07-F-2106 DOC 21 Redacted

• · . llll!l&t · . • !£ us• WI A1TACffMENTs ~ tl/l//J1t11.11c I 1 Novo2 MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE USDp ASDIISA FROM: Bill Luti SUBJ: NSC Papers on Providing Support to lJNMOVIC Attached are the full set of papen, concerning support to l.JNMOVIC haodod out at yesterday's meetings at the NSC staff · Of particular interest are • Draft letter to BJix (tab A) I I I • Draft NSPD on providing SUppon to VNMOVIC (tab B) . • Protocol for Interviewing lraqis·outside of Iraq (tab C) - k '1-t'-c. e . . ~~ ov\--c- ~ • Papezs on status of VA Vs (tab D) r~ ~...,.-k.""~J Remaining papers at tab E I 11!:a •• . - - - b)(1) i I · DRAFT _ Version 3 Dear Or. Blix (Dr. ElBaradei): At the President's request, I wanted to write you and Dr. BlBaredi (Dr. Blix) to reemphas i ze the U.S. support for robust, and penetrating, UN weapons inspecti ons that offer Iraq a last opport• unity to -disarm unde. r the terms of Resolution 687 . Our meetings October 29 provided the President and Vice President the opportunity not only to underscore our oonmitment to work with an effective UN inspections process, but also to discuss the kind of inspection process needed to meet the challenge of disanning Iraq . As we conveyed to you during the meetings, this must~ Iraq's last chance .• We are determined that there must be no return to the cat and mouse ·tactics that plagued UNSCOM and the. IAEA throughout the 1990s . . The UN resolution will· be clear ort t~: se points . J:t will give UNMOVIC and IAFA clear~ effective authority. The burden of proof is on Iraq, not on the UN and Iraq's interactions with UNMOVIC and the IAEA should demonstrate clear, transparent Iraqi efforts to cooperate and disarm. ., ., - - --- - -- -- - - - ~ . DRAFT \ b)(1) I want to reaffirm our view that the job of UNMOVIC and the IA.EA is to provide objective information to the Security Council . We welcome your intention to report frequently to the Council, and immediately if there are acts of noncooperation. ---') ;f c:k~· ... - - . ...,......., .-;...·1 -h ..... _.,, ~-, i"--'" c;,\~-~ .. ffe accept your determination t:o maintain the UN character of the {c-< ~, ··- inspection process. Within that framework, the United States is • .... ~~prepared to provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA with assistance in all the areas mentioned above and other requests that you may have, (including. the list of UNMOVIC requirements that r received from you last weekJ. The secondment protocol that has allowed U.S. active duty military to work in the UN Secretariat could serve as a mechanism to provide you more U.S. personnel. My staff will come back to you shortly with several concrete proposals. and we are prepared to urge others to provide support in areas where there is not a unique US capability. I would welcome a response from you on the views described in my letter. ,------:--------~ - : ... : . . :-:: . _ ::: . . :- . ::_ : _ : , ===::-~~---- ---· --- - ... --l'!';,t·;Jl'W> . ~~~~ .. \...--· - ··- -- --- - - - -1 •I . , £@!.ffili?i• H 7 Support for UNMovrc and the IA.SA -.. In 1991, Iraq agreed to a UN-negotiated ceasefire. to.en,:l .. the war of aggression it had lawt"1>ed aga.inst kuwatt. The ceasefire te...., included il-agi•s Voluntary acceptance of, Md ""°Pezattdl! with, compreh~nsj1ie, 1m£~tterea inspections · to ensure compliance . For eleven years Iraq deceived UN inspectors and · defied the inspections regime before finally denying inspectors access completely in 1998 . (U) The Iraqi regime must now show that it has 11,ade a•~-- - ------- shift in its approach ;!md~to COillpI]' idt5' its : ·. . .. . . .. · · . . ~ --,..; .. - - -- __ _ _ . . . .