The text was extracted automatically from an image of the document or from an old file, and may contain errors in some words or in line order. The original file is the reference.
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD
ACTION MEMO
June 9, 2004
FOR:
HE ADMINISTRATOR RAFT
FROM:
narew Morison, Governance Coordinator, Baghda THRU:
Cap Dean, Regional Coordinator, Baghdad
(61)
SUBJECT:
The focus group for Sadr City is seeing significant progress in infrastructure development, police econstitution, and reconvening the District and Neighborhood Councils in the district. Ir addition. 15 Brigade Combat Team (IS BCT) of the 15 Cavalry Division continues to decimate
(b)(1)
RECOMMENDATION: Release the attached cable to CENTCOM Commander requesting allocation of SOF or civilian intelligence assets to Sadr City.
Approve:
Approve with modification:
Disapprove:
ATTACHMENTS:
Cable: (DX1)
COORDINATION:
Office of Provincial Outreach - Ambassador Ross - Deputy Regional Coordinator - Cap Dean - DRAFTED (0X3/10 USC $130c(D) COO SECRET
PROG: 06/08/2004
UTHORIZED: UPBREME
RAFTED: (b)(3) 10 USC $130b, (DY€ CLEARED: AVORRISON, CDEAN, CROSS, OSTERI CPA BAGHDAD CENTCOM INFO SECDEF WASHDC SECSTATE WASHDC WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC CIA WASHDC IRAQ COLLECTIVE DRAFT TAGS:
SUBJECT: CPA: Intelligence Assets for Sadr City REF: CPA Cable - Turning the Tide in Sadr City
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 7.
(b)(1)
4. 88) The population density, history, and demographics of Sadr City make it unique among the problem areas of Iraq. Nearly all of the population are Shia nostly drawn from across all the areas of southern Iraq to which they still maintair strong tribal ties. They have been mixed together in a milieu of poverty and chronic unemployment. (b(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
6. 8) We cannot over-emphasize the superb work of the ICD, IBCT, and 2-5 CAV
- the battalion doing the lion's share of the work in Sadr City. These soldiers and officers have performed magnificently and prove themselves again everyday. The issue here is not of performance. 1)
(b)(1)
040609-07
_PB HAS SEEN
LPB:
Subject: Detailed Comments on TOR for Partnership Consultations Overall, this is a good approach, based on the analysis and recommendations we have made. I have the following specific comments:
• In order to guide the partnership's efforts, it is important te get right the formulation of the shared overarching security goal. It should not be simply to defeat the enemies of free Iraq or to protect Iraq and its people. Rather, it should
*
e to create a security environment in which Iraq may continue its progres oward irreversible democracy, unity, and prosperity. The latter is mo meaningful and realistic.
I wish it were clearer in the TOR that the MCNS should not become the venue for overseeing the MNFI. We should be clear with the Iraqis on this. As you know, we have favored a partnership policy group (contact group) and a commander's council (for high-level coordination). The team can, I'm sure, thrash this out with the Iraqis, as long as we do not lose sight of the design principles.
• The approach on detainment looks right. However, we should be prepared to broaden the discussion to cover all policy and operational issues that could infringe on the Iraqi Bill of Rights. Policies and decisions that affect individual freedoms and rights should not be seen as coming from a foreign-led MNFI but ather from the partnership itself. In this general area, we must avoid (a) dayligh etween the partners and (b) the appearance that the IIG has no authority whil the MNFI may do as it pleases under "all necessary measures."
• The "redlines" are now fine, with three provisos:
o we should display unreserved willingness to reach joint decisions on the initiation of sensitive offensive operations;
o we should not attempt to define them in advance;
we should tell Allawi that "regular diplomatic channels" includes a communication line between him and the White House.
(b)(5)
•
Marit
Cc Scott Castle, Scott Carpenter, Jim Jeffrey, Dick Jones, Fred Smith