08-F-0194 Doc 11

THE DEPUTY SEMcISWOF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 1 7 ..it* 2033 'OR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENS SUBJECT: IMPRESSIONS FROM ROMANIA REGARDING IRAQ 2 I ?001 • During my visit to Bucharest May 18-19, I met with the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, opposition leaders, and members of the press and the community of non-governmental institutions. *Thoy nenortod that tho following cxp.cricnc,;a from Itonieuno. ciTtitt (Ai t dubruilig from a Communist autocracy to a Western democracy have relevance to Iraq, • Political reform in Rorniania began expeditiously. (b)(1) o A National Council (unelected) was soon stood up and promulgated quickly an election laud. o Free elections were held in May 1990 -just five months after Ceaucescu's execution (b)( 1 ) • The National Council sustained p1ogrjt (sani Thatior -- 1— Mi as— the Parliament's promulgation of a new constitution. (b)(1) administrative Ia5ks died from more political tasks, such (b)(1) elt ASSISTAX 171".: OECILET 4krsiall-inew-14401,1opliieupPerr. la KW • Iihrpionewirone-440 -Nfirt.14 )— aim swan t o The National Council was not an elected body, hut one composed of representatives from various parties. • The government provided quickly tangible benefits to the people. Plots of land were sold in tht countryside. Those in cities were allowed to buy theic apartments. • The new authorities provided transparency (press coverage) into their actions. The Parliament's deliberations on the constitution were broadcast nation-wide. (h)(1) (b)(1) (bX1) Some in the non govcrnmentul community asserted this inclusive approach is in (b)(1) (b)(1) • On the economic front, a former minister of finance emphasiLed that it is essential to prevent rampant inflation. To allow pensions and salaries to erode only undercuts confichrnce in market reform. • They all warped that (I) transforming Iraq into a democracy will take much time and effort and (2) hard reforms only become more difficult over time (b)(1) ko xvi63$760 - MEMO TO: Secretary Runtsfeld DATE: ,July 25,2003 FROM: Paul Woliowitz SUBJECT: What to Call the So-Called "Sunni Triangle" Don, the Turks call it the "Devil's Triangle." That might be a good phrase for us to adopt. (b)(1) 10)(1) Cc: GEN John Abizaid I ,TG Ricardo Sanchez AMB Paul Bremer Clay McManaway Lanry DiRita • ' in:050-73z- 3Z UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON. DC- 20301-1100 INFO MEMO July 18, 2003, 5:42 PM COMPrFOLILR FOR SLECRUARY OF DEFENSE 1.1ta4: Driv S. Zakhcim S UBJECT: 1.1.N. Oil for Food (OFF) Contract Audits ri Under the auspices of a Policy-directed Task Force, thc DCAA and DCMA have conducted a review 01 approved and funded Iraqi Oil for Food contracts. The team selected 700 high priority. high-dollar contracts valued at $7 billion for review; this amounts to roughly 10 percent of the OFP contracts but about 70 per cent of the 111311111S. • The audit team has briefed interim findings on 312 individual contracts, Of these 312 contracts the audit team believes 172, or 55 percent, of the individual contracts arc overpriced. The average amount of overpricing per overpriced contract is 22 percent. The total of potential overpricing of the 312 individual contracts is $358.7 million. This rate of over pricing, when applied to the 700 high-priority, high-value contracts, could result in as much as $805 million in overpricing. • in addition, the audit team found some contracts of questionable (I) value, such as contracts for Cigarette Paper, Mercedes Benz Sedans, Sports Halls (Gymnasiums) and larger than expected quantities of spares. passenger vehicles, and other pieces of miscellaneous equipment. • The Secretary General has the authority (Pursuant to UNSCR 1483 (2003)), to either postpone action on or negotiate adjustments in the terms or conditions of these contracts. The CPA can ;iilvise the U.N. Secretary General of any postixmements or adjustments in the terms of the contracts that are believed to be warranted. if postponed, the contract amounts would be deposited into the DFI; if adjusted, the contract amounts could be used to meet current requirements, • I believe the CPA should pursue this effort with the U.N. If CPA prefers, my office and Policy could act on CPA's behalf. I recommend you discuss this matter with Jerry Bremer. COORDINATION: OSD (PI cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense FW. Page 1 of 2 03X1X1.4a CIV, OSD From: (bX1); 14(d) Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 12 30 AM To: (bX1); CIV. OSD Subleet: FW; importance: High Ori inal fbiessa e From: Sent: ur ay, Ju y 19, 2003 8:23 AM To: Kennedy, Patrick AMB Cc: McManaway, Clayton; Lemmon, Justin; Raphel, Robin Subject: FW: Importance: High Sir - Six months ago SecDef undertook an effort to audit UN OFF contracts. He wanted leverage over the disposition of these funds. The surprise result: 55% are over priced I understand transfer of OFF to DFI is a done deal now, although Robin has asked for this in writing. See the paper Robin did for Arnb Brumor's trip book. If you do not have it, I can forward. vr isn Original Message-- From: McManaway, Clayton Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 8:16 AM To:1(brIt 1.4(b) Subject: FW: Importance: High As discussed. cent -----Original Message- -- From: McManaway, Clayton Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 5:55 AM To: Ftaphel, Robin Subject: FW: Importance: High Robin. We will need to discuss this as early this morning as possible. Did this get out of the box. or does it have your input and concurrence? Clay Original Message From: Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSID Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 3:08 AM To: McManaway, Clayton; Oliver, David R., Jr.; Jeffery, Reuben Subject: FW: 7/19/2003 FW: Page 2 of 2 Original Message From: Zakheim, Dov, Hon, OUSDC Sent: Friday, July 18, 2003 6:45 PM To: 'robin cleveland-2' Cc: Durnan, Jaymie, C1V, OSD Subject: «SDinfoOFFprrcing_.. .pdl>> FYI. Dov UKIL - 2003 MENIORANDUN1 TO: Secretary Rums feld FROM: L. Paul Bremer, Ill RE: CPA issues MEK • Need to resolve broader strategy as soon as possible.30 July NATO • Should we consider issuing invitation to NATO to 1) establish small presence in Iraq of commanders/ advisors or 2) make a statement in support of international troop contributions? • Endorsement, even in the absence of large troop deploment, could help provide political cover to member countries. IRAQI GOVERNANCE COUNCIL • GC elected a new nine-member leadership body to chair the Council on a rotational basis. • Nine members elected were Ja'afari: Chalabi; Allawi; Talabani; Pachachi; timid; 13ahr al-Uloum; Barzani. Page 011 (b)(1): 1.4(b) 1.4(g) Page 012 (b)(1): 1.4(b), 1.4(d) Page 1 of 2 63)(6) CIV From: Sent: To: xo) Ca:- p X6) Carpenter, Scott Cit./ Ministry of Governance Tuesday, July 29, 2003 12.27 PM tFS01), McManawar Clayton, Putnam. Candad E. (FS-02) Crocker, Ryan, Executive Secretary Sy_bject: RE: Dick Nabb's report — o-v ., / ,,, 7 ; lc 3 11 tc e. ,:717/ ,/ • lbX0) f c iere_isIrte dperft letter to Paul plus the original report. I'm not sure the DepSecDef note is in the appropriate format but the co -nTeTifis line Ori inal Messa e--- From: )(8) (FS01) Sent: ues ay, u y 9, 2003 8:55 PM To: McManawa , Clayton; Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Putnam, Candad E. (FS-02) Cc: •)(6) Crocker, Ryan; Executive Secretary Sub ect: RE: Dick Nabb's report We will be here at least until 10. You may send it to us electronically to execsec as it appears on the cc line. if not processed tonight, it will be first thing in the morning Thanks. 