· . .. ·; . .;..;.- ;._-. ,·, .. , .. . · . ; - .• - obhg,,rions . A new UN i:,,spec;t, o,, regime. P!'W',_~, : ~ a_, - "-"'~t:q_- , ..• , , .• • . ·--·. .. . , , . · , • test: ~t;J,er t!!e, , J:z'."Si .. ""°lJime has ma<le, Whi.s': ~,:;f~.;· •lif tl:<aa<1 ili{-..iH'iiig ricf Sive up iiss. weapons Of "1ass ch,>ie"'1ctfon. There . can . he Zero tole: r.ani,e for further deception or noncompliance. To be successful, inspectiqns must place priority on testing- • Iraq's wilHngness to COoperate and to be d~ of lllerpi,ii,i of· ·· ma~P . de. s .truct- ion. {-O)· · · Ollr'J'BD STATES SUPPORT l'OR %.NsPBCTJ:ows Subject to successful COmpletion of work UQdel:Way in the 1JN Security Council to ·pass a new resolution on Iraq, aru, to , • receiving necessaxy assurances ""'9ard.ing the principles under , which inspections W'ill operate·, and in PllrslLit · 0£ tile !!Oals / rm tlilled ""°"8, the llnited sla teo will p"9vf..., fu1J. ""PP<>rt · to !j;:;', !:.-:::.,--;:::_ ; the United Nations Monitoring V<idleiiiation, and Inai:>ect:ion I<<•- .~ . commission f'-OVIC) and the International J\tomic Energy J\gency ;.,.,<,,, . .. o,,.., in the aecomplis1>me4t of their missions. Nbile we progress on f •1., <•·•"""·· fulfi1ling these coriditions, it is time .now to begin to prepare to support the UNMovrc and ·rABA rnissions fn Iraq. · .._ Fulfilling these missions requires that !JNMovic and the IAEA employ a strategy of robust, flexible, and secure inspections that use, as appropriate, the full range of releVant technical · and human ~apabilities. The United States ~ill ,:::espond to ONMOVIC and the IAE:A requests for material, operation~l, personnel, · as we11 as suggest sU<;;J, support to UNMovzc and . the IAEA, sufficien,: to accomplish the .• .. responsibilities mandated for them by the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions . ... •u ram a "Classified b} . Willian, !fleecy Pe51 lo'QAli I .l. § Ce* {d) Eee:laeeify 811, J.O/;u;.1~ --·---- _______ .. .---· _____ ___.. .... ·- 2 b)(1) The Proliferation Strategy PCC will coordinate development of policy guidance regarding i n s pectio ns in :Iraq and U ._ S . support for them. The Department of State will be responsible for official communications with UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and for coordi nating U.S. support ·and assistance to UNMOVIC and the rAEA . within policy this guidance . The Departments of Defense, ~~:~~ . ;~~:s~:;,o:~d ~=h=e~~~~- al 1 IJ.~e ~ lig~:~~ ,:! ~;;~~' .... ;t~;~~: _>,_;:~;f\~i:-.~~--~·-· '• . . •. .-· ....... · .'.. ·.:·. ~ . ~ •. :·_._-: .... ·-.·: .•f~•- ·. ··:-"'; _,,::_~i-i~-'.:;~~~-f_/:'i_ ._i· ~.1 ... ·· .......... . • .,, . "(' .: !