Ongoing Military Operations and Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq

S. HRG. 108–653 ONGOING MILITARY OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN IRAQ HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION SEPTEMBER 25, 2003 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 96–500 PDF 2004 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 96500.CON SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma PAT ROBERTS, Kansas WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina JOHN CORNYN, Texas JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JACK REED, Rhode Island DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii BILL NELSON, Florida E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MARK DAYTON, Minnesota EVAN BAYH, Indiana HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JUDITH A. ANSLEY, Staff Director RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Democratic Staff Director (II) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 96500.CON SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 C O N T E N T S CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES ONGOING MILITARY OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN IRAQ SEPTEMBER 25, 2003 Bremer, Hon. L. Paul, III, Presidential Envoy to Iraq ......................................... 9 Abizaid, Gen. John P., USA, Commander, United States Central Command .... Page 16 (III) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 96500.CON SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 ONGOING MILITARY OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN IRAQ THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2003 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m. in room SH– 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nel- son, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor. Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff director. Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, profes- sional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, pro- fessional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel. Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, profes- sional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; and Peter K. Le- vine, minority counsel. Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew W. Florell, and Sara R. Mareno. Committee members’ assistants present: Dan Twining, assistant to Senator McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Rob- erts; Lance Landry and Jayson Roehl, assistants to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven, assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assist- ants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey and Caroline Tess, assist- ants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Sha- (1) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 2 piro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN Chairman WARNER. Good morning. The committee meets this morning to receive the testimony of Ambassador Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, and General John P. Abizaid, Com- mander, U.S. Central Command. We extend to you a very warm welcome, Mr. Ambassador. While we may have differences among us with regard to policy issues, I think you’re setting somewhat of a record in the United States Congress for the number of hearings and appearances. Monday, you appeared before a committee, three committees yesterday, three today. That’s seven, plus I think three other briefings. But not only is it a reflection on the depth of knowledge that you have, which you’re sharing with Congress, it’s also a reflection on the leadership on both sides of the aisle of both houses that are trying to lay before the respective bodies and Congress, as a whole, a body of fact on which we hopefully proceed early next week to have a full and thorough debate and passage of this matter. General Abizaid, you’ve taken leave of your forces in Central Command, but the urgency of your appearance justifies that, and we commend you and those under you in your command, particu- larly their families here at home, for the extraordinary courage and staying power that they’ve manifested throughout this. We’re pleased to have both of you here today, together with Mr. Korologos. Mr. Korologos has been Ambassador Plenipotentiary throughout this whole matter, and we welcome him. The timelessness and importance of this hearing in the wake of President Bush’s forceful speech to the United Nations (U.N.) on Tuesday cannot be overstated. The stakes, not only Iraq, but, in- deed, Afghanistan, are enormous. The military victories—and, in- deed, they were military victories—achieved by our Armed Forces are not complete as yet. Certainly initial goals were achieved on the military side. We did that with coalition partners. We must now secure the advancements that have been made. While America is watching this hearing and the other hearings— indeed, the whole world is focused on them—they’re watching to see if America has the staying power to complete its mission. I feel we do. I know you, Ambassador, and I know you, General, likewise feel we do. We’ve achieved these successes in a relatively short period. Sad- dam Hussein has been deposed, his ruthless regime deposed, and I have not heard anyone raise their voice to say we’d be better off had we not done that. We must, though, through deliberations and actions in the days ahead on President Bush’s emergency supple- mental request, send another strong message of bipartisan resolve to our fellow countrymen here in America, to our troops, to our coa- lition partners, to the rest of the world. We’ll stay the course and get the job done. It is part of the oversight responsibility of this committee to re- view ongoing military operations and other significant activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD). This is the fifth VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 3 hearing in a series of hearings this committee will conduct, along with countless briefings and updates we receive, to review the con- duct of Operation Iraqi Freedom and to understand the challenges that lay ahead of us in the future operations. The hearing is also part of a unique process. This week alone, three Senate committees and a like number of House committees will conduct hearings on this subject and provide a body of fact to Congress. This is, I think, unprecedented. Twenty-four months ago, terrorists turned New York City and the Pentagon and a lonely field in Pennsylvania into battlefields, terrorizing all the world and forever changing our sense of security. War against terrorists and those who support them became essen- tial. This Nation, under the leadership of our President, responded, as did our coalition partners. America didn’t ask for this war, but we have acted appropriately to defend our Nation and to prevent future terrorists from reaching our shores or from attacking our in- terests and friends abroad. As the President stated so eloquently on September 14, ‘‘And for America, there will be no going back to the era before September 11, to false comfort in a dangerous world. We are fighting the enemy in Iraq, in Afghanistan, so that we do not meet him again on our own streets here in the USA.’’ The choices involved in prosecuting this global war have been difficult. Not all nations have agreed. But I applaud our President for reaching out, as he has done this week and continues to do, not only in the U.N., but elsewhere. We invite their participation. If we, together with those who join us, succeed, we will have done this region of the world a whole change of direction towards free- dom and some measure of democracy for their peoples. The decision to confront Saddam Hussein was made not without careful deliberation, extensive diplomacy, and substantial efforts to find a peaceful solution. By the time U.S. troops crossed into Iraq on March 19, it had been the conclusion of three consecutive ad- ministrations of our Government, countless other nations, and the U.N., that Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime had used weapons of mass destruction (WMD), had threatened them against others, neighboring countries, and represented a clear and present danger to regional and world peace. It had been the conclusion of the Clinton administration that Saddam Hussein had stockpiles of WMD, was actively seeking more, and would ultimately use them. The U.N. Security Council had passed 17 resolutions dating back to 1991, 12 years, which re- quired full Iraqi cooperation in the disarmament of WMD. Saddam Hussein’s response was defiance, deception. October 2002, after an unprecedented amount of debate, the Sen- ate voted, 77 to 23, to authorize the President to utilize force in Iraq. The House of Representatives also voted overwhelmingly in favor of authorizing the use of force. By that act, it became our war, and the American people’s war, not the President’s war. At this critical juncture, it is our responsibility to continue to support the President in this operation, which we overwhelmingly supported, and to provide the resources necessary for him to finish the job, together with our coalition partners. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 4 American Armed Forces, together with coalition partners, achieved extraordinary rapid military success in Iraq with mini- mum casualties and damage. This is a clear tribute to the profes- sionalism and the dedication of our young men and women in uni- form and those who support them. We have succeeded in ridding the world of a brutal tyrant and have revealed the extent of his barbarism. We should be congratulating our President and our Armed Forces on a job well done, and I so do this morning. Despite the pockets of resistance in Iraq, that feeling of gratitude and goodwill toward the United States seems to grow. A Gallup Poll conducted earlier this week found that 62 percent of Iraqis be- lieve that ousting Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they have endured since the invasion, and two-thirds think Iraq will be in better condition 5 years from now, before that invasion. That will be a direct result of your efforts, Mr. Ambassador, and those of the Armed Forces of the United States under our military com- manders and the coalition partners. We must build on this goodwill and seize this historic opportunity to help build a thriving democ- racy, an ally against terror in Iraq. American forces and coalition partners have already done a re- markable job restoring basic services, and I think if there’s any- thing that’s been understated, Mr. Ambassador—and you have that opportunity this morning—you had a plan. Do not be reserved in telling us, in your judgment, how closely you’ve achieved the goals of that plan: ending ethnic violence, creating an environment where reconstruction can succeed. Most members of this committee have seen this with their own eyes, and the response of most members who have been to Iraq is concern for the good things that are tak- ing place in Iraq and are not somehow getting that message out, not only to our people, but to the Iraqi people. This reconstruction work is being done in a difficult environment of harsh conditions and significant risk. Those who have been re- moved from power seek to delay their inevitable defeat and, as ter- rorists, lash out. We’re ever mindful of the risk of our forces, Gen- eral Abizaid, every day, and the sacrifices made by their families and communities that support them. What is the best way to reduce U.S. casualties and create better conditions for eventually withdrawing our forces? That’s the ques- tion before this committee. In my judgment, the key is to improve the security situation in Iraq by restoring essential services, re- cruiting and training dependable Iraqi security forces, and repair- ing the infrastructure so that real economic growth opportunity can once again grow. The emergency supplemental request before this body, of $87 billion, submitted by President Bush specifically ad- dresses that goal. That is why it merits our support. It is imperative that we give our President and our troops the resources they need to complete their missions, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. The faster money gets to these sources, the faster con- ditions will improve, and the faster our troops will have the oppor- tunity to come home. I hope you, with specificity, address, as best you can, the schedules that you contemplate as it regards this par- ticular bill and the monies in it. Lasting peace and security will be achieved when we establish the environment for a democratic, economically viable Iraq. The VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 5 first steps to democracy have been taken, and a fledgling govern- ment is preparing itself to assume the responsibilities of sov- ereignty. Senator Levin and I and other Senators had the opportunity early this week to meet with two ministers, one in charge of elec- tricity, the other, water, both vital to this infrastructure. I, myself, was greatly impressed with the credentials of their background, their professional training. One had left his family, as so many— you, yourself, and other members of your team left your families— to go and literally volunteer to let this nation once again take its rightful place in the world community. So I commend them, and I commend you. You will talk today about the Marshall Plan, which brought peace and prosperity to a war-ravaged continent. I think that’s an important historical precedent. The modest investment has been repaid a hundred times over. The funding we are now being asked to provide is an equally important investment that will likewise be repaid many times over in the decades to come. You have my support. I wish you well. Senator Levin. STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me join you in welcoming Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid to our committee this morning. We appreciate what you and those who work with you, particularly those on the ground in Iraq, are attempting to do, at great personal risk and under very different and very difficult circumstances. It is clearly in our national interest for democracy and stability to be successful in Iraq. For this to happen, the stabilization and reconstruction effort needs to become much more of an inter- national effort. Achieving this will lower the risk to our military personnel, both by sharing that risk and by changing the nature of the effort from a U.S.-dominated occupation, where the United States is identified and visible as a target, to an internationally- supported transition to a new Iraqi Government. Internationalizing the effort is also the only way that the cost of reconstruction can be shared with other countries so that the burden is not carried so exclusively by U.S. taxpayers. We will be able to leave Iraq sooner, rather than later, the sooner that we internationalize the effort. Recent experiences in other settings illustrate that point. In Bos- nia, for example, the 1,800 U.S. troops constitute approximately 15 percent of the 12,000 total NATO Stabilization Force, and the Po- lice Task Force to which we contributed financially and with man- power has now been replaced by a European Union Police Mission. In Kosovo, the roughly 3,000 U.S. troops make up about 11 percent of the 27,000 total NATO-led Kosovo force, and the U.N. mission in Kosovo runs the civilian side of the effort there. The United States pays only 25 percent of the cost of the U.N. mission, and the European Union carries most of the burden of reconstruction. While I was pleased that President Bush went to the U.N. this week, I was disappointed that the President seemed to so severely limit the possible role of the U.N. in Iraq to assisting, ‘‘in develop- ing a constitution and training civil servants and conducting free VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 6 and fair elections.’’ In the aftermath of other conflicts, and even at times when, as in Iraq, the conflict is continuing, the U.N. has been responsible for post-conflict reconstruction, for the conduct of civil administration, for the supervision of civil administration, and for executive responsibility for police and the judiciary. A number of nations have made it clear to us for months, that their willingness to provide troops for Iraq or to contribute finan- cially to Iraq’s reconstruction depends on the U.N. being given a key role in Iraq. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan told me earlier this month when I met with him in New York that the U.N. will need to have broad functions in the reconstruction and political de- velopment effort if we are going to have a realistic hope of persuad- ing other key countries to join in the effort. The President’s appar- ent reluctance to grant a meaningful decisionmaking role for the U.N. in Iraq’s reconstruction means, I fear, that we will not suc- ceed in acquiring the troops and financial resources from other countries that we seek. What is necessary is not just a vague U.N. resolution of support, but a resolution assuring real power-sharing with the international community over the civil administration and reconstruction effort that results in additional nations, including Muslim nations, join- ing this effort. There are a great many other very serious issues that Congress must address concerning the administration’s $87 billion supple- mental request. Some are life-and-death issues affecting how long our troops will be in Iraq and at what risk. Some will have a long- term impact on our taxpayers and on our deficit. Others are tran- scendent issues relative to how a democratic nation can be built and sustained in Iraq in the current circumstances. There is no reasonable way that these issues can be adequately thought through, much less properly worked through, by next week, as the Majority Leader currently plans, despite urgent and repeated requests by the Democratic leadership and Democratic members for additional hearings. We take months to consider far less significant matters. The massive and unprecedented $87 bil- lion request has been before us for just 2 weeks. Some have compared the Iraq reconstruction effort to the Mar- shall Plan that led to the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In fact, the differences between the current proposal and the Marshall Plan are dramatic. For instance, the Marshall Plan re- quired countries receiving assistance to contribute a matching amount to their own reconstruction, and also included loans that were eventually paid back. Neither of these important require- ments are present in the Iraqi reconstruction request of the admin- istration. There is one aspect in which the Marshall Plan analogy can be helpful. When the legislation went to the floor of Congress, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, the chairman of the Senate For- eign Relations Committee and one of the architects of our biparti- san World War II foreign policy, called the Marshall Plan, ‘‘the final product of 8 months of more intensive study by more devoted minds than I have ever known to concentrate on any one objective in all my 20 years in Congress.’’ VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 7 We don’t need to study the request before us for 8 months, but we certainly owe it to the people that we represent, to our military members serving overseas in harm’s way, and to the institution in which we serve, to give the $87 billion request more than a 2-week, slap-dash, lick-and-a-promise review. When it comes to the portion of the supplemental request which supports our troops, there should be no issue. Our troops must be, and they will be, supported. But when it comes to the request for tens of billions of dollars for the building of an Iraqi nation, the answers, and, indeed, the questions, are far more complex. Should a timeline be established for Iraqis to assume responsibil- ities for their own safety and security? What are the administration’s goals for Iraq’s economic recon- struction? What is the timeline and what are the costs to meet those goals, including a detailed plan for the restoration of basic services, an es- timate of the costs and percentage to be borne by the United States and the percentage to be borne by other countries? What is the timeline to meet the administration’s goals for Iraq’s political reconstruction, including the adoption of a constitution, the holding of elections, and the establishment of an elected gov- ernment with broad public support? What is the likelihood that the administration will be able to as- semble a broad international coalition to address the military, eco- nomic, and political needs of Iraq? How does that affect the need for the $87 billion request before us? Why shouldn’t Iraq invest more in its own future by pledging some of its future oil revenues to the building of its nation? Put more bluntly, isn’t it essential that the people of Iraq want to be- come a unified and secure nation badly enough that they are will- ing to make that pledge and that financial commitment now to help raise funds now for reconstruction costs, and not simply be the re- cipient of financial assistance? Would it not be an important step towards independence and self-reliance for the Iraqis to make the same pledge of their ‘‘fortunes’’ that the founders of our Nation made in 1776? How do we ensure competition in awarding contracts for recon- struction projects, and transparency in budgeting and expenditure of U.S. taxpayers’ funds? These and many other questions need careful and thoughtful consideration by Congress. Getting answers to probing questions on the reconstruction funds is not aimed at shirking our responsibility, but at fulfilling our responsibility. That is what our constituents sent us here to do. That is the job that they expect us to do, and there is no way we can do that job properly in 2 weeks. The issue is not whether we are willing to spend enough to de- fend America. Of course we all are. The issue is whether the huge amount requested for an American reconstruction effort doled out by an American administrator, an effort that will be seen in some parts of the world as perpetuating an American occupation of Iraq, will make our troops more or less secure, and make their job of sta- bilizing Iraq more or less difficult. We have expended huge amounts of blood and treasure already. Will the additional $87 bil- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 8 lion requested by the administration effectively reduce our future sacrifice, or will it be lost in a deepening and downward spiral of civil disorder and chaos? I hope that thoughtful congressional consideration of this recon- struction request can lead to sharing the burden with other coun- tries, who will benefit from a secure and democratic Iraq, and to reducing the risk of American troops being drawn more and more deeply into a jihad-type guerrilla war against Western occupiers. We should take the time to do this right and to do it on a biparti- san basis. These times and the threats surely call for that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin, thank you. I’d like to ask the committee if we could digress for a moment, that we have a quorum, as we have a number of promotions relat- ing to the Armed Forces of the United States. I observe a quorum now present. I ask the committee first to con- sider the nomination of Gordon R. England to be Secretary of the Navy. His nomination has been before the committee the required length of time, and no objections have been raised regarding it. We had a thorough hearing on Tuesday. Is there a motion? Senator LEVIN. So moved. Senator INHOFE. Second. Chairman WARNER. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] Opposed? [No response.] Next, I ask the committee to consider a list of 5,552 military nominations. Again, no objection has been raised among the com- mittee members regarding these nominations. However, I must in- form the committee that 705 of these appointments, all for officers below the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral lower half, were not received by the committee until September 22 due to the Federal Government being closed last week. Under the committee’s 7-day rule, these 705 officers would not be eligible for consideration unless the committee provided a waiver. Monday, in my view, would be not fair for the promotion of any of these officers to be delayed when they would have been eligible had we not had the storm conditions. Therefore, I ask that we now waive the 7-day rule with regard to those nominations. Senator LEVIN. So moved. Senator INHOFE. Seconded. Chairman WARNER. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] Opposed? [No response.] The full slate of nominations have now been acted upon favor- ably by the committee. I thank my colleagues very much. Listening to not only the comments this morning by us, but there’s a chapter in history that always interests me about the Marshall Plan. Truman is reputed to have said that he was con- cerned that Congress would not pass this plan. He turned to George Marshall, and he said, ‘‘Let’s name it the Marshall Plan. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 9 It’ll go through.’’ Perhaps we should refer to this as the Abizaid plan. Here we go. Mr. Ambassador, would you lead off? STATEMENT OF HON. L. PAUL BREMER III, PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY TO IRAQ Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear in behalf of the President’s supplemental. Before I begin, I, like you, Mr. Chairman, want to pay tribute to the fine young men and women in our Armed Forces, who led a co- alition to a military victory without precedent. In roughly 3 weeks, they defeated a country larger than Germany and Italy combined, and they did so with forces smaller than the Army on the Potomac, a point I make with all respect to the chairman for bringing up memories. [Laughter.] Chairman WARNER. I hear you. Ambassador BREMER. Mr. Chairman, I know that you, like all Members of Congress, hate to wake up to the news that another American serviceman has been killed in Iraq. These deaths are painful. I hear about them often before you do, because I’m eight time zones ahead of you. The deaths, although they’re painful, are not senseless. They are part of the price we pay for fighting for civ- ilization, for being part of a world that refuses to tolerate terrorism and genocide and WMD. Those who ambush Coalition Forces, who set truck bombs, and who assassinate people like the deceased member of the Governing Council, are trying to thwart constitutional and democratic govern- ment in Iraq. They will win some battles, Mr. Chairman, but they’re going to lose their war with history. President Bush’s vision for Iraq envisages an Iraq that is secure through the efforts of the Iraqis. It provides for an Iraqi economy based on sound economic principles and bolstered by a reliable in- frastructure. Finally, the President’s plan provides for a democratic and sovereign Iraq at the earliest reasonable date. The stakes couldn’t be higher. If we fail to recreate Iraq as a sov- ereign democracy sustained by a solid economy, we will have hand- ed the terrorists a gift. We must deny terrorists that gift of state sponsorship, which they enjoyed under Saddam, and we just deny them the chaos such as they thrived on in the 1980s in Lebanon. Creating a sovereign, democratic, constitutional, and prosperous Iraq deals a blow to terrorists. It gives the lie to those who describe us as the enemies of Islam, the enemies of Arabs, or the enemies of the poor. That’s why the President’s request has to be seen as an important part of the global war on terrorism. Mr. Chairman, many of you have pointed out our national experi- ence teaches us how to consolidate a military victory. This was a lesson we did not learn at the end of the first world war. Many here opposed that war and wanted to solve problems at home. We won the war, but we did not consolidate the peace, and we know what price we paid. Extremism bred in a swamp of despair, bank- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 10 ruptcy, and unpayable debts gave birth to a world of fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, and another world war. After that conflict, America showed that we had learned that military victory must be followed by a program to secure the peace. In 1948, America’s ‘‘greatest generation’’ responded with the bold- est, most generous, and most productive act of statesmanship in the last century, the Marshall Plan. When George Marshall first described the Marshall Plan at Har- vard, he laid out some truths that resonate, anyway to me, today. He said, ‘‘Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.’’ The emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. The Marshall Plan, enacted with overwhelming bipartisan sup- port by this Congress, sent war-torn Europe on the path to the freedom and prosperity which Europeans enjoy today. After a thou- sand years as the cockpit of war, Europe became the cradle of peace in two short generations. A similar opportunity for transforming the region lies before us in Iraq. The grants to Iraq the President seeks bespeak a grandeur of vision equal to the one which created the free world at the end of the second world war. Iraqis living in freedom with dignity will set an example in this troubled region which so often spawns ter- rorists. A stable, peaceful, economically productive Iraq will serve American interests by making Americans safer. I’d like to make just a few points about the supplemental re- quest. In response to several comments, we do have a definite plan, with milestones and dates. Second, no one part of this supple- mental is more important than any other part. It is an integrated request. Third, this request is urgent. The urgency concerning mili- tary operations is self-evident, but the funds for non-military action in Iraq are equally urgent. Most Iraqis welcomed us as liberators. As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, a just-released Gallup Poll shows that almost two-thirds of the Iraqis continue to say that getting rid of Saddam makes the sacrifices of the war and the aftermath worthwhile. Even so, the reality of foreign troops on the street is understand- ably chafing. Some Iraqis are beginning to regard us as occupiers and not liberators. Some of this is inevitable, but faster progress on reconstruction can help stem the tide. The link to the safety of our troops is indirect, but real. It is true that the people who ambush our coalitions are small in number, and they’re not ambushing because they don’t have adequate elec- trical power, but the population’s view of the United States and the coalition is directly linked to their cooperation in hunting down those who attack us and giving us, in a word, good intelligence. Early progress on restoring basic infrastructure gives us an edge against the terrorists. This money will be spent with prudent transparency. In answer to the question that Senator Levin raised, every contract of the $20 billion requested for Iraq will be competitively bid. Mr. Chairman, I know there’s been some talk of granting some parts of this as a loan. Initially, this may appear attractive. But, once again, I’m afraid the facts and historic experience intrude. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 11 The facts are that the Iraqi people have a debt of more than $200 billion hanging over them, a debt incurred by Saddam’s economic incompetence and by his wars of aggression against his neigh- bors—$200 billion. They cannot pay that debt, they can’t even serv- ice it, and it makes no sense to lay more debt on top of them, again, a lesson that we should have learned from the aftermath of the first world war. The President’s first priority in this supplemental request is se- curity, and it has three elements, most of which you and the other Members heard about when you came to visit in July. First, public safety, money for the police to get a professional, well-trained po- lice, respectful of human rights, onboard; funds for border police and border enforcement. Second, a national defense element, which involves standing up a new Iraqi army as quickly as we can, and a civil defense system. Third, a justice system so that when crimi- nals are caught, there are courts and prisons to look after them. This security assistance benefits the United States in four con- crete ways. First, Iraqis will be more effective collecting the impor- tant intelligence than we can be. As talented and courageous as Coalition Forces are, they can never replace an Iraqi policeman who knows his beat, who knows his people, their customs, their language, and their rhythms. Iraqis have asked repeatedly to play a greater role in providing their security, and we agree, they should. Second, as these Iraqi security forces assume their duties, they replace Coalition Forces in some of the roles that generate frustra- tion, friction, and resentment, things like conducting searches, manning checkpoints, and guarding installations. Third, this frees up Coalition Forces for the mobile sophisticated offensive operations against former regime loyalists and terrorists, for which they are best suited. Finally, Mr. Chairman, building up these new Iraqi forces re- duces the overall security demands on Coalition Forces and can speed up the day when we can bring our troops home. Security is, of course, indispensable, but it’s not enough. A good security system cannot persist on the knife-edge of economic col- lapse. Saddam left behind an economy ruined, not by our attacks, but by decades of neglect, theft, and mismanagement. In 35 years, he never once prepared a national budget. The Iraqis must refashion their economy from the Soviet-style command economy Saddam left behind. That poor model was fur- ther hobbled by cronyism, theft, and pharaonic self-indulgence by Saddam and his intimates. Members of the committee saw a number of the palaces in Bagh- dad. I can tell you, those palaces exist in every single city in the country. The good news is that important changes have already begun on the economic front. As many of you know, on Sunday, at the an- nual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF in Dubai, the Min- ister of Finance announced a bold and sweeping set of economic re- form programs, the most open program for foreign direct invest- ment of any country in the region, a new Central Bank law which establishes complete independence for the Central Bank, a tariff policy which is simple. It’s zero, except for a temporary 2-year 5 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 12 percent tariff, called a reconstruction tariff, to raise funds for the Iraqi Government. On October 15, we will introduce a new cur- rency to Iraq. For the first time in 20 years, there will be a unified currency. That currency will float against the world’s currencies. Mr. Chairman, the Iraqi Government, by taking these steps, has put in place the legal infrastructure necessary to create a vibrant private sector, but those policies will come to nothing if they don’t rest on a sound economic infrastructure in a reasonable security environment. We’ve made significant progress in restoring these essential serv- ices. The widely predicted humanitarian crisis did not occur. There was no major flow of refugees. You spoke about our plan, Mr. Chairman. All 240 hospitals and 90 percent of its health clinics are open today. All of the schools finished their school year. All 22 uni- versities in Iraq held final exams in late May and early June, de- spite the difficult circumstances, and they will reopen again in a few weeks. There is an adequate food supply, and there is no evi- dence of epidemic. We have cleared thousands of miles of irrigation canals. Electric service will reach prewar levels within a month. But there are remaining demands that are vast, and that is why most of the President’s non-military, non-security assistance is fo- cused on critical infrastructure. The third major element of our overall strategy is to move to- wards a democratic Iraq. Here, too, Mr. Chairman, there’s good news. We have laid out a seven-step process for Iraq to return to full sovereignty through elections. Three of the seven steps have al- ready been taken. Governing Council took office on July 13. The second step was then when they appointed a committee to make recommendations to them on how to write a constitution. The third step was the appointment of the cabinet on September 2. You met, and some other Members met, two of the very impressive members of this cabinet when they were here earlier this week. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that an Iraqi friend pointed out to me last week that this is the best-educated, most qualified cabinet in Iraq’s history. As I probed a bit, I learned that 17 of the 25 cabi- net members have PhDs, which makes them probably the best-edu- cated cabinet anywhere in the world. These are not just PhDs in subjects, like I’m an expert in, in history; these are PhDs that actu- ally really count. The Minister of Agriculture is a professional agronomist. The Minister of Water Resources is a hydrologist. The Minister of Electricity, whom you met, has almost 30 years experi- ence running power companies. They are a very competent group of people, and they have lots of responsibility. The remaining steps on the path to Iraqi independence and sov- ereignty are to write a constitution. We hope a constitutional con- vention will convene shortly, in the next month or so. That con- stitution will have to be ratified by the Iraqi people, the fifth step. An ultimate step will be holding of free elections. Finally, the sev- enth step is when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) hands sovereignty back to the Iraqi people. No one looks forward to that day more than I do, except perhaps my wife. Some, including a few members of the Iraqi Governing Council, suggest we should give full sovereignty to an Iraqi Government im- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 13 mediately, or anyway very soon. Mr. Chairman, I believe that such haste would be a mistake, and so do the Iraqi people. The same Gallup Poll I cited earlier shows that 85 percent of the people of Baghdad believe that an immediate departure of Coalition Forces would lead to chaos. No appointed government, even one as honest and dedicated as the Iraqi Governing Council, can have the legit- imacy necessary to take on the difficult issues the Iraqis face as they write their constitution, elect a government, and, I might add, undertake a major economic reconstruction effort. The only path to full Iraqi sovereignty is through a written constitution, ratified and followed by free democratic elections. Shortcuts are potentially dan- gerous. As you examine the President’s plan, as I hope you will, I’m sure you’ll see that every part is connected to the others. The need to protect the coalition and the Iraqi people alike against terrorists and common criminals is obvious. The United States must take the lead in restoring Iraq as a friend and democratic model. There is, as you have mentioned, a donors conference in Madrid in late October, and we, the United States, must set the example before then and work to show that we must avoid together the near anarchy in which terrorists will feel right at home. Mr. Chairman, make no mistake, these requested funds rep- resent an investment in America’s national security. If, after com- ing this far, we turn our backs and let Iraq lapse into factional chaos, we will have sown the dragon’s teeth, will sprout more ter- rorists and eventually cost more American lives in Iraq or even here at home. You may think I exaggerate, but I ask you to look at what hap- pened in Afghanistan, another country which, after it was debili- tated by decades of war and mismanagement, became easy prey to the Taliban and al Qaeda. The reconstruction of Iraq may seem distant from American con- cerns today. Eight time zones and two continents separate where we are on the East Coast from Iraq. The West Coast is effectively half a world away. But Iraq only seems far away. Today, Iraq has become a focal point in the global war on terror- ism, a point I make with some trepidation, because it means we are on the front line of the global war on terrorism. But failure there would strengthen terrorists morally and materially. Mr. Chairman, I think you said in your opening remarks, it is ex- tremely important for the world to understand that we have the staying power to see this through. All of this requires the combined support of the American people and of both parties in Congress. This is a large, serious, important, and urgent matter. It must be done quickly, and it must be done well. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I look forward to an- swering your question in support of this request. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Bremer follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMB. L. PAUL BREMER III Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the President’s supplemental request. Before I begin, I want to pay tribute to the men and women of our armed services. Leading a coalition, our Armed Forces delivered a military victory without prece- dent. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 14 In roughly 3 weeks they liberated a country larger than Germany and Italy com- bined. They did so with forces smaller than the Army of the Potomac. Our Armed Forces accomplished all this while absorbing and inflicting minimal casualties. Iraqis understood that we tried to spare the innocent. Mr. Chairman, I know that you and all Americans hate waking up to hear a newscast that begins, ‘‘Last night another American soldier was killed in Iraq. . .’’ I am among the first to know of those deaths and no one regrets them more than I do. But these deaths, painful as they are, are not senseless. They are part of the price we pay for civilization, for a world that refuses to tolerate terrorism and genocide and WMD. Those who ambush Coalition Forces, who set the truck bombs, are trying to thwart constitutional and democratic government in Iraq. They will win some bat- tles, but they are going to lose their war with history. President Bush’s vision provides for an Iraq made secure through the efforts of Iraqis. It provides for an Iraqi economy based on sound economic principles and bol- stered by a reliable infrastructure. Finally, the President’s plan provides for a demo- cratic and sovereign Iraq at the earliest reasonable date. If we fail to recreate Iraq as a sovereign democracy sustained by a solid economy, we will have handed the terrorists a gift. We must deny terrorists the gift of state sponsorship, which they enjoyed under Saddam, and must deny them the chaos such as they thrived in during the 1980s in Lebanon. But creating a sovereign, democratic, constitutional and prosperous Iraq deals a blow to terrorists. It gives the lie to those who describe us as enemies of Islam, en- emies of the Arabs and enemies of the poor. That is why the President’s request has to be seen as an important element in the global war on terrorism. Our national experience teaches us how to consolidate a military victory. We did not have that experience when we emerged victorious from World War I. Many had opposed the war and wanted to solve problems at home. We won the war and did not consolidate the peace. We know what happened. Extremism, bred in a swamp of despair, bankruptcy and unpayable debts, gave the world Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany— and another World War. After that conflict we showed we had learned that military victory must be fol- lowed by a program to secure the peace. In 1948 the greatest generation responded with the boldest, most generous and most productive act of statesmanship in the past century—the Marshall Plan. When Secretary of State George C. Marshall first described the Marshall Plan, he laid out some truths that resonate today. ‘‘Its purpose,’’ Marshall said, ‘‘should be the revival of a working economy . . . so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institu- tions can exist.’’ The Marshall Plan, enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support, set war-torn Europe on the path to the freedom and prosperity which Europeans enjoy today. After a thousand years as a cockpit of war Europe became a cradle of peace in just two generations. The grants to Iraq the President seeks bespeak grandeur of vision equal to the one which created the free world at the end of World War II. Iraqis living in freedom with dignity will set an example in this troubled region which so often spawns terrorists. A stable, peaceful, economically productive Iraq will serve American interests by making America safer. There are some things I would like to point out about this supplemental request: • We have a definite plan with milestones and dates. • No one part of the supplemental is dispensable and no part is more im- portant than the others. • This is urgent. The urgency of military operations is self-evident. The funds for nonmilitary action in Iraq are equally urgent. Most Iraqis wel- comed us as liberators. Now the reality of foreign troops on the streets is starting to chafe. Some Iraqis are beginning to regard us as occupiers and not as liberators. Some of this is inevitable, but faster progress on recon- struction will help. The link to the safety of our troops is indirect, but real. The people who ambush our troops are small in number and do not do so because they have undependable electric supplies. However, the population’s view of us is directly linked to their co- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 15 operation in hunting down those who attack us. Earlier progress gives us an edge against the terrorists. • This money will be spent with prudent transparency. Every contract of the $20 billion for Iraq will be competitively bid. • That the money be granted and not loaned is essential. Initially, offering assistance as loans seems attractive. But once again we must examine the facts and the historical record. Iraq has almost $200 billion in debt and rep- arations hanging over it as a result of Saddam’s economic incompetence and aggressive wars. They cannot pay what they owe now, much less take on more debt. The President’s first priority is security and he has a three-element plan. • Public safety—police, border enforcement, fire and a communications sys- tem to link them. • National defense—a new army and civil defense system. • Justice system—courts and prisons. This security assistance to Iraq benefits the United States in four ways. First, Iraqis will be more effective. As talented and courageous as the Coalition Forces are, they can never replace an Iraqi policeman who knows his beat, who knows his people, their customs, rhythms, and language. Iraqis want Iraqis provid- ing their security and so do we. Second, as these Iraqi security forces assume their duties, they replace coalition troops in the roles that generate frustration, friction and resentment—conducting searches, manning check points, guarding installations. Third, this frees up Coalition Forces for the mobile, sophisticated offensive oper- ations against former regime loyalists and terrorists for which they are best suited. Finally, these new Iraqi forces reduce the overall security demands on Coalition Forces and speed the day when we can bring troops home. Security is indispensable, but by itself is insufficient and cannot endure. A good security system cannot persist on the knife edge of economic collapse. Sad- dam left behind an economy ruined not by our attacks but by decades of neglect, theft and mismanagement—he never once prepared a budget. The Iraqis must refashion their economy from the Soviet-style, command economy Saddam left them. That poor model was further hobbled by cronyism, theft and pharaonic self-indulgence by Saddam and his intimates. Important changes have already begun. The