compatible with the advance of Governance. (2) Concept for Security Force Integration. We have reached a staff-level consensus between ONSA, CJTF and MOI that a roles and missions framework for Iraqi Security Forces would be useful to guide these related transitions. ONSA has undertaken to prepare a first draft. Command Relationship between CMATT and CJTF. CJTF is working from a premise established in a CENTCOM planning order that places CMATT under operational control (OPCON) of CJTF. This is a significantly stronger command relationship than I believe Walt discussed with you, which was that CMATT would be TACON to CJTF and ADCON to CPA/ONSA. Doctrinally, none of these terms fits the current situation precisely. The attached memo elaborates. (3) Role of the NIA in Internal Security. ONSA is preparing a paper to go to General Counsel and will work with General Counsel to develop appropriate guidance (CPA Order, Policy Statement and/or NIA Regulation) to provide guidelines for "Use of the Military in Support of the Civil Authority". To support coalition forces TOA, both NIA forces and ICDC forces must be operationally and legally prepared to take on the full range of tasks currently performed by coalition forces. (4) Using NIA Funds from the Supplemental to Support ICDC Expansion. There are limits in the law on how much can be transferred without referring back to Congress. We are coordinating with PM0 who is exploring all options. General Council view is that, once we identify how we want to shift the funds, Congressional notification will be required. Impact on timeline is undetermined at this time. (5) Senior Leader Selection and Development. Rapid expansion of both ICDC and NIA, together with what appears to be a requirement for NIA to accelerate development of its headquarters infrastructure means that we are facing an immediate requirement to appoint relatively senior leaders (colonels, brigadiers and major generals for the military, office directors and some senior directors for the civilian agencies). We may already be at the point where we need to consider appointing higher echelon commanders. ONSA has devised a system for vetting to address not only the concerns relating to the de-Baathification Policy but which also provides a means to obtain a measure of assurance that the subject individual is not either politically or criminally tainted. ONSA proposes to use this system as the basis for recommendations to appoint these persons. A policy letter describing this process is in progress. ONSA is also identifying training opportunities and preparing budget requests to support senior leader professional development for both military and civilian security sector. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Original Message From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 1:17 PM To: (b)(6) Cc: Subject: Responsiblities for NIA/ICDC Here is the revision, based on our talk. Walt Points re CMATT — CJTF/CPA Relationship As decided last week in Washington, the implementation of the NIA training program and the development of the ICDC require some adjustments to command and oversight arrangements. In that connection: CJTF-7 will be executive agent for execution of the NIA training program. CJTF-7 will retain its responsibilities for training, employing, and 'supporting ICDC. CMATT will be TACON to CENTCOM/CJTF-7 reporting directly to Commander, CJTF-7. Commander, CMATT, will be dual-hatted as Senior Military Advisor to CPA/OSA for policy issues related to the NIA and ICDC and to the establishment of Iraqi national security institutions and procedures. CJTF-7 will have operational command of NIA and ICDC units after they complete initial training and will provide follow-on training for them.. CJTF-7 will coordinate its overall concepts for employment of the NIA and ICDC (but not detailed operational plans) with CPA. CPA will Serve as the national command authority for the NIA and ICDC, pending transfer of such authority to an Iraqi government. Appoint (include promotions as well as initial commissioning) all officers and enlisted personnel to positions in the NIA or ICDC. (Ambassador Bremer or Delegate) The power to appoint officers below the rank of Colonel in the ICDC may be delegated to Commander, CJTF-7. Other appointment powers may be delegated in accordance with the relevant CPA orders. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Provide policy guidance and oversight to CJTF-7 for NIA and for 1CDC, to include setting total force targets and equipment levels, basic functions assigned, personnel policies (to include disciplinary rules, recruiting/vetting standards, and salaries and benefits), and determine and manage budgets for financial support to ICDC and NIA programs. (OSA, OMB). In particular, any re-allocation of funds between ICDC and NIA (or other applicable accounts) will require action by CPA. Execute programs for providing basing facilities and equipment to NIA and ICDC units, including contracting and financial oversight. (PM0) Retain administrative control ("ADCON") of CMATT. Provision of logistical and administrative support to NIA