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1• 1157 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2400 DEFENSE Pl!:NTAGON WASHJ~cYIM~l-2400 I-02/007062 FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action _____ _ . FROM: e. International Security Affairs M. · ......__ _ __, . t r J"' 0 7 lfAy 18oz SUBJECT: Iraqi Inspections/UN Strategy • You should urge the U.S. to move quickly and state out a strong public pmition. to ensure against an unsatisfactory deal between Saddam and the UN. • Much of the public debate on Iraq focuses on UN inspections. 'The essential issue and key U.S. goal is not inspections but disarmament of Iraq. • The centerpiece of U.S. policy should be UN Security Council Resolution 687. which states: - ••Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destnJction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of [all WMDJ." • NSP0.11 directs the USO to ensure that •'no inspection regime is put in place that cannot guarantee the verifiable elimination of Iraq• s WMD ... . RECOMMENDATION: Sign the Memorandum (next under) requesting a Principals . Committee meeting to discuss this issue. COORDINATION: Tab A Attachments: As stated Prepared by: Col bX6} ~-~------' DASO (NESA) l,PCI~--PDASD OSA) Copy Provided Ulb. 0 I ·t Jtfr;; 30:l 05-07-02 1~:1g RCVD Ii•-• I - I uuwm• THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, CC 20301-1000 MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE ASSIST ANT TO TIIE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS SUBJECT: Iraqi Inspections/UN Strategy Though much of the public debate on Iraq focuses on UN inspections, the essential issue and key U.S. goal is not inspections but cfo;armament of haq. WMD is the heart of the problem posed by Saddam. The U.S. cannot rely on a UN inspections regime to eliminate Iraqi WMD capabilities. The proposed UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is even weaker than its predecessor, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was not strong enough for the job. The centeipiece of U.S. policy should be UN Security Council Resolution · (UNSCR) 687, which states: "Iraq sba11 unconditionally accept the destruction. removal, or rendering bannless, under international supervision, of [all WMDJ." This states the disarmament goal categorically. The U.S. should quiclcly establish its public position that the requirement is disannament, not inspections as such. We should do this ~ Iraq reaches an agreement with the UN on deploying UNMOVIC. A disannament mechanism sbouJd ensure the elimination of Iraq's WMD capabilities, despite the skillful denial and deception programs of the Saddam Hussein regime. It should also incorporate the lessons of UNSCOM: Even intrusive inspections over s. everal years missed significant parts of the Iraqi program and failed to detect an ongoing buildup. - Unilateral intelligence capability is required to complement inspections. Counterintelligence capability is required to deal with Iraqi attempts to penetrate and deceive inspection teams. · - There should be linkage between inspections and enforcement. ------------------- ·-- - ----- --------- 11 '1 ·c lllldlf And the past few years since inspections ended. Saddam has been able to improve his technological capabilities: not only WMD, but also his ability to conceal it. This approach is, indeed, directed by NSPD-11, which directs the USG to ensure that "no inspection regime is put in place that cannot guarantee the verifiable elimination of 1raq•s WMD." The worst outcome for the U.S. of a . renewed UN inspections regime would be a protracted and period of inconclusive inspections. The U.S. should publicly advocate new conditions for disarming the Iraqi regime's WMD that are in line with the original language ofUNSCR 681. A new inspection team should have: . - an American in the lead; . . access to any place in Iraq, k> anything (including infonnation and data) . and anyone in baci., all in a timeframe determined by the inspectors; intelligence-sharing; - authority to impound equipment or shut down facilities; unrestricted overflight rights for fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. including UAVs; and bases in northern. southern and central lnq in order to decrease Iraqi reaction time to short-notice inspection opportunities. We need to stay one step ahead of the negotiations between Iraq and the UN. Their next meeting is scheduled for 30-31 May 2002. Therefore, this issue should come to the - Principals Committee as soon as possible. I i'li@l&Jb . \' .. .:__ ___ _:___--~----- I . . . . . · Coordination Page Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Mr. Douglas J. Feith _(