100) Head of CPA Executive Secretariat Executive Asst, CPA Administrator (Commercial line, at desk) (call) DSN) Original Message From: McManaway, Clayton Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 8:15 PM To: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Putnam, Candad E. (F5-02) Cc:kbX6) I Crocker, Ryan; IOW FS01) Subject: RE: Dick Nabb's report Please send it to the Executive Secretariat first, thank you. CCM -----Original Message From: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 5:54 PM To: Putnam, Candad E. (FS-02) CC: (b)(6) McManaway, Clayton; Crocker, Ryan Subject: Dick Nabb's report Candace, 7/29/2003 Page 2 of 2 Would you please do a note from Ambassador Bremer to DepSec Wollowicz on the latest developments with the Turks? The letter format can he found on the website. The note should essentially say "I am attaching the latest report from Dick Nabb, our CPA regional director in the north, that indicates our continued difficulties, etc, etc." Feel free to add whatever else you feel relevant. Keep it to less than one page. I'm going out to dinner at 8PM but will back lo clear it or Ryan can do it if he's here. In any case, I'd like to get it to him tonight. Thanks. 7129/2003 -14:•?x,z)' . 60 1 if - August.4, 2003 mer CC': Pahl Wolfowitz Doug Fah FROM: Donald Runtsfeld SUBJECT: Iraqi Envoys at the UN The attached on Iraqi envoys at the UN is self-explanatory. I hope you are working the problem. Let us knim what we can do to help. Thanks. Attach. 7/ 1 K/03 1.SD4P1 memo to SecOet ie. Iraqi Fnvoyc nt the UN WM a OlUs01 Pleas(' reApund by s I L -7 >1 47 -x' ° c / fIC ic U12966 03 INFO MEMO OSD Policy 18 July 2003 N.111.MOKANDLINI FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM: Douglas J, Feith /1'11'733 SNIP:Cf: Iraqi Fnvoys at the UN • You asked us to look at the Washington Post article "Saddam's Low Level Envoys Still Work at the UN" and research the facts presented in the article. If true, what do we do about it'? • After discussion with the USLIN Mission, wc discovered the following: Article refers tS diplomats plus 8 staff in the Iraqi Mission. to_____ Former Iraqi Amh;Nsminr to the UN, al-DoorLdnignated a Charge d'Affaires for the Iraqi Mission upon his departure. UN currently reeogni/es him and his staff as legitimate representatives. Ilc maintains status until transferred or challenged by the Credentials Committee. redentials have not been challenged hceause they arc "cooperative" and then - participation is mostly nonexistent. }'or example, at the pre-donors' conference assembled a few weeks ago, the !Mos asked to pal- 10We ..uenIZ. 7 4'r---- • liaq's new Governing Council is sending representatives to addre.ss the l. titled `cani.ins Sccuricy Council next week. We may tt.fint the Guverning Council to deal with this issue. • Recommendation: no action required as Iraqi Mission staff has marginalized itself and the new ( kweming, Council has this on its radar screen. • -7) (. / /1 kz)i/t, ( • /( / /AI DUSI) (NESA) I s %CI .17 7 0/4.•Z4 5 , IL • a • / / , — COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD 13 August 2003 MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM: Paul Bremer SUBJECT! Meetings with the Governing Council on FDI I had two meetings with the Governing Council today. The first was part of our regular weekly consultations, which are driven by an agenda agreed to earlier in the week. The bulk of our conversation focused on foreign direct investment (FDI). I made the general case why Iraq should be open to FDI. Given the dramatic lack of domestic investment over the past two decades, Iraq needs substantial FDI to create the jobs for its unemployed. GC members did not react in a unified way; some were enthusiastic about the prospect of EDI, while other resisted it - although less for ideological reasons than for ones of political sensitivity. It was, however, obvious that we need to cultivate the debate within the GC on FD1. Beyond expressing a fear that foreigners would buy up real- estate, no member expressed an opinion on any of the five other elements of an FDI policy I identified: restrictions on investment in certain sectors, percentage of foreign ownership, rapid approval mechanisms, the repatriation of capital and profits, and mechanisms for dispute resolution. I hope to facilitate an FDI briefing by a World Bank team on Sunday. I will then push GC thinking by submitting papers laying out the sort of FDI policy we believe is in the best interest of Iraq. I also discussed with the GC two other issues related to the former regime. First, we spoke about how to handle the former employees of entities that were dissolved under my May 23rd order. We have thus far approached this issue differently depending on the entity dissolved; the military collects stipends, Ministry of Information employees received severance, and the members Office of the Presidential Diwan have acquired no benefits. GC members did not reject our proposal of paying severance to members of entities dose to the former regime. In fact, several pushed for a more generous solution, offering pensions to long-time employees and re-employment for non-senior Ba'athists. Rather than allowing us to move ahead with a severance package, the GC announced its intention to form a committee to look at this issue. On de-ba'athification, members resolved to appoint ten people to the Iraqi De-Ba'thification Council created in order to hand responsibility for de-ba'athification over to the Iraqis. Interestingly, more than one member argued for an amnesty for former Ba'athists who had never committed any crimes. Later in the day, senior advisor for finance, David Oliver, and I met with the GC Subcommittee on Finance and Economics to discuss the budget. We underscored how Iraq would be in deficit in 2004 and how this would affect key sectors such as security, health, and electricity. We urged the GC to prepare for the Madrid Donor's Conference with a plan to seek funds to cover these gaps. Appointing an interim Foreign Minister, we stressed, would help Iraq increase its outreach and argue its case with donors around the world. 1 4e1t191 0 19r1TrIrt1111,1114t-t" (..tislirpit, 14- '- =c-- c_ 1:k P AUG -9 aro- MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (L. PAUL BREMER) 71 FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy V it ) (11 r".11 SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food (OFF) Program • As you know, an interagency Task Force is reviewing the pricing of 760 (roughly 10%) of the approved and funded OFF contracts. Those contracts, valued at $7B, represent 60% of committed funds. The Task Force has reviewed the first 628 contracts. Attached arc its initial recommendations. • The potential savings front implementing the recommendations could he significant • Up to ZOOM saved if overpriced contracts are renegotiated; and ▪ S2-3B saved if overpriced and questionable contracts arc cancelled. * The CPA has the authority to advise the UN Secretary General to either cancel or negotiate adjustments in OFF contracts, If cancelled, the amounts should eventually be deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq. if adjusted, the amounts could be used to meet current reconstruction and humanitarian requirements. a You may warn to consider the Task Force's recommendations, as you determine how to proceed with the OFF program. My staff is ready to help you. Attachment als OSD Policy August 9, 2003 44+11.044 1 1€4014.41£44404146, • OFF TASK FORCE INTERIM FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Interim Findings • Of the 628 contracts already reviewed, roughly 50% were assessed to likely be overpriced. The average overpricing is 22% per contract. • Thc total value of the contracts assessed to be overpriced is approximately $2.8B; potential overpricing in the contracts is roughly $600M. • The OFF program reflects heavy dependence on old technology, particularly M the electrical sector; significant variability in prices for identical items; and little itemization or training, spare parts. and transportation costs. 40 Several items of questionable value were identified, such as contracts for Cigarette Paper, Mercedes Benz Sedans. Sports I falls and larger-than-expected quantities of spares, passenger vehicles and other items such as maize headers. Recommendations Regordine OFF Contracts • Request documentation from suppliers for overpriced OFF contracts: '0 Assess whether contract terms regarding spares or other items should be amended and whether contracts for "old technology" or items of questionabie value are essential for immediate needs; a Require adjustments in contracts that arc overpriced. Recommendations for Post-OFF Contracting • Require that future contracts itemize transportation, insurance, and deliverables, including spare parts, services, or other items; • Require suppliers to provide detailed specifications on items being supplied and detailed cost data for unique (sole source) items; and • Require competitive bidding for commodity items; limit the use of middlemen. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD August 15, 2003 MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM: Paul Bremer <signed> SUBJECT: Urgent Budget Request As you know, we have submitted a detailed budget request for funds needed before the end of this calendar year. It is a sizable request; eighteen billion dollars. This request was carefully prepared and a detailed budget was provided with it. We run out of money in January. Without these additional funds, this calendar year, we can, not succeed in Iraq. Now that the proposal has been prepared and submitted for your consideration, our political strategy and the timing of next steps become important for several reasons: 1) the Congressional calendar; 2) the scheduled UN sponsored donors conference; and 3) our political strategy as we seek congressional approval. The last of these looms large and immediate as we face the arrival of important congressional delegations in Iraq. These coming visits sharpen the need to maintain party lines of support. Specifically, I will be pressed hard beginning Monday on our needs for additional appropriated funds by visiting CODELS. Murtha is here Monday and Jim Kolbe will be here Tuesday with McCain. Rep Kolbe already signaled that he knows we need more money and wants to know the amount. I can make the general point about the need for more money and point out that the amount and legislative tactics must be decided by the President. But it would be better if I could go further, at least on the ballpark figure we will be asking for. Tom Korologos believes that the sooner we can discuss our plan with people like Kolbe and Murtha the better the chances are we will get the money we need to succeed here. In that event, we must also insure that other senior appropriators in Washington arc informed of our intentions first. For this reason I ask that you give this your earliest attention. Dov has the details. Given the timing of events, I will try to reach you by phone to discuss this later today. As always, your support is 'greatly appreciated. Cb'OPZI- ; u ( $t, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD August 15, 2003 MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM: Paul Bremer <signed> SUBJECT: Muqtada al-Sadr For almost a month we have been examining the implications of allowing the Iraqi police to move against a radical, young Muqtada al-Sadr for the murder of highly respected Shisa Ayatollah Mohammed al-Khoi in April of this year. The investigation of this murder has been underway for the past four months by a fearless Iraqi Investigative Magistrate. He has assembled more than thirty witnesses who support his case against Muqtada al-Sadr for this crime. They include two who are prepared to swear they heard al-Sadr give the order to have al- Khoi killed. Twelve defendants are already in prison in Najaf. Another eleven, including al-Sadr, have been under investigation for planning and masterminding the crime. Yesterday I sent Major General (Reserve) Don Campbell, a State Supreme Court Justice in New Jersey, to Najaf to interview the Magistrate. Judge Campbell has closely followed the case, as have two experienced American prosecutors at CPA. The case the Iraqi Magistrate has put together appears to them to be fully and convincingly documented. They believe the Magistrate will sign the Arrest Warrant for al-Sadr and his assistants in a matter of days. They conclude that the Magistrate is acting on his own without improper outside influence. He has previously told us that if he decides to arrest Muqtada al-Sadr he will use Iraqi police to do so, though he would like Coalition forces prepared to back them up if needed. We have considered carefully the concerns voiced both about the potential for violence in reaction and about the possibility that Sadr's star is waning and should be allowed to fade without interruption. Our conclusion is that these analyses are wrong, and in particular fail to take into account our obligation to uphold law and order in Iraq and to be seen doing so. We conclude that we should not interfere with the Investigating Magistrate's proceedings even if they reach to the issuance of an arrest warrant for Muqtada al--Sadr for murder. We also conclude that should the Magistrate issue an arrest warrant for murder he should be allowed to carry out his duty and we should support him in that effort as the responsible, legally governing power in Iraq. To date we have avoided direct confrontation with Saclr. We took no action when his newspaper of July 16 indirectly called for vigilante action against a list of 124 supposed Ba*this and Bat' h Party sympathizers. At least one of those listed was subsequently killed. And we have taken no action as he has bussed thousands of followers from the poorest neighborhoods of Baghdad to Najaf where he verbally attacks the Coalition, the Iraqi Governing Council and the traditional Shi' a leaders of Najaf. Intelligence suggests that he has plans to establish a separate governing body to compete with the Governing Council. He has publicly announced the raising of the "Mandi Corps". Though to date this group appears to be unarmed, it is not clear how long that will last. Contrary to the view that Muqtada is fading, our assessment is that his activities are spreading to other areas of Iraq. I experienced this first hand. On a trip to the South yesterday, two Shi'a members of the Governing Council I was traveling with expressed rising concern about Muqtada's activities and urged the Coalition to deal with him (as far as I know, they are unaware of the Iraqi Magistrate's investigation). Our forbearance has been rewarded with a growing religious-based insurgency against the Coalition and the Governing Council. CPA and C.ITF-7 are working together to plan for handling the consequences of an arrest. The arrest will be conducted by Iraqi police, with US forces providing back-up. We are already working to shape the environment and once he is arrested, we will launch a public information campaign that will emphasize the fact that Sadr is an accused murderer violating Iraqi law. We will also contact several Shia Clerics who in the past weeks have expressed concerns about Muqtada and seek their public support for the Iraqi Magistrate's decision. The decision to support the Investigative Magistrate is not an easy one. The likelihood of serious unrest in the poorest neighborhoods in Baghdad, Basra and perhaps elsewhere is real and must be anticipated. But I do not believe that it is best to retreat in the face of this threat. EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY DOCUMENT TRACKING SHEET ACTION OFFICE: Strategic Comms ACTION: PLE.ASF.- prepare Response for the Administiatur's Signature , .c.-- ----/ SUBJECT: TV in Iraq — ---- _ COORDINATE WITH: Special Instructions: c 4 7--rfi NeW SAA)1 /4 /Fi-iikt Fga sickjer-- SUSPENSE: ROUTING DATE: CONTROL NO.: LCOB 08 AUG 03 030807-20 INFORMATION COPIES TO: (4(6) • ACTION TAKEN/RESPONSE: Document Ink Received: Doc. Oat*: Origination: COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD 23 August 2003 MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM: Paul Bremer, AdniudeapUl 63 SUBJECT: Kevin WocIficin We have hired Kevin Woelflein. 1.k will work in CPA's OMB. His first major task will be to develop better processes for pushing government funds through the banking system for execution of regional, provincial, and municipal programs August 21. 2003 TO: Doug Ecith CC: Reuben Jeffery Larry Di Rita FROM: Donald Rumstetd?