and ICDC will be divided between CJTF-7 and CPA as previously agreed. In general, CJTF-7 will provide such support for ICDC units, and CPA (through DSA) will provide it for NIA units under agreements to be reached. NIA and ICDC will, to the maximum extent feasible, use common programs for acquisition and support services, when doing so serves efficiency, interoperability or economy. TEXT BREAK (3) These are the official definitions, paraphrased to reflect the sense of Walt's memo: OPCON = ... authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command ... TACON = ... limited to the detailed direction and control ... necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned ... ADCON = ... authority control of resources in respect to administration and support, including organization ..., The underlying issue is our vision of how the responsibility for security will be transferred from the CJTF to proper Iraqi authorities and the role of CPA and CMATT as these transitions advance. CMATT envisions creating a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) as the top echelon of command of the New Iraqi Army forces, to be joined with a future ministry as a single institution, similar to the British system. We envision the JFHQ as becoming the headquarters of the Iraqi component of the coalition command, directing the actions of all Iraqi armed forces under direction of the coalition commander, while the CPA provides the National Command Authority resources and policy inputs to enable the forces to execute their missions. This configuration directly supports transition. As the CJTF and its' MSCs continue to draw down, NIA units, augmented by ICDC, assume the MSCs' mission. Although it will not be easy to execute, this approach leads more directly to Iraqi control of Iraqi forces, to Iraqi responsibility for the overall UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED security situation and to coordination between the military and civil chains of authority as governance advances. UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 of 2 is/// 2-27 (b)(6) From: (b)(6) Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 7:57 PM To: (111(61 Cc: Executive Secretary Subject: FW: Karbala Security Sitrep: Wed., Nov. 12: Demonstations in al-Hindiya, one person killed, Suspension of 20 officers from al-Hindiyya District Police Department (b)(6) Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat Original Message From: (111(A) — Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 12:05 PM To: Cc: Su ject: Kar a a Security Sitrep: Wed., Nov. 12: Demonstations in al-Hindiya, one person killed, Suspension of 20 officers from al-Hindiyya District Police Department There were large demonstrations in the al-Hindiya municipality last night in which one person was killed by local police. Demonstrations persisted in the area this morning and a delegation came to the Governorate building this morning where we held an emergency meeting with the deputy and assistant Governors (Sa'd Safouk Al-Ma'oudi and Abd al-Aziz al-Nasrawi respectively), the Chief (Qa'im Magam) of the al-l-lindiya municipality and other notables of that district. The police chief for the al- Hindiya municipality, Mandi Salih Kadhim, was also in attendance. Brigadier General Abbas, the Governorate's police chief was not present as he claimed to be ill and resting at home. Deputy Police Chief Lt. Col. Karim attended in his absence. The Bulgarian Commander, Colonel Marinov, and the representative of the Polish Brigade Commander, General Ojrzanowski were also in attendance, The demonstrations had to do with the claim that the municpality's police and police chief were abusing their powers and were hold-overs from the previous regime and secret Baathist supporters. The citizens of al-Hintliyah had submitted a petition requesting their dismissal, held demonstrations, the confrontation got out of hand and shots were fired. A police officer killed one of the demonstrators. I decided to suspend (b)(6) and the other nineteen other officers accused in the petition of 11/12/2003 Page 2 of 2 being Baathists until we could investigate their background. I also instructed the deputy police chief of Karbala to send another municipal police chief, one who meets with the Qa'im Maqam's approval, and nineteen officers from the Karbala city police force to serve in their places. The Bulgarian force commander will assist the Karbala police in disarming the suspended police officers and the taking back their uniforms, equipment, etc. The Deputy and Assistant Governors will write an official decree confirming the decision within the day. The order is to take effect immediately. Everyone except the (b)(6) • was very supportive of my decision. I will forward a list of the names of the officers affected by the decree to Hillah and Baghdad ASAP. They should be vetted carefully for Baathist backgrounds. We shall also establish a committee to listen to the grievances that the citizens have against them. If they are clean, some of these officers will allowed to resume their duties. If not, they will be discharged. (b)(6) GC Karbala