07-F-2106 DOC 09 Redacted

•· . . 81J@MJlfl ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON / ill WASHINGTON, DC 20301 ·2400 r _ 14 AUG 1001 INTERNA"flONA.L SECUAJTY Al-FAIRS . . ' MEMORANDUM FOR ASSIST ANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SUBJECT: Iraq WMD Declaratory Policy (U) • • Steve, the paper and talking points are very good. They clearly state disarmament as the key issue and put the burden for compliance back on the Saddam regime. ~ We attach a few minor edits. The main point -- not really a substantive one - is that the USG is not really in a position to state what "most of the world" believes. Better to say that Saddam has .. attempted" to shift the burden. (U) We also recommend adding the following closing statement. .._ "Any Iraqi proposal that falls short of these requirements is part of a continued campaign of deception and delay." · (U) Thank you for the good work on this issue. Peter W. Rodman Jb.asc:11;: 1:5 b1 e1 mt4 4. Balusil') aa. 14 Att1••• iOlil • G , . FAOIL-~ITE HOVSE ·SITUATIO~ BOOM 81 . • n • · tTV11:1 • · u ·u:t n n,,.,.,. 11:• u'"'- b)(6) -.11• NATIONAL ;SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 2050,,I l August 13, 2002 6.n.2 • • ' ···.::,.. \ ..... MEMORANDUM POR HS . MAURA HARTY sxecutive Secretary Department of state · MR. - LIWIS LI~Y National Security Adviaor to the Vice Preaidenc MR . JBPFREY . JCUPP'BR Bxecutive Secretary Departm.nt o~ the 'l'rttasury_ HR. JOHii G. EDWARDS Executive Secretary Central Intelligence Agency COL JAMES A. WHITMORE Sxecutive Secre ta-zy Department o~ Dctense MR.. ALBBRTO R. GOlfZALBS Counsel to 'the Pl:eaident . MR . ANDREW H . · CARD Cbi-•f M . ·,$~·: t9 : ~ President COL BOlfARJ> If. SNBM.>, USA Secretary, Jo~nt Staif ··· - .. ..... . . . .. . . .. .. . 4;•"' • SUBJECT : . Iraq WMD Declan.tory Policy (U) Ateached at .Tab A are t~ ·pap~r•. drawn from a draft paper and cable on · our approach to - potential 'UN Weapon• cf Mass Destruction tWMD) inspection• in Iraq '(previously approved· by Principals), tor. your consideration ae a statement .and ·a· ••t of ta1k.ing po1.nta . P1•.,.• p:r~de yo~ c:cmaen~• iD wr.i.Una to tll• NSC by Doo11 Oil Auguat 16. Once the ~inal veniona are agproved. these paper• will • crve aa tbe b&•~• for our. public stateaaenta · about our· policy ~or Iraq and it• WMD . · Pl•••• pa•• th• at- t.cbed paper• to Principal• sns OJIL~ • .._. ~· ·· :rt·• s~ .. Stepb;-BJ Biegun Executive Se~retary \ . \ . Attaeluner•t - 1 Tab .A ~raq ~ l>eclar•to-ry Policy Papers ·,. ·' .. • • .. ·,. •• .. ... ITU£) 9, i,· 02 1"151/•T. 17 147,,..., )(6) p , 6912 • Declaratory Policy on UJf WMD Inspection• in Iraq The goal of the United States is the verifiable elimination of Iraq• s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-. Th~s is the U.N. Security Council. ' a mandate, and is the only way to prctect the national security of the United Sta;es, and its friends and allies in the region, including the Iraqi people -- who have been the victims of che~ical weapons attacks by Saddam Kusaetn•a regi111e . 'fo u,w~""c..... o.. 't't~ p +~ -to ,r . 'l'be eaaentia1 i•• ue ia diaariuae ot in• pection• by (..C. .. " i.,\,.I_. the U.N. Under UNSCR. 687, Iraq diaaXlll itself · of v\'i.,,,., all WMD. The Iraqi regime rM...,1MMMM.eeM-..-,;14shift~ the burden :. ~~_.Ai,..,,. rrca itsel_f to the U.N. 1 @ear. Q) tlie world now believes that. the 11,--.11 U.N. baa the burden of proving I~aq•a noncompliance with ita l,Jl>,r "''_.\~.. obligation to diaan11. In fac:t, Iraq haa the burden of proving ~ . _;..) its compliance wit.hits U~N. obligatioiu, . @he pwrpa• e of 4' U~N. ~\.»"" · · inspection fe9;i,• ia a ••~•, not anjl°end. . Its pu.xpoae ia to facilitate and. confirm Iraqi disarmament . • Eight yeara of U.N. Special coanisaion (UNSCOM) inapectiona were unable -- because of Ir~q•a aysteniatic campaign of deception and denial ~- to confirm that Iraq had met it• UNSCR 687 responsibility to deatray ita WMD· . UNMOVI.C i • at present weaker th~ its predecessor, t:he U.»