( SUBJEC-1'. Kevin WocifIcla Sometime hack 1 recommended a man named Kevin WoeMein for consideration to go to liaq. This is a person with banking experience. My recollection is he may even speak Ar.thic. but I ini not sure of that. I sent the material on him to somebody. I was told today that he was told that his services were not needed. I would be. curious to have someone check into that and explain to ine what in the world N i!oinf. , on. I thought we needed people out there. Pleme respond by TO: Gen. John Abizaid CC: Gen. Dick Myers Amb. Jerry Bremer FROM: Donald Rumsfeld Vt: NEIN SVH DATE: August 30, 2003 RE: SADR If SADR is publicly calling the Coalition "the enemy," we really need to think through carefully where the red lines are, and what we are going to do if red lines are crossed. If people want to define themselves as our enemies, then I think they've crossed over a line. Thanks. DHRJaza 083003.03 Respond by: UNCLASSIFIED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 29 August 2003 Mission: TF Reconstruction of Iraqi Electricity (TF RIE) deploys to Iraq and is operational within two weeks in order to support CPA in the delivery of reliable and consistent electrical power to the Iraqi people. Concept of Operations: *fit concert with guidance, achieve the objective of 4400 MW by 30 SEP 03 and 6000 MW by EOM MAY. *Rapidly deploy and carefully integrate a planning and management team with CPA, Iraqi Ministries, C.ITF-7. IT R1E will be under the command of BG Hawkins. *As much as possible, leverage USACE personnel and resources in country. -Intent is to invigorate and empower current effort, not to scrap everything and start all over again -Right mix of using existing command and support structure with appropriate augmentation for maximum effect *Rapidly establish a (de-engineering network at cad( of the 18 major pOWCT plants and selected distribution nodes for in-country coordination and reachback to industry experts. *Leverage reachback with private industry for expertise through tele-engineering. *Continue to develop a mid-, and long-range plan of action that will mesh with the CPA PNIO. *Deploy a power system security assessment team (RAM-I) to develop a national level infrastructure security plan. The following support is required for implementation: -S500M under IF R1E control as initial seed money in order to leverage current USACE contracts and fund TF RTE. -Need to draft a "terms of reference" for the C2 piccc so everyone knows (CPAJCITF 7) how we lit and how we will be an executing agent for OPS. This will save an incredible amount of pain later. e.g. Mr. Bremmer and General Abizaid need to agree on the approach and empower their respective staffs with understanding of who is doing what to whom. -Full acquisition authority -Security in support of operations -Authority and funding to conduct an expedited CRC process -Logistic support for Tr' R1E. (Beddown, communications, etc.) -A senior civilian mentor who is a world class power infrastructure expert. Our research has identified a person with these characteristics (not contacted though) named IMIEllislaval Academy Graduate, Bonneville Power Administrator (1993- 1998), CEO Seattle City Light (second largest municipal power company in U.S., currently a power industry consultant. Augmenting such an individual could be senior professional representatives from BPA (could be made available). TVA or a large private power company such as Duke Energy. Approved By: Prepared By: William E. Mortensen Major Cieneral, USA Colonel, USA Director of Logistics Chief, Engineers 29 August 2003 Page I o12 pow From: Browning, Stephen E SES Sent: Monday, September 01.2003 10:02 AM To: xer Strock, Carl Subject; FVV. Presentation on Exercise Essayon/ TF RIE Importance: High FYI on Tampa CENTCOM setter—response to. Regards, Some initial comments: This plan focuses on generation. There is little or no reference to the security and restoration of 400kV transmission lines - the area whero we feel that a task force type of approach will be most useful and effective We are not aiming for 4400kW but 4400MW (slides 4 and 5) Security problems are not nodal (site security has not been too much of a problem). 'rho issue is security of power lines and piperiries. This is where wo need military support Slide 13: the management/planning function must not be separate from the CPA electricity team (descnbed as a cell within this presentation). It must report into the existing team To do otherwise would add complexity. The contracting officer should fit within the CPA Contracting Authority (led by Col Tony Bell). Slide 6 The assumption that no new assessments are required is incorrect. We would welcome FEST support in conducting assessments - that would be most useful. In reality, we do not expect that Exercise Essayons will be able to contribute greatly to the 4400MW programme, simply because of deployment timescales, On October 1st, we will commence an autumn maintenance programme. There are not really 18 major power stations - the ones that count are smaller in number effective to provide larger teams at a fewer plants. It would be more Questions. For how long do we expect to retain the services of the additional staff of Exercise Essayons? How does Exercise Essayons fit in with Task Force RIP or RIE? What accommodation requirements does Exercise Essayons have? Is it understood that we are expecting 18 Bechtel engineers to arrive within the next few days? The key point that we wish to gel across is that, although we warmly welcome more support and applaud the enthusiasm of Centcom, we have already have a team structure and approach that is correct and that is starting to gel results We wish to augment this team rather than create parallel managemert structures. 9/1/2003 9/2/2003 DRAFTED: .IKREUL AMEIORIZED;PDREMER CLEARED: SCAR PEN' rLiz, .1.KIZAJ ESK1 FROM: I lEADQUARTERS COALITION PROV ISI ON A I. AlY1110)Z1 I TO: SECDEP WASIIDC SECSTATE WASIIDC UNCLAS 11Q CPA E.O. 12358: N/A. TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, ASEC, IZ SIJIIJErf: CPA ADMINISTRATOR MEETING wrrii IRAQ GOVERNING COUNCIL, SEPT I, 2003 1.(U) CPA Administrator Bremer met with the Governing Council (GC) today (911/2003) to discuss security in the wake of the Najaf bombing. Administrator had met with the GC on Sunday night to diseuss their plans to announce Ilw new cabinet. They released the list of ministers today and plan an official event to unveil the cabinet im Wednesday. 2.(0) Today's session began with a short meeting with the full GC. Administrator offered his condolences to thy members for the deaths in Najaf and reiterated that the U.S. stands ready to provide any assistance requested, Ile said that security clearly was the highest priority Concern Pot the country at this time and be welcomed the GC's agreement to convene the Joint Security Committee. Administrator underlined USG support for putting an Iraqi face On security as quickly as possible. 3.(11) Administrator Bremer, LTG Sanchez, Sr. Advisor Slocombe, and Sr. Advisor Kerik then joined UK Representative Richmond for a smaller meeting with the GC's representatives to tlic Joint Security Committee. Adininists ator reminded the GC members that the Coalition had adopted a less intrusive posture in providing security for Najaf at the tequest of the local religious and government leadership, and that when those leaders did ask for More assistance we were quick to deliver, lie also made clear that he did not appreciate the public criticism directed against the Coalition by GC members in the wake or the bombing and that additional unhelpful comments would make it difficult for ihc U.S. to continue its strong support for Me GC. The GC members present were sympathetic but resisted taking responsibility for setting the record straight. 4.(U) While there was some discussion of arming militias, most members present agreed that creating unaccountable militias would only undermine security. Al) agreed that the situation in Najaf was extraordinary because of Ow city's religious 'importance and that we should arrange a joint GC-Coalition delegation to visit Najaf and develop a plan to improve security Mem Some members argned that the Coalition needed to "take off the gloves" and make mass arrests of suspected Ba'athists to send a reassuring message hi the public. Some also called for comptehensive registration of all foreigners in the country accompanied by increased police supervision. The Administrator pushed back on mass arrests as being reminiscent or the previous regime. Registration was a good idea but would take years to implement. 