·~· •·N• 0 ,_.., lb)(ll ; (b)(3):10 USC §424 ; CbX3):50 USC§ 403-10) _u, 11>)(1) ; (b)(3):10 use 1424 ; (b)(3~50 use 1 •oa-10) .._ ... lbK1) ; (b)(3):10 USC 1424 ; (b)(3):~ USC f 403-1(i) rogew ki,X1) ; (bX3):10 USC §424 ; (bX3):50 USC§ 403-1(ij ~11) kbx11 , <bX3J:10 uec 5424 : CbX3>:so use s 403-1ci1 .._ .. (IIX1) ; (bX3):10 USC §424 ; (IIX3):50 use§ 403-10) _ ... ll>XIJ ; (bX3):10USC §424 ; (bX3):50USC §403-1(1) r-'" ~)(1) ; (bM3i10 use 142• ; (b)(3t50 use •-1~) , I • ()pto~31,2002 . ISSUE: Docs UNMQYIC have Existing ~uthomy to Destroy Iraqi Unmann~ Aerial Vehiclq <UAVs)? . . . . • The authority of UNMOYIC to destroy items in Iraq derives from that granted to UNSCOM under UNSCR 687. • The 687 authority to destroy ballistic missiles is not applicable to UAVs, winch do not follow a ballistic trajectory and. at least for 1NF pwposes, we ~ not consider to be missiles. • 687 further authorizes UNSCOM tQ destroy, inter alia, "all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and.all related subsystems and components and all research. development, support and manufacturing &cilities." • UA Vs ~odified or designed to ~C?C chemical or biological weapon agent may reasonably be ;::n·;-,~ ~--~ ~t~~=~~ ~: - considered "chemical or biolp.gical ~,'" and ~for subj~-to destruction unde{' 6a7. . ~ .. . CJ~ -·- _ - )1-~if :.; . ·-definition of cw. 681 invites Iiaq to ntify the :ewe : (it' signed m t 9n) ind strC$SCS die imp<>rtancc of early conclusion of-the ewe, suggesting tbe CoUDCil bad in mind a definition of BW/CW that iocluded:deli"WZYvebicles specially desi~ or modified. for CBW use • . • UA Vs can also be uac,d for non-prohibited pmposes. ·such as pilot lnining. ~ choacs or ~ - While such USC3 may be counter to U.S.~ dM:y are notprobi"bitcd uudcr 687. UNMOVIC authority to destroy such UAVs would need to be determined an a casc-by- case basis. · •· ~aUAV-il9t~iji~ydC$i~~Qi_ modifiedjx-~lofCB~~~to,', d~~n,~ on tlJe· ~- ~~~9~• suspici~~ ~ - the u~v ia ~eid ~a· .. proluoi~ USO~ i.e.; 1$ _ if• elii!mical or biologital Weapon,· 01'·~ or coiilpcment-tbamf. • For ex~plt; through UNSCR 1051, the ~~ took the position that failure to notify an 1 - 1 imported dual-use item UDderthe exportrunport monitoring mechanism a-ca1ed a stxQng presumption that the item was intended for a prolul,ited purpose. md therefore subject to destruction. · . · . • Similarly. if Iraq is :required under a new UNSC resolution to dcclarc-UA Vs, milurc to do so with respect to an UA V may Cieate sufficient suspicion to wammt its destroction. Moreover, to the extent that any Iraqi UAV, declared or undeclared, is discovered to be designed or modified for CBW use, suspicion may be. cast on lr.lq's entire UAV program. • We are not aware of a specific evidentiary threshold that must be croaed before destruction of UAVs by UNMOVIC may occur. However, given the limited numbel' of aedll>le non-CBW uses ofUAVs by Iraq, crossing this thicshold should not be too onerous a~ Drafted: THirsc:h - ~/NP .~ .. a 31 October 2002 UNSCR LangU.age Regarding OAVS l Background UNSCR 687, makes no reference to UA Vs and n:quiff:S only that "AU ballistic missiles with a range gn:ater than 150 km and related parts •.• " shall be destroyed. TI1C resolution also states "All chemical and biological weapons .. .and all related systems and components ... " shall be destroyed, but makes no specific reference to UAVs as "related systems". (3: t?• L 5 Rf) . . UNSCR lOS l provides provisions for monitoring sal~ of prohibited systems to Iraq, and Annex r.v to the resolution provides extensive definitions of UA Vs (as well as auise missiles), stating "The Prohibitions under the Plan apply to ballistic missiles or missile deli very systems cap~ble of a range greater than 150 tm.including. •• cruise missiles. target }·':. > .