~ Special Conniaaion . Iraq's ·refusal to re-admit veapon• • - inspectors ~or almost: 4 - yeara haa given Iraq aq,le opportunity to h.ide re111aining WMD capability and to . acquire new WMD. · Ne support the U.N. •- • eftort• to ~ure compU,ance with UNSC resolution 681. !.l'h& U.N. should be considering ways of enabling UNMOVIC to · verify effectively the reguireaenta of UNSClt 687, requirements vhich were supposed to have been completed ·11 yeara ago. An Iraq that was willing to comply tu.1ly with UNSCR 687 would accept unconditionally whateve~ waa requested to demonstrate that it has disarmed. Iraq would offer an international inspection team: • A~cesa to any place in Iraq, anything in Iraq to include infonution and data, and ·ally person in Iraq, immediately on demand to c?nduct destruction or confirm Iraqi destruction of its WMI> capability and infrastructure; • • Authority to impound and destroy equipment or shut down facii-ities; - ~ROM WHITa HoyeE •rTUATJOH KOON 18 - (TUEi •· i,· 02 t,, ,1/ff. , .,. •7· no~ )( _ 6 - ) _-'--__. ,. 4 . .. ) . 2 -r 6'. .... Un.·• i"..&..A. .S t-w-tc.s .:::: "J +"-«- U. N. Allow~IV:i.] EU,)J.~ access .to and presence inside Iraq for the duration of the inapeetion process to conduct armed inspection missions. The . United States and U.N. would be able to operate fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft, including UA.Va, anywhere in Iraqi and bases in northern, central, and southern Iraq to facilit~te short-notice inspection opportunities; • Unr@stricted ·acceaa to Iraqi scientific personnel fro• inside Iraq that are knowledgeable about Iraq'• WMD program and allow them to be interviewed together with their familieD outside of traq; • Acceptance of any UNMOVYC inspector•, including American and UK inspectors. .. . ·-. :· .. . . . ; .. •.: .. ·· I ... . • .. FROM 1fH.1'TJ: HOUJIJ: IIITVATION ROOM 8B - tTUE) 8. U'02 17 151/IIT. 17 :oi7AIO. )(6) ,. 5 ,. 3 ~ . •• Declaratory Policy ou UN 'MMD In•pection• in ?raq Talking Poiut1 • The goal of the United States i1 the verifiable elimination· of Iraq's Weapons of Maas Destruction (WMD) a1 called tor _by the U.N. mandate . • This ia the only way to remove the WMD threat to the United States, its friends and allies in the region, and the Iraqi people. • The •••ential i••u• :L• diaa:nu.m•11.t by Iraq, not. i11• pect:iona by the U.lf. •· Iraq has the burden of proving it• compliance with it• U.N. obligatioDa. • Bight year• of U.H. inspectione· were unable to confint that Iraq ha~ met its U.N. obligations. • Unconstrained acti~ty over the lut • year• mean• Iraq ha• bad ample opportunity to hide retnaining WND capability and to acquire new WHD . · • • Me support fully the 11.N. • a effort• to i'l!li>leraen~ UHSC c'.1.~!;,""; Reaolution 687. , . ?,\.-1.:p;.. • An · t-ha..-t '°'4' w-.,a;~ · f.u,w,th v,-,.sc.2. 11,t'l -~~ .,t1~/r' (,A,.~,.,.,._,• M"lraq..,6'aaeiFely iete111de• to coq,ly/\ M would unconditionally" ~ :,t ~ '-' ".1 .... ,<1)offer acceaa in line with tbe original •lansuage i n UNSCR· 1587. ~~ fAJ _ \:;~~...,,.., Iraq would orfcr an international inapection_ teaa: ~•~ . .s • Access to any place in Iraq, anything in Iraq to include in~ol:tll&tion and data, and ony· person in Xraq. irnnediately on demand to conduct des~n.ction or confiZ'lll Iraqi · destruction of it• WMD capability and infrastructur~: • • Authority to il'llpound and de1troy &Qllipment or abut down facilities; ...,.,l. • -'U . S. t;.. ,tu. N. r' access to and presence inside Iraq for the duration of the inspection process to cORduct armed inspection mission• • The United State• and U.N. would be able to operate f'ixed - ~r rotary-wing aircraft, including UAVs, anywhere in Iraq; and bases in northern . central, and southern Iraq to facilitate short-notice inspection opportunities, • • ..oP • FROM "!'f TII: H0~81: 81TVATfON ROOM dB .. (TUI:) •. u· 02. t7,5t/rr. 17147/NO. )(6) p 6 • .. . . • • Un~eatricted access to Iraqi scientific peraonnel fr011 inside Iraq that are knowledgeable about Iraq's WMD progrUI and allow them to be interviewed together with their families outside of Iraq; - Aeceptance of any UNMOVIC insp_ ectors, including Junerican and UK inspectors • • • FROM WHITE HOUSE SITIIATION ROOM 8A lMONI 9. 