5. (U) Administrator responded by offering a series of proposals in addition to the Najaf assessment: create an intelligence service and analysis center in the Ministry of Interior; establish customs/visa policies to improve immigration controls; provide military 1.NOs to each ministry to help coordinate security and Facilities Protection Service activities; solicit governors nominations for Ministry or Interior governorate security cootdinators; enlist GC members' assistance with recruiting for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps; and accelerate build-up of the police and the New Iraqi Army. (U) A follow-on meeting later in the day covered similar ground. The new Interim Minister of Interior agreed to create a joint MOI-Coalition working group to study ways to improve border security and CPA agreed to beef up security at key Sunni shrines that could be at greater risk Ibllowing the Najaf bombing. The Administrator also offered to arrange for his chief of staff to brief the CC on measures CPA is taking to address members' concerns about their personal safety and the security of the CC complex. 7. (U) COMMENT: There is no doubt (hurt security will continue to be the dominat int; issue for at lust the near future. BREM ER ' I i.• 111 010:?02 .. _ ?1/oc3/20ee oe: 33 (bX6) TAOS WEST i-CUSE PAGE 02 8:58 PM TO: Jerry Bremer Gen. John Abizaid FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld DATE; August 25, 2003 SUBJECT: 9\-) . .sc,A -4 1- 0 14 --- Attached is a letter I received from Retired U. Gen. James B. Vaught. I thought it • had some interesting ideas, and you might be interested in Keading ii Thanks. DHRifun 082303.*1 Attach: Letter to Si) from LTG Vaught 1/21/03 Ant i:>11t:A... 1,1•(--• J. i ty4,1 4-10 str\ • is l'Nevc 111.) 'A" shil(cs,wc--- kola' c•-,5 e. %'. v,juv„, 0041t4 It • 01/09/2000 20: 33 MO) AOS GLE51 HousE PAGE - AVG-21-4115 764u 020* PS EzxV.2 .-, \- -7 ' Cr C.-- %c &ti 'via 34/ 21ti P.04 o kbx8) G.P7.1p1123A.,143.1!:NAD(RIT • S. AMY MIRED) BUSINLSS 11101s -r/FAX :1(bX6) HOME FLIONE4(bX8) 21 August 1.002 Dear Secretary Rurtisbetd: Thuile for your c.onti rti.i rig, determined leadership in the Global Wu Against Terrorism. (GWAY). Listed next are some thoughts, for you considerations, to help stabilim the situalon irset,i wIlp:ottat;on sonit now rsy is beginning to turn negati‘e in thc eyes of yott former supporters. W;:hott: alot of ecbotatice, ; suggest the following: A. fr.rpuse a d.;sk to dawn cta few each WO: eJcig alt of Iraqi's ioteniatiesa/ borders. Annouucas via all media that 2U person within 10,000 meters of the bottler uho rno•.•e .^-^ound during cu;few, will be shot by Americas A.itcraft (AC-1301ot etlier weenona plofernit). daylight hours, the bordrrs will be surveilled by nd gootid patois. 'This action will Mop the o',Ildldera and Stddern taloa-34.-y loyalists. B. ACtiVitt several thoutasd formes Iraqi professional soldiers and place it least one (unarmed) io or on eacb American vehicle, positioned so they are visible while (ha vehicle is outside a sectue bora. General Parton did this with glut soccer:, in, the U.S. Zone of occupied Germany during 1945.46. C. 7ec all 13/0 Dine Grange to active duty, appoint bus to the park LTG. and make him the special tectulty adviaor to Ambassador Bremer (CIA ad other ildVit0Ty ft esentittiou notwithstanding). Irssrc would not undercut Gen. Ableald's ci.thority. Oo the annary, he would facilitate the C:ENTt'OM liberation and security oats. (Noe. I tave not ta:ked to Dave ot Pete SchooLmaker. flowerer, I am sure ilt.ty both oul ecnctu) Dave tr..notys what to do. He does not need a long list or guidance There tr.ity be others who believe tl,cy Ire equally cosh lied, heroiever,3 don't k::ow w:10 iliey are and would iNe to co:npuft their Credentials with Dare Crnuge's. lie his done it all, served at all lei. els, end still knows how to work as x rrienfocr of 3 MUiti•diftip:ine LICti eiviliarthniii:aly team He has served with me row iiints, (in prate and war) 1:cEiyming when he was a Lieutenant, "Thanks again r less on with your VISION TO VICTORY?. Bat Vau L LT& ,g) Pwro it am-t7C\N) 3 3 tits) .4 IJKRIT Introduction: Tikrit is well known as the homeland and heartland of Saddam and his family. Security operations to mop up remaining senior baathists absorb a considerable amount of US forces effort in this area. Ethnically, Tikril Is mainly Sunni Arab with smaller Turcoman and Kurdish populations in the northern city of Tur Khormatu, the scene of recent violence following the destruction of a Turcoman shrine. Politically, Tikrit and environs houset a constituency of 'disgruntled' 3Znni who feel that they are being side-lined in the national political processes. Political: Despite being further behind its northern neighbours in political developments. Malt is just about to start enagaging in the process of selecting a governing council for the governorate of Salahaddin. Although there has been an appointed interim governor in place since shottly after the liberation of Iraq. he has had mixed rsviews from community leaders in the governorate. And so Coalition tbrces helping locals to organise the piocessp'have built on the formats used in Kirkuk and Diyala. Representgtives of each of the main municipalities in the governorate will gain representation at the governorate level from the process. Tribal and community leaders from 8 municipalities have the opportunity to develop the political processes in the governorate. The selection process begins this week, with the governing council of 25 expected to be selected and functioning by the middle of September. Economic: The Baiji refinery is in the Salahaddin Governorate. This facility is the primary refinery tor processing Iraq's oil and a cornerstone in the pipeline to transport oil to Turkey. Despite a number of engineering challenges - a legacy of years of neglect and disrepair, the pipeline and refinery are improving and continue to increase capacity for processing, Reconstruction: The bridge over the Tigris at Tikrit has recently been awarded a Bechtel reconstruction contract. This will close the bridge for a short time while modernisation and repair work is carried out. Humanitarian assistance: There is much non-conflict reconstruction and governance work to be done in Tikrit, particularly in areas outside the Saddam palaces and compounds. However, a reluctance by the UN even before the Baghdad bombing to consider this area permissive has limited UN visibility over the needs in Tikril and has also limited the number of NGOs willing to consider working in the area. CPA North and the Coalition Forces have been working actively to persaade NGUs to do so. MORS Mosul has traditionally been Iraq's second city an the north. It has an ethnically diverse population with a majority of Sunni Arabs - both urban and tribal, a large population of Kurdsitand sizeable but mixed Christian and Assyrian community. There is cilso a Turcoman community. Mosul is the administrative center for the Nineveh governorate which has a large Kurdish/Yazidi Kurdish population in its northern region, and a large Turcoman community in Tall Afar. There are also key branches of the Shammar and Jibboer; tribes among a myriad of tribes in the agrarian areas of the governorate. The governorate was the victim of large scale social-engineering programs under Saddam, including the establishment of collective towns which displaced many Kurdish village populations and placed them in one center, and of Arabization where Kurds and Turcomans were expelled Iron the city and the governorate. losing property and land rights and title, Most were forced into the areas controlled by the Mr and PIJK. The legacy of these social engineering programs which has left a large displaced population from Mosul and Nineveh Governorate in the northern governorates has been one of the key issues since the liberation. Rspecially in the early days atter the conflict, Kurds displaced from the governorate attempted to return, in some cases displacing Arabs living in the area. In advance of the May/June harvest season, Coalition forces established short-term harvest arrangements to acknowledge the disputed ownership of arable land but enable Arabs who had planted the summer crop to benefit from half the profits of the