-, -• ·· · ;~ ~r •;;,'., dro~~. i;ec;. · . ·~a: dioJJCS m.,d . othedJA V s~.,. •. '" H()WCYCl'1 - ~er.e .is ~ . . . _ Ji/ · -· " /;~~x~~~;_~~t~.gt~ · · · ., .. ·•-t ·.-:·, -~,·· ·· ·. , · ·, , .- • , . • .' , ,~ .,t, . ·, ~~,:!Jr ,~ ~r?.!'.I.•,~·•:• ·\T\ >1~-r-•~ • . .~if: ,'¥~-;•~~~· - •• • Constraints UA Vs are difficult to captum uridcr existing UNSCRs in that· they me dual-use and' an Iraqi UA V could be intended to carry an underwing spray syst.em without any visible e. videnc.e to an inspector. It is probable that Iraq ig developing UA Vs as. aerial targets- and fOl' reconnaissance. as well ~ foe WMD delivesy missiOIIS. and it may not be possible for · an inspector to ~ne the mission of the vehicle. Fwthc~ Iraq. ~ght be able to quickly "deconfigure" UA Vs with internal modifications to hide the tnle mission of the vehicle. '8:il&L Cit) · 1b!=J~ e.~tbl;JSO-nn· ~ mi .. ~1 ~ .. ,~t- Lt.,.._.-dalificatioa• is -- .. .. ·.!'.rJ'J .. - • ., .. , .• _ . ·.: • .··.• ~ ·· -~: ·:~';- 'll'Y"'·~~ -' ~~~ .... .. ... ·: ~":;"- ··. _ .·., ... , ··' : • . diffl&ilf'tcH1ij;.if1d·u~V•· ~ ~tliq•ir,UAVs. caii'~ue~y·~liollcd to that range and. VIOUld~ an autopil~ to fly furtlu . . Altboogh.lniq.·has . Oidt:t~ aa . . .-. . . .. .. •· . ..... ~ . . :• , ... ,-, · .. ··~ $:-· ···.·~ ·· least one UAV with aa· autopilot. those autopilots cowabe removed'oii" short nolice allowing Iraq to claim a range of ~css than 150 km for Chcir UA Vs. 'This despite the fact that lcaq!s UAV&-latge and small-almost certainly have fuel exhaustion ranges significantlygrcaterthan 150km. (l?E seq Recommended Added Language Clarify the range reqidrement as follows: Range shall be defined as the distance an unmanned aerodynamic vehicle can fly over .the ground and shall not be constrained to mean straight-line distance flown from the launch point. This aerodynamic range shall be calculated using the dc~nition of IB11gc agieed to for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR..). attached below, and assumes a best-ase flight profile and standard day conditions. Thi~ distance shall be called "aerodynamic range .. and is the fuel ahallstion range of the vehicle assuming a one-way I I UC!& rm RI I I I I RESSEE 75 DI SUBJECT: UNSCR Language Regarding UAVs trip with no return. 1be distance shall be determined using the best..case (i.e. loogest range) flight profile oflhe vehicle in.standard day conditions with no wind. This distance shall not refer to the remote control range of the vehicle. (i 111£1 WI" ''MTCR Range Definition" The maximum distance that the specified rocket system or unmanned aerial vehicle system (UA V) is capable of traveling in the mode of stable flight as measured by the projection of its trajectory over the surface of the Earth. MTCR Technical Notes: ·1. 2. 3. 4. The maximum capability based on the design characteristics of the system, when fully loaded with fuel or propellant, wiJJ be taken into consideration in detennining range. The range for both rocket systems and UA V systems will be dclennined independently of any external factors such as operational restrictions, limitations imposed by telemetry, data links or other external constraints. For rocket syst~, the range will be determined using the trajectory that maximizes range, assuming ICAO standard atmosphere with x.cro wind For UA V systems, the range will be determined for a one-way distance using the most fuel-efficient flight profile (e.g., cruise speed and altitude), assuming JCAO