9• 02 .... DRAFT WORKING PAPERS 14 : 49/ff. 14 I 41Ji,')l0.a;_ ____ _. p 2 )(6) ~ mio• '\~~ INSPECTION MODALITIES • All teams lffllBt be permitted anywhere, anytime and without interference. Iraq would have to accept immediate , unconditional and unrestricted access to any site, facility, equipment, records, information, Iraqi personnel or other items that the inspectors may wish to inspect. • In addition, the inspections will be conducted based on: o Removal of inspection modalities · (Iraq u•ed •sen•itive site modalities~ (1996) and "'presidential site modalitiesu (1998) to obstruct access to sites .suspected of conceali.ng WMD). o Unrestricted acceas to Iraqi national.sz, without the presence of Iraqi government monitors, with freedom to interview any Iraqi nationals under condition free of intimidation including intervievs of Iraqi nationals, accompanied by their families, outaide of Iraq. o Regional bases and oper•ting bases tor inspection teall\S throughout Iraq, including especially inspection team offices in regions outside of Baghdad to allow quick, effective inspections. o Inspection teams will have unrestricted overflight tor fixed and rota.ry-w1ng aircra!t, including UAVe. o Inspection teams will determine their own personnel, including U. s. personnel, and will accept and use information and inteliigence that any member state is willing to provide. • Any denial of entry, interference with, harassment of, or non-cooperation with the inspection teams will be considered a material breach of Iraq'& obligations to the United Nations. Should any inapection te&m find any item or activity prohibited by the UNSC resolutions, this will also be considered a material breach. ~n UNSCR 678 the Security Council authorized member states to use •all necessary means" to uphold and implement the UNSCRs relevant to Iraq . FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 9A (MON) 9. 9' 02 14 : 49/ST. 14141/'M I bX6) p 3 ZRAQI DECLARATIONS • Make a full, final, complete, and accurate disclosure of all chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles with a range cf over 150 kilometers, all components thereof and related materials and equipment, and all related research, development, support and manufacturing facilities . · • Identify [and release] all Kuwaiti or third-state nationals still unaccounted for from the Gulf War held in captivity, and identify those who are deceased whose remains are held by Iraq {and return those remain&] or otherwise account tor them; inventory [and return) all Kuwaiti or other property stolen during the Gulf War and not returned. • Identify {and surrender) all persons in Iraq who are or have engaged in acts of international terrorism; identify and describe (and terminate} all forms of support to groups or persons involved in such terrorism, including support for recruitment of members of terrorist groups and supply of weapons, money, or other support to terrorists (including payments to families of suicide bombers); condemn and renounce all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism. • Document all acts of repression of the Iraqi civili~n population, including especially repressive acts aimed at minority groups, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region, [and allow immediate and free access by international humanitarian organiaations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq.] • Account for all funds or items received by Iraq in international trade conducted outside the oil-for-food program.