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.___l(b><_ 6> _ _.I~ · The International Presence in Iraq post CPA Summary The date on which CPA will cease to exist is unknown, but assumed to be no later than 30 JW1e 2004. If we are to have the right post CPA structure in place we need to start planning, and implementing, it soon. This paper considers the pros and cons of some of the options as seen from a CPA Operations and Infrastructure perspective. It concentrates on structures - what those structures should do will be the subject of further papers. ~ BackgroWld The CPA is what it is, and will neither change much nor improve substantially in the coming months. Much, indeed most, of it will transform itself into a US Embassy. This paper considers the broader issue of the shape and form of the International Community presence. It assumes that the IC, and the, by then former, members of the Coalition will wish to be involved in three broad areas- security, constitutional processes, and economic and public sector reform/reconstruction. Much work is already ongoing on the security agreement which is scheduled for signature by the end of March. As far as the constitutional process is concerned the assumption is that this will involve a UN SRSG ( however labeled and wherever located ) supported by strong bilateral inputs from the US and UK. This paper thus concentrates on the final issue of the IC involvement in reform and reconstruction. It assumes that whatever is put in place must be acceptable to the Iraqis, that the Coalition will have no legal status ( except perhaps in military terms ), but that the current members of the Coalition will have a strong continuing interest in seeing through economic and administrative reforms. Possible options 1. Minimalist One option is to have no particular structure, which is in fact the model which applies for most of the world. It implies that Aid Ministries rather than Foreign Affairs Ministries will take the lead for their respective governments. Put crudely DFID, FCO, US AID, DOD ( and a host of others ) will run programmes of economic support, institution and capacity building and reconstruction exactly as they do elsewhere with the usual limited coordination applied by a combination of peer pressure by the donors themselves, the Iraqi government, and no doubt in due course UNDP. This model seems acceptable elsewhere and may well prove to be the default mode. But there are two reasons for not accepting it without debate. The first is the considerable, and generally well focused, effort which has been made in these fields by CPA; the second is that the size and thus power of the Program Management Office ( the body established to oversee the US$18.6 billion supplemental ) is so great that it would most certainly not be a coordinated group of equals. 2. Maximalist There is thus a case to be considered for a "new model CPA" which would continue to provide that degree of focus and policy coherence. There would be obvious advantages, but these advantages should not be overstated - CPA itself has not always found it possible to have consistent or coherent policy positions. More importantly though it is difficult to see what legitimacy the "new model CPA" would have. The Coalition will have ceased to exist at the point of hand-over of sovereignty. Existing institutions such as the UN, OSCE, EC etc lack either the mandate or ability to take the functions on. So the only option would be to create a new, open to all, International Institution. The US and UK might well wish to dominate this, but that objective would not be shared by the other 68 countries represented at Madrid. To have legitimacy such an Organization would have to be accepted by the Iraqis and enshrined in one of the UN resolutions. In structural tenns the obvious parallels are the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and the EU Pillar ofUNMIK in Kosovo. The creation of both was painful and expensive. It is questionable as to whether one should voluntarily repeat the experience here. 3. A realistic mid-way? Current activities in CPA are designed to lead to a structure which incorporates the following elements. We are about to create a "new" Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation which will amongst other things take over the functions of the existing Council for International Coordination. This, along with the Ministry of Finance, will sit alongside the "Donor Committee Structure" which is being put in place to handle the World Bank and UN Trust Funds. Rather than create something new it would be possible to strengthen the MPDC with a robust donor coordination cell, possibly funded and manned at least for the first year by the US and UK. This does not of course resolve the issue of the all powerful PMO, but this might be handled by asking the PMO to have its own "External Affairs Department" which would provide the necessary interface. A related issue One related issue is the follow on role of the existing Regional and Governorate Offices. If we accept the absence of a single IC office at the centre it is difficult to see the justification for maintaining it in the field. My preferred option would be to allow the free market to operate. If the US wishes to maintain some of them as Consulates or sub- Consulates so be it. If the UK wishes to do likewise that is your prerogative, although with the exception ofBhasra I would fmd it hard to see why. But the default position should surely be to hand them over to the Iraqis for use as they see fit. That would not preclude a continuing presence of agencies such as RTI, or indeed UK equivalents, but it would mean that such projects would survive on their merits rather than simply because an office existed and had to be utilized.