standard atmosphere with zero wind. Incluth amenJ.ed wording to allow destruct;on of ALL UAVs in Iraq that can fly a ground distance of greater than 150 Ian: Any UA V or cruise missile with an aerodynamic range of greater than 150 km shall be prohibited and must be immediately destroyed, regardless of intended mission or payload. This aerodynamic range shall be calculated using the definition of range agreed to for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and assumes a best-<:ase flight profile and standard day conditions. In addition, the aerodynamjc range shall assume thai all empty space in the fuselage is available to be filled with fuel, as long as weight and balance limits for that vehicle are not exceeded Furthermore, subsystems (defined in Annex IV to UNSCR 1051 )that allow UAV operations to ranges greater than 150 km shall also be prohibited. These subsystems include remote control equipment with a range capability greater than 150 km, as well as all autonomous guidance and control equipment that could provide an air vehicle with the ability to autonomously fly and navigate to any distance. tome n., - -- --- ---- - ---- ------ ----- ....,.,, (b)(1) r-"' k!,)(1) ll>X1l ......... (b)(I) ,.._ ... ~)(1) ; (bX3~50 USC 1-.1(1) SP?RRT US 7775 ,. Personne1 Requi.red : · I l . Xnapectors: Chemical , Biological, Nuclear, and Missile. Need about 25 per discipline. Expect the chemical, biological and missile inspectors will have to go through the UNMOVIC_!-wee_!t training course .before ·they can~ become inspectors. The next class will be Jan 27, 2003 in Vienna. · • 2. Support personnel : We n~d an appropriate number of people in the following categories: a. Computer forensi cs experts b. Translators c. Document exploitation d. Security experts e . Interviewers (FBI Trained?) . f YJfa ~?}'• ': ... ·t?f ~ ' Ph~'tb~]!2~ 1l';ttf 1 j~;~f:' ;~); : ~~;:f; ),t~~tffl\" ! j. Chem';b~o lal:> techni. cians . ·:·•. , ... . . . .. I :-. ·k. Med• ical. l. Building engineers m. ASsocia.ted personnel with equipinent we provide- n. Ground and Air Transportation o. Geo-technical engineers p. Contracts, finance and auditor experts 1 I ;_ i i i . . ... 3 • . Bxp~ft/-x.po~t ~spec:~ors_, 'App~o~_ imately' 200 . . ·. · · 1 ··.- ~~---, I . . 'jn.~~cto~~'.- ~e-_ ~!~4~d .. ~~tll. ~ : U ~ S •· Ji)lf.?,v.t._~~- "~~-Pf>~~~~- , ;: , . · · . · ·. · , ·. of. that;:; -n~r. • ' ~ l~e. ctors . wou1d : ,h~.- . to - be. tr.ai~ · .-e -~ -• .·. · . . . . . ,:...-_ .· _ ,: .: .• ,Gdoa.~-.Di#.~w,;·1!~,irst[. ;;;1R.h-;·::~ ];)i!:~il/:sii1'.A~t.;..,:;,:,,du.1t&~s.: ~ ,;;, _ _-, .:,./~(~ "··· ._ . ;':· ;: ,·c,·1 • . • • ~ ~ --: . .: ':""' •::. ~ ~• . . ·• ,. !"IJ! .. . ;: .f.. · . . - " .... ... •9't'l . . , •~':'U~ =-;~~ ?= ~ ~ ~ •I . ',( "s.. 1 ;'• · ./~J_ '_' J•;• :» ;'~..., .'~r-~ +";"~-\.~t-~.!~11_ ~ ··: . . ·.•··.:·· _·:.~.=;: _: · · . . __ ;·:: .· ··.':.;··.:v:· . . . · __ : ~ . .... .. . ... . .. . ·Paeil.iti~1u11: ~C- ahpu).d ha¥e . a(l~t~,- . s~f:e and ·-secw;e · · and pro. p~~iy ' ~ipp~d fa.cilititSe:~ · Tbeiiit· Tnclu,4'e: . • . . .. ·: . . ·; , . , .. r r l. Living acconmodati?nS 2. Office facilities (Baghdad and Larnaca) 3. ~lytical lab facilities . 4 . Secure communications (telephones/computers/links) s. Physical Security a. Buildings sweeps b. Access c. Other ·(document storage) ..... b)(1) Logistics: · · l. Ground transportation sufficient- 75 2. Helicopters sufficient - 9 helos ••