harvest. Mosul is also the home of 30% of the officer corps of the former Iraqi army. On the announcement of the dissolution of the armed forces following liberation, there were demonstrations and finally a riot where former officers demanded salaries until they could find new jobs. The establimhment of the stipend structure and Initial programs for the new Iraqi Army has gone some way to calming this volatile group. Mosul was one of the first governorates in post-liberation Iraq to select an interim City/Governorate Council. With the help of the Coalition forces in the area, local community leaders shaped a process which gave representation to all key ethnic and religious groups present in the governorate The Council is headed by an Arab Mayor and a Kurdish Deputy. There1J are also Assyrian. Turcoman and Tribal assistant mayors Moslawis say that their number o priority is security. Many lawyers and security enforcement personnel acknowledge that Saddam's amnesty whiroi relenned A Ierge number c,f pr'sonPrs mito the eity have rontributed to the security probler experienced since liberation. The city escaped large-scale battl,4 damage (though there were some good surgical strikes} but fell tctim to widespread looting. Reconstrucliun and rehabilitali of key city functions and infrastructure continues to be priority of coalition forces on the ground. LhAce/Vt... 4 YVt7t . CrCKe gr ,.. U, -)c^-c ccv-%‘.,..t_.\.,e —3 ,' - f\ - cvs_Cik_ CA. c--‘ -(37 ----- ffiarei--1^4. '4., c.-- CT-Ad•-c ( \ o v, ckn c" r•sr‘ 7c Mosul boasts a key university. As in other parts of Iraq. Baathism was endemic in the teaching system. But through agreement with the Coalition Provisional Advisor, a mechanism was found to enable sludests to complete their end of year exams, with tutors who had baathist affiliations employed on temporary 'at will contracts. Mosul University is beginning to re-establish links with the three Kurdish universities in the northern governorates. CPA North is working with the universities to help establish liasion mechanisms for sharing resources, personnel and expertise. Mosul also has the capacity for a dynamic industrial and tourism sector. Local economists, industrialists and bankers are clamoring for national investment legislation to be established to free them from the old centralized system. There is plenty of entrepreneurial spirit in the city but the old State Enterprises have limited economic viability. The Governorate's main sulfer factory, already badly neglected before the conflict, was badly damaged in a sabotage attack in June. Other key economic concerns include fuel supply. Mosul has benefited directly from a road 'pipeline' of benzine and LPG from Turkey which has ?alleviated fuel distribution problems and helped secure the successful completion of the summer harvest, Now concerns turn to continued supplies, and the supply of kerosine required for winter fuel. Page 1 of 3 U1 a30103-01 (bX8), (CIV) From: Krajeski, Thomas Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2003 9:07 AM To: Executive Secretary Subject: RE: FVV. SECDEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker Tikrit paper attached. Mosul on the way Torn Krujeski Deputy CPA Governance Cep: po) ----Original Message Frorni(b)(6) kCPT) Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 9:00 PM To: Krajeski, Thomas Subject: RE: FW: SECDEF trip Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker Torn, Thank you. Original Message From: Krajeski, Thomas Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 8:29 PM To: ,X6) Cc: Larpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Executive Secretary Subject: RE: FIN; SECDEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECOEF visit Tasker Dick, CJTF and DOD are dinging us for one-pagers on Mosul and Tikrit Do have something we can send? Torn Krajcski Deputy CPA Governance Cell: (bX6) ----Original Messacte From 01(6) Sent: i uesday, September 02 2001 R•40 AM To: Krajeskl, Thomas;(b)(6) Cc: Carpenter, Scott cry Ministry of Governance Subject: Re: rW: SECOEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker lave already provided thc 1.310s for Mayor and Dep to Marian. I'll work something up !iv the two cities hut I think the Divs arc doing that. Dick >Froni: "Krajeski, Thomas" 913/2003 Page 2 of 3 >To: "Dick Naab (CPA-N)" , "Liane Saunders (Mosul', "Emma Sky (Kirkuk)" 'CC: "Carpenter, Scott a V Ministry of Governance" 'Subject: FW: SECDEF trip- Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker >Date: Toe, 2 Sep 2003 07:30:47 10400 >Dick, Could you get us a bio for the mayor of Mosul as well as your >points for a "read-ahead" for the SccDers proposed visit to Mosul and >Iikrit. Don't worry about format, we'll sort that out. 'Thanks. Need it by COB today. 'Torn Krajcski > 'Deputy 'CPA Governance >Cell: 10,X8) > Original Message >Frornpx6) (CPT) 'Sent: Monday, September 01, 2003 9:57 PM =To: Kerik, Bernard 13.; Carpenter, Scott CD/ Ministry of Governance 'Cc: Krujcski, Thomas; Braun Michael A. (SES-5); Executive Secretary Subject: 1:W: SECDEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker 'Mr. Kerik: Please answer 114 Tasker 030901-45 DUE COB 2 SEP 03 >Scott Carpenter/Tom Krajcski: Please answer 1, 2, and 3. Tasker =030901-46 DUE COB 2 SEP 03 9/3(2003 Page 3 of 3 >Just got a call from PO in OSD >trying to gel some info for the Secretary's trip book. She said that -'she needed the info ASAP She said that you coordinated u prior trip so >1 am sending you the info. You can get all of this info front the >Governance team. >1 Bio for GovNice Gov of Mosul >2 Governing Council Bios >3 Read-ahead on Mosul and Tikrit (1 pg max setting climate, >history, etc) >4 I pg bio on the Brit that runs the Abu Gharib prison (Ministry >of Interior should be able to get it for you >So good to be back. >Cheers, >Justin Get MS N 8 and help protect your children with advanced pmentkontrols, 9;3/2003 • 4.•444ki64611010•10, 446 • •••••••••.411.4a • 41..00.111....•••• • c /7- 3 MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary Rumsfeld FR: Paul Bremer RE: CPA Talking Points 0 7> Yc NN- . t )C) cs r - c)4 aS--\ NAJAF • Yesterday's funeral uneventful. LISG helping with investigation. ELECTRICITY • Crossed 3400MW mark today enroute to goal of 44007vIW by 30 September. Signed agreement to import 50-75MW from Turkey. Close to agreement with Syria for l 00MW of power. • Proposed ACE-led task force on electric-ity. OIL 0 Crude oil production has exceed I .5M barrels per day for two weeks. Buck-up , generators delivered to southern oil fields have resulted in consistent production above target. GOVERNING COUNCIL • Interim ministers appointed today. • Governing Council focus on security after murder of Mohammed Baqr Al Hakim, • Shia GC member Mohammed Mutt- Al Uloum suspended membership in GC over "coalition failure to provide security for holy sites." ECONOMY • J.P. Morgan-led consortium will run Trade Bank. • Opening banking sector to international banks. t eed-- CA.( CO/ -) cwzoic El El 001 Sk-c /3E- F- Iraq Status Update 11 SEP 03 9114)2003 0 Coalition Provisional Authority Vision .11E11 OEN "No thoughtful person would suggest that the coalition should govern Iraq for long. Although Iraqis have freedoms they have never had before, freedom is not sovereignty and occupation is unpopular with occupier and occupied alike. We believe Iraqis should be given responsibility for their own security, economic development and political system as soon as possible." .the path to full Iraqi sovereignty is clear. The journey has begun and three of the seven steps on this path have already been taken. The first step came two months ago with the creation of a 25-member Governing Council broadly representative of Iraqi society. The second step took place last month when the Governing Council named a preparatory committee to devise a way to write a constitution. The third and most important was putting day-to-day operation of Iraqi government in the hands of Iraqis. Last week the Governing Council named 25 ministers. Writing Iraq's new constitution is the fourth step. It begins after the preparatory committee recommends a process for writing a constitution to the Governing Council later this month. Step five, popular ratification of the constitution, is indispensable. For the first time in history, Iraq will have a permanent constitution written by and approved by the Iraqi people. The sixth step, election of a government, follows naturally. The seventh step, dissolving the coalition authority, will follow naturally on the heels of elections." "Last night the President called upon Americans to continue to support the Iraqis in their progress. I am confident that the American people will rise to this challenge as they alsg P88." Announcement by L. Paul Bremer III, 9 September 2003 2 Strategic Priorities 1 - 1 I j EJOI Report organized by five principal objectives: • SECURITY — establish a secure and safe environment. • ESSENTIAL SERVICES — restore basic services to an acceptable standard. • ECONOMY — create the conditions for economic growth. • GOVERNANCE — enable the transition to a legitimate, constitutional government. • INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION — maximize contributions from international partners and organizations. 9/14/2003 3 Progress on Priorities Security Update • Border Enforcement is divided into three bureaus: Border and Customs Police, Border Inspections, Nationality and Civil Affairs. • Border and Customs Police: • Enforce the immigration and customs laws and regulations along the border between the ports of entry and the interior of Iraq. • The current number of personnel is about 4,000 of the 6,000 required. • Border Inspections: • About 2,500 customs inspectors who inspect imported and exported products. • Approximately 350 Border Guards who perform perimeter and internal security of the respective port of entry compounds. ▪ Bureau of Nationality and Civil Affairs: • This bureau is divided into three sections: Passport, Nationality and Civil Affairs, and Immigration. • Total required personnel is about 2,250. • Traffic Police • The Iraq Traffic Police has 5,200 officers and 27 Office buildings countrywide. 9/14/2003 4 Progress on Priorities Essential Services :a I L11111 Food Food distribution through Public distribution System (PDS) continuing smoothly. • WFP brought in 139,200 MT in August; slightly down from the planned 150,000 MT because of bombing of the UN building. Water • Ministry of public Works' water & sanitation goals are 80% restoration by October & 100% by end of year; currently at 68%. Health & Medical • Ministry of Health priorities are: 1) security of hospitals & warehouses; and 2) no major disease outbreaks. 9/14/2003 5 Progress on Priorities National Power Update 0E1 • Electricity generation reached its highest point on 29 August was 3,734 MW; 7-day average of 3,488 MW. • CPA is making immediate repairs to power stations and transmission lines as part of the plan to increase power to 4,400 MW by 30 Sep 2003. • The Oil-Power Fuel Task Force is working to ensure adequate fuel is available for increased generation. Shortage of diesel is a limiting factor and other fuel sources are being sought. • Signed agreement with Turkey to import 50 MW, growing to a potential of 100 MW in exchange for & #6 fuel oil. 6 10 Power / Baghdad 0 0 3000 2500 2000 1500 1229 1000 500 0 Pre-War End of May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Baseline Major Combat 9/14/2003 Power Production Timeline 'Monthly averages. Estimated date to achieve pre-war baseline:1 October '03 7 Progress on Priorities Fuel Status Update 0 0 DILA • Iraq-Turkey (IT) Pipeline. — Contract issued 4 Sept to repair nine pipelines damaged late evening 29 August, including 40", 32" and 30" crude pipelines. • Repairs finished to16" natural gas pipeline north of Bayji, discovered afire on 29 August. • Basra Refinery on independent power, producing all products. • 14" LPG line in South repaired, preparations underway to pack with gas — will improve distribution of LPG throughout Iraq. • Loading of crude oil tankers at Mina at Bakr (Persian Gulf) now averaging 600,000-700,000 barrels/day. 9/14/2003 S Crude Oil / Iraq [ - 11 1_] I Sr g I cruche. C111 FP roc& aat lip ors ir a riga 43 toi 0. Tres riclis 2 0 200 , or, 1 00 I ro 1.00 1.50 I 4.0 I 30 70 I I0 1 00 0 too 0 50 - 070 • 0 00 0.30 0 40 0 30 0 PO 0 10 0 00 . -4 7' "'C' - 5- .111 4 3J, .: 1 I 4 r . Vele , ..1:-. ' .rf;Ar A . -.. i i& i fial4M 'I MUS Tro.-. .44.-Mes- -. 3 / 4 -43Aiiei: . 74Q7Z1. 51q.:-. '-'.; _ . ._ ., . . .' W,A C. ..;„;.tf•,,,Ir ..: „In: i., f - .If s, 7 ".- .... .r. ' • . • „ A, ;.::' ' : . t)e.4 . I , , :s .. . _ ...,.: - .1 .,...,.... 4p,c..._.......:___..4...._ J.7 ...- : ..;‘,• • '' *: - ' ; , . . ,...i ,...._ r ",.......by. :yr . Z. Alt ... . ___.„.. . W4...... ..±er.ret., ' • * .1",440.11C.W pp,.... ^.7 ..-";;; :e4kn .. • r ir C •• 4. 4ei . . . ti . ir ... ._ . 4 . ,,...,,....„,.. ....„...,...•,.„..,.., . . ..,.......„.......-.,„. t...........- -..,:.:. .... 4.• iv . . ,-, ,.::.• - --.,- . .i.•-.- - .71triiirgivi'0*."- --.:•3- -vkle.oviir. r• 4,Nitczari, .b.....,...,..1a....at...... ...,.__. .. .4 . 4.„..4,... ..1161 ., • 1 ---•--- Ss40111:1 C ailment F. rcycluctilon arr4pw,i Pvc43....rcIl1et IS fitt coirnalCalo as/ o-Wso• Av or sawb 14- 10- AkI.0- 03 03 18- 21- .4.0- 03 03 24- Akcpso- (1'3 20- 20- 31- 1ku0- 4.4/- 03 Oft 03 2 - - SwiP- 03 - 03 4- 13...n.- son.- 03 03 car Iiti t (J.arl 04): 1.75 1•41311 2 .1.", 4it..1-tcratl -1 - nrgc:t: 2.1 NAL31P1=1(1Prc.. .-Waar ./N.vratgez 2002) 1-cosiks trt - s-r 'Thract: 3.1 1‘,113PIL, (Pre-War (Thpat..711.50) Jaen 03 .4 %.Net-ia8 , =. 2.45 1%.4 Apr 03 A vcrai go — 0.14. IN/1 13P1C) Ma y.03 era 0.30 l'4 BPI J 4114/26)00% •01-a4?„4 =. 0 . eS7 MI la Pr, JLaly 0 .Avcraikg= 01 1%/113.1PC:i A.Lsgunt 0 3 / 1/4 - vcrsist., ,== 1.44 Mr3F•1", C) Gasoline / Iraq I I 0 0 Duo Iraqi Gasoline/Benzene: Production & Imports vs. Pre-War Production Target late July: Re-War Roduction I Imports 111Domestic Production 14- 16- 18- 21- 24- 26- 28- 31- 1- 2- 4- 7- 9- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Sep- Sep- Sep- Sep- Sep 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 9/14/2003 10 12.00 r: ,t1Iff. = U111 = ItiTigZ 15 00 Kerosene & Diesel / Iraq 11111 L IMTIMie : urren upTMIR-VICWolduction 1 DUI [Diesel Target: 14.9 (Pre-War oduction) 9.00 KeroseneTarget: 7.7 (Fte-War Roduction) 600 3.00 ea Kerosene Domestic • Diesel Domestic o Diesel Imports 0.00 14- 16- la- 21- 24- 26- 28- 31- 1- 2- 4- 7- 9- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Sep- Sep- Sep- Sep- Sep. 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 9/14/2883 11 .....1.101=1 Pro ane Gas /Iraq , I= i le I 1 1- 1 . Iraqi LPG: Producticbn & Imports vas_ Pro-War Production 10000 0500 - 9000 - 8500 8000 7500 7000 - 8500 - 8000 5500 • 5000 4500 4000 • 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 Tor get August, Pro-War Prod uc Hot impons in Domestic Production 14- 16- 18- 21- 24- 20- 28- 31- 1- 2- 4- 7- 9- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Aug- Sep- Sep- Sep- SOP- SOP- 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 Nirt 2 08 on 2 Sep 03 due to 8000 metric ton import of LPG by ship 12 Progress on Priorities Economy EMDE1 Salaries: CPA Order Number 30 • Effective 1 October 2003 until 30 September 2004 • A new public sector salary system reform aimed at fostering transparency in payments & to regularize payments to ensure comparable pay for comparable work across all areas of public service. • Establishes 13 Grades with 10 internal promotion Steps. • Effects all ministries, state owned enterprises and other public agencies. • Requires employees to report to work or not be paid. • Allows for dismissal; establishes merit promotions. 9/14/2003 13 Governance AIN EIDI Iraq Council Foreign Minister -Hoihyar Zebari ., Amite Minister Kemil ar-Galiani Interior mister.- M Ngtiti Badran stet- it*hirn Etahr. al.l.11oum Human. Righte Witter 4434:1014f i lasit Turk' "riculture MIntsr.- Aiiiitirftahkna Mr1citi- Awn Sarneraei • cultural Minister -=Mofeedeii-Jazaeri Planning Minister WWI al-Hafidh Youth & Sport Minister - All Faikat•Ghadban Work & Social Al7eini lQini8ter'7.;! , al-Majoun Housing & Ccinstibction Minis TraniPort Minister - Behnem Polls ui wz,vVJ EnvIrOliment Minister - Abdul-Rahman Kareem Water Resources Minister - Abdul Räèhid Ed4cation Minister Mohamrhad Aswad Justice Minister - Hashim ucatiori Minister - Alaudin ai-Alvian Hegtth Minister - Dr. Khudayer AbbzW:-. Trade Minister - All Mewl • Science & Technology .Minister - Wished Public Works Minister - Nesreen Berwari mmigration &Refugees Minister - Jassern Khudai CommUnication Minister -:Haiderel-Ebildi Industry & Minerals Minister - Tawfik•Raheem 14 Progress on Priorities Governance 1 :iii 111111 Arab League Grants Seat to Iraqi Governing Council • League of Arab States offered seat to interim foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari • Establishes international recognition that the Iraqi Governing Council (1GC) is the political voice of Iraq. • Limited to one year, allowing IGC time to prepare a constitution, a national vote & the formation of an elected government. 9/14/2003 15 Progress on Priorities International Participation IL l HHIi1LiEI • 46 nations potentially supporting Iraqi Stability and Humanitarian Relief. • 30 Countries with military forces in Iraq: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Macedonia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, and UK. • 2 countries committed to provide forces in Iraq: Moldova and Portugal. • 14 others are considering decision to provide forces for Iraq. 9/14/2003 16 Iraq Status Update [ El no. (b)(6) • POC: OSD SO/LIC Stability Operations (b)(6) 9/14/2003 .7 1../13 HAS sEFr .2 September 16, 2003 Ptc.c,v,4 1 s-Er )---) 51 L. TO: Jerry Bremer Gen. John Abizaid CC: Gen. Dick Myers Paul Wolfowit2 Doug Feith Larry Di Rita FROM: Donald Rumsfeltry, SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Iraq fr4l 1 Attached are some notes I made after a meeting with some editorial boards in New York. Attach. 9/1.5/03 MFR DHR:dh O9l3-fl respond by September 16, 2003 (- A F4Act'r— fkb F , SUI3JECT: Afghanistan and Jray—The message In New York at two editorial board meetings, I received the following suggestions: — Our message isn't getting through — It will take video and pictures—not just print. — We could use some polls to prove there is recognition of progress in Iraq. — We have to control the spectrum. -- We have to do something about improving Al-Jazeerah and Al Arabi yah. — We may need some creative events. 09 150344 e./2 F.r-} 17-Ai September 16, 2003 11 cLf) 175E TO: Jerry B er Gen. J Abizaid t Gen. Dick Myers Paul Wolfowitz Doug Feith Powell Moore Dov Zalcheim Reuben Jeffery FROM: Donald Rumsfeld SUBJECT: Pending $87 Billion Presidential Request It looks as though the key witnesses on the $87 billion Presidential tcquest will be Ambassador Jerry Bremer and General John Abizaid. The thinking currently is that several committees in the House and Senate would be holding hearings on it, possibly September 24 and 25. I wanted to mention this to you immediately, so you would have it in your thinking in terms of travel plans. While it is not set, there is at least a reasonable possibility that the folks are going to want you back here as the lead witnesses. Regards, UHR.411 MINJ3.16 Please respond by 6, 1j -1 6/ ( // 1 September 17,2003 TO: Jerry Bremer CC: Paul Wolfowitz Doug Feith Reuben Jeffery FROM: Donald Rumsfeld SUBJECT: Business Development What can we do to get more business people interestr,d in hag? What can I do to help? DianIa. 1111Xx111 091703 13 Please respond by io 0 3 6 -75'15_5 -03 it/ ,. <2C/ September 17, 2003 TO: Jerry Bremer CC: Gen, John Abizaid Gen. Dick Myers Paul Wolfowitz Doug Feith Reuben Jeffery FROM: Donald Rumsfeld SUBJECT: Generators I met with some people from the region the other day, and they said there are a number of five-megawatt generators that ran light up a city in Bahrain. Kuwait and various Gulf locations. Why don't we borrow them and get them into Iraq? Can we be helpful? Thanks OFIR:dh 091701.9 Please respond by gil.(403 UNCLASSIFIED OFFICE OF 'THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CABLES DIVISION FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET Telephone: I8-Sep-03 / 09:27 To: Ambassador Bremer From: Secretary Rumsfeld Subject: Business Development Fax #: # Pages: 2 (Including corcr) Remarks: 411 'CABLE CH rms UNCLASSIFIED F. 1 t t * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORTUMEDIATE TX) ( SEP 18.2003 10:2IAM ) 1 t i FAX 11EADER: DATE TIME ADDRESS MODE TIME PAGE RESULT PERSONAL NAME FILE foc-- I SFO 10.INNM 03£S •53. P. 2 OK 549 • :SAICN U $MtMON• TK • SITANDARD • .rc 2. : ASyNC MODE C :CDNrIbENTAL '1ZPIP lAIkk D .DETAll tROUT:NO 1-,MiE_STO MOO& $ •itANSfirt • ,f04WAROIND .rINE O rRECf.r. 1)I CI NE() 3. 'RICON mcvcomttoleLt moot • .ftOLLINO f :ECM ) .NED0CrION • IttcriPl. NolICi (/7: C )0/e/ - 7-./y COALITION PROVISIONAL A vn tokin. ACI-IDAD 1 October 2003 MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM: Paul Bremer <signed> SUBJECT: Training Iraqi Police I have your note of September 29. As I mentioned to you September 30, wc welcome assistance from the military in the police program. The single most useful service they can immediately provide is helping us with the recruitment of pollee. To come up the some 40,000 recruits we need to train over the next 18 months, we will need a pool of over 200,000 candidates. We will use the military for this urgent task. And we will see how they can help us with the logistics as we ramp up the training in Jordan. I intend to keep responsibility for police training with the Ministry of Interior. I have asked Rick Sanchez to detail staff into the MOI to coordinate the support activities which the military can provide. O 10: Jerry Bremer Oen. John Abizaid CC: Gen. Dick Myers Paul Wollowitz Doug Feith FROM: Donald Rumsfeld SUBJECT: Assistance front Germany Colin Powell told me this morning that the GerIllitliS have offe Se ti e to m h be elp r 29 to C).1.1°— 461.14 police in Iraq. I mentioned that I thought they had done a pretty slow jot in Afghanistan. Condi said she thought the reason was because they did the facilities first, and now they are ready to really get going in Afghanistan. I don't know if that is going to happen or not, but we sure ought to check and see what they have done in Afghanistan. Then we ought to decide what we want them to do in Iraq. If they are stepping up and offering it. my instinct is to grab it and have them help us. Thanks. 1411t 092911).?7 Please respond by U16081 /03 73 September 29, 20::: Cti 3 C)- C-4; TO. Jerry Bremer Cien. John Abizaid Got. Dick Myers Paul Wolfowit7 Doug Feith ht<OM: Donald Kustisfeld St `1311 1 ,CI: Twining Iraqi Police A. I understand your interest in making sure the police arc trained in a way that -1:41-4j4c) is appropriate for poke. On the other hand. ir k urgent that we lid a rapid expatimint of the re.,licr capahotii;• frA,1 The only capability we have to really get something done fast in that country is the I :,S militai).. We have plenty or people 'dieting /65151011(X. sliCh Olt' Depart milt Slate. Germany. Jordan. UAL and tulle) My suggestion is that I name CENTCOM the "executive agent" Vor police ii aining, and that the Ciialition Provisional Authodly hold control ()vet the CUR thc type of twining they waive and who does the actual tranitne. Since Benne Krrik left. I understand things have slowed down oil police. traoune. I think this would be a good utty gct it guitilt. (F.NTC0111 brIp with lien) lilting. l'Icasc talk about this. I hank' .. 111W _ UI6083 /03 C3 t i° 73 —64:7-1(.. Ta- September 29, 2003 10: Larry Vi Rita Jerry nrtmer Pant Wollowit, FROM: Donald Rionsteldl* SUBJECT: Press in Iraq I am told that the press people arc frightened to leave Baghdad, I wonder if we tti,glit to :is-range for them to get out on a s[we available basis to go to places like tstmilt. !Jo they c;in c thc iem of the ‘..ouhtry NIP 0, fr*A/1 Please a.5 pond by U16082 /03 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FROM: Adam Sugar DATE: 29-Oct-03 ACTION REQUESTED FOR: Ambassador Kennedy ORIGINATION. Ex ccSec RE: Snowflake on Garner Memo This October 14 memo is still marked as in with LPB. We want to determine whether this requires a written response back to SecDef, or if we can assume this was covered during Ambassador Bremer's consultations in Washington. If you believe no further response is necessary, we can close the loop with CPA-Rear and confirm we will not be sending a written reply. Attachment(s): As stated