Iraqi Minister of Finance on Sunday announced a set of market-oriented poli- cies that is among the world’s boldest. Those policies include: • A new Central Bank law which grants the Iraqi Central Bank full legal independence. • Foreign firms may open wholly owned companies, including banks, or buy them. Foreign firms receive national treatment and have an unrestricted right to remit profits and capital. • Tariff policy is simple. There is a 2-year ‘‘reconstruction tariff’’ of 5 per- cent on most imports and the rest come in with no tariff. • On October 15, Iraq will get a new currency, the New Dinar, which will float against the world’s currencies. The Iraqi Government has put in place these legal procedures for encouraging a vibrant private sector. But those policies will come to nothing if they do not rest on a sound infrastructure in a reasonable security environment. We have made significant progress restoring these essential services. The widely predicted humanitarian crisis did not occur. There was no major flow of refugees. All of Iraq’s 240 hospitals and 90 percent of its health clinics are open. There is ade- quate food and there is no evidence of epidemic. We have cleared thousands of miles of irrigation canals so that farmers in these areas have more water than they have had for a generation. Electrical service will reach prewar levels within a month. However, the remaining demands are vast, which is why most of the President’s request for nonmilitary assistance is for infrastructure programs. On another front there is already good news. The democratization of Iraq, on which so much global attention is focused, is further advanced than many realize. Encouraging a quick political transformation, we have laid out a clear, seven-step process leading to sovereignty. Three of the seven necessary steps have been com- pleted: 1. An Iraqi Governing Council was appointed in July. 2. In August the Governing Council named a Preparatory Committee to recommend a mechanism for writing Iraq’s new, permanent constitution. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 16 3. Earlier this month the Governing Council appointed ministers to run the day-to-day affairs of Iraq. 4. The fourth step, writing a constitution, frames all that follows. The constitution will be written by Iraqis. 5. The constitution will be ratified by popular vote of the entire adult pop- ulation. 6. After the constitution is ratified, elections for a new government will be held. 7. The final step will come after elections, when we transfer sovereignty from the coalition to the new government. Some, including members of the Iraqi Governing Council, suggest we should give full sovereignty to an Iraqi Government immediately or very soon. I firmly believe that such haste would be a mistake. No appointed government, even one as honest and dedicated as the Iraqi Govern- ing Council, can have the legitimacy necessary to take on the difficult issues Iraqis face as they write their constitution and elect a government. The only path to full Iraqi sovereignty is through a written constitution, ratified and followed by free, democratic elections. Shortcutting the process would be dan- gerous. As you examine the President’s plan I am sure you will see that every part de- pends on every other part. The need to protect the coalition and the populace alike against terrorists and common criminals is obvious and indispensable. The United States must take the lead in restoring Iraq as a friend and democratic model. There is a donor conference in Madrid in late October. We must set the ex- ample for other nations of goodwill and work with them to avoid the near anarchy in which terrorists will feel right at home. When we launched military operations against Iraq we assumed a great respon- sibility that extends beyond defeating Saddam’s military. If, after coming this far, we turn our backs and let Iraq lapse into factional chaos, we will have sewn the dragon’s teeth which will sprout more terrorists and eventu- ally cost more American lives. Make no mistake. These requested funds represent an investment in America’s national security. You may think I exaggerate. I ask you to look at what happened in Afghanistan, another country which, after it was debilitated by decades of war and mismanage- ment, became easy prey for the Taliban and al Qaeda. The reconstruction of Iraq may seem distant from American concerns today. Eight time zones and two continents separate the east coast of the United States from Iraq. The west coast is effectively half a world away. Iraq only seems far away. Today Iraq is a focal point in our global war on terror- ism. Failure there would strengthen the terrorists morally and materially. All of this requires the help of Congress. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee we respectfully ask Congress to honor the President’s supplemental request, which responds to urgent requirements in order to achieve the vision of a sovereign, stable, prosperous and democratic Iraq at peace with us and with the world. Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for a very thor- ough and strongly delivered statement, with your own personal conviction resonating in every sentence. General Abizaid. STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND General ABIZAID. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. It’s an honor to be here. It’s an important opportunity to testify before you. CENTCOM stands at the center of the global war on terrorism. We’re at the heart of it. We have over 200,000 soldiers, sailors, air- men, and marines that are out there serving—in the east, all the way from Kyrgyzstan, to the west, in the Horn of Africa. They’ve had important tactical success in the past 2 years on the broader global war on terror, and they have, in conjunction with friendly VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 17 nations in the area, done much to help defeat and disrupt the ter- rorist threat. But there is much work that needs to be done in that broader war. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, our troops are involved in combat operations to attain stability. In Iraq, our focus continues to be that of increasing Iraqi security capacity, looking for opportunities to in- tegrate international forces into the coalition, building a stronger intelligence system to enable us to get actionable intelligence against the various enemies that we face there, building the infracture, and working an information campaign that tells the Iraqi people what we are doing, why we are doing it in order to bring them more strongly to the side of the coalition. I’ve said on numerous occasions, and I know all of you know it, there is no strictly military solution to the problems in Iraq. We must move together hand in hand with the CPA and Ambassador Bremer. We must synchronize the power of the United States Gov- ernment in diplomatic, economic, and political measures, along with the military, in order to achieve success. Our young people are capable and they’re confident. Much is made of my father’s generation being the ‘‘greatest gen- eration.’’ But I would tell you the next-greatest generation is out there serving in the Central Command area and fighting and win- ning and representing the American people in an absolutely out- standing manner. Their work will continue to be difficult, and it’ll continue to be dangerous. We will need both patience and courage to see the mis- sion through. Likewise, the Iraqi people have shown great courage. Many of them serve with us day after day to make their country a better place. They have put their lives on the line in the battlefield, and they continue to show optimism about the future. This battle for Iraq is a battle of moderation versus extremism. We have to give the Iraqis a chance to succeed. This supplemental is about giving our troops, the great people that work in the CPA, and Iraqis the tools necessary to succeed. Mr. Chairman, it’s an honor to be here. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General Abizaid follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA It is an honor to report to this committee on the situation and our actions in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. Our command is focused on three main prior- ities: defeating transnational terrorism and creating safe and secure environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. CENTCOM operates within the geographic and ideological heart of the global war on terror. It is a war without borders that spans all 25 coun- tries in the region. There is no doubt that the war on terror is connected to our ef- forts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Success in Afghanistan and Iraq will result in stable states that do not harbor terrorists and provide a visible alternative to the terrorist vision of hatred and conflict. The over 195,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines now serving in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility are engaged in a wide range of activities, each of them critical to maintaining our national security. These include counter- insurgency, counterterrorist, stability, and civil affairs operations. Over 20 ships and 200 aircraft are sustaining our land forces and providing a potent deterrent to our adversaries. Our service men and women are also occupied with training exer- cises designed to increase our ability to operate with regional partners as well as enhance their military effectiveness. I visit our troops and their commanders fre- quently and they remain confident that we are winning the war on terrorism and VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 18 winning the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are also realistic and understand that success will not come without cost or without the cooperation of local popu- lations. Those of you who have visited the region understand the great strides our servicemen and women have made toward accomplishing our objectives. We all rec- ognize, however, that there are no easy answers to the problems we face in the re- gion. At CENTCOM we also know that, while we are the military centerpiece of our national security efforts in the region, none of the problems with which we are en- gaged will succumb to military force alone. Integrating our efforts with those of other agencies and ensuring that our operations advance our political objectives are essential to our success. WAR ON TERRORISM We have had good effect against terrorists throughout the Central Command Area of Responsibility. Our success has not been due to military actions alone. The United States Government, in cooperation with our regional partners, has killed and captured terrorists and attacked their infrastructure. CENTCOM is proud to have played a role in an effort marked by unprecedented cooperation between various agencies, regional partners, and members of the largest international coalition in history. Despite remarkable victories, the fight against terrorism is far from over. The en- emy’s ideological base, financial networks and information networks remain strong. Indeed, the demographic and economic conditions that breed terrorists may be wors- ening and those conditions are heightening the ideological fervor associated with radical Islamist extremism. It is clear that we must continually reassess our efforts and improve our effectiveness. We at Central Command, partnered as we are with many Islamic nations, recog- nize that the war on terrorism is not a war against Islam; it is a war against the enemies of Islam. It is not a war against religion; it is a war against irreligious mur- derers. Securing all of our futures depends mainly on collective action and inter- national cooperation. Each of the three main Combined Joint Task Forces in our Area of Responsibility has an important role to play in the greater regional effort against terrorists. Through these task forces and Component Commands, we synergize theater cooperation efforts with other nations and build indigenous capa- bilities to combat terrorism and control borders. Central Command, our regional partners, and the 71 members of the Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition will re- main on the offensive until terrorists no longer pose a threat. IRAQ In Iraq, our forces are working alongside the CPA to provide military capacity in our interagency and international efforts toward building a unified and stable coun- try. The CPA’s endstate for Iraq calls for a democratic and sovereign nation, under- pinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing market economy, and made secure through the efforts of Iraqis—able to defend itself, but posing no threat to its neighbors or the international community.1 Coalition servicemen and women, alongside many Iraqi partners, are fighting our enemies and making progress toward a return of Iraq to the Iraqi people. While Iraqi police capacity still remains below requirements, joint coalition and Iraqi po- lice operations are bringing to justice criminal gangs that have been preying on the Iraqi people. Neighborhood watch programs are springing up throughout towns and villages. Although large reconstruction projects will require considerable time and resources, military commanders are working with local townspeople to prioritize small reconstruction projects; thousands of these have been completed. Town and city councils are in place throughout the country. The first battalion of the new Iraqi army will graduate on 4 October and the second battalion begins training the next day; these soldiers are proud to be part of the new Iraq. The first 2,000 men and women of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps are assuming security responsibilities along- side coalition soldiers. All this and more has been achieved in just over 4 months, despite the utter collapse of virtually every Iraqi institution. Our achievements, however, have not come without sacrifice, and there is more fighting ahead. Iraq has tremendous potential, but the coalition and our Iraqi partners must de- feat our enemies and overcome considerable obstacles before the future of Iraq is 1 This more closely follows Amb. Bremer’s testimony yesterday. It reads: ‘‘President Bush’s vi- sion, in contrast, provides for an Iraq made secure through the efforts of Iraqis. In addition to a more secure environment, the President’s plan provides for an Iraqi economy based on sound economic principles bolstered by a modern, reliable infrastructure. Finally, the President’s plan provides for a democratic and sovereign Iraq at the earliest reasonable date.’’ VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 19 secure. While all but a very few Iraqis recognize the promise of freedoms they are enjoying for the first time—freedom to express their personal views, freedom to practice their religion, freedom from fear, freedom to determine their own destiny— there are those who would deny the Iraqi people the peace and prosperity they so richly deserve. We continue to experience attacks on Coalition Forces, our Iraqi partners, and infrastructure punctuated by larger high-visibility attacks to discredit the coalition, disrupt reconstruction, and cause unrest. While former regime loyal- ists remain the focus of our operations, extremists, foreign fighters and terrorist groups are emerging as a major threat to Iraqis, the coalition, and the international community. Criminal activity continues to frustrate reconstruction efforts and is the major source of instability in some regions. While our enemies are too weak to chal- lenge us militarily, they believe that we do not possess the will to persevere in Iraq. They are wrong. We are taking the fight to the enemy in Iraq. Attacks against our forces are local- ized in the Sunni areas and the city of Baghdad. Over 75 percent of violent incidents and sabotage have occurred in only 4 of the 18 provinces. The preponderance of the country, including Baghdad, has achieved a very high degree of security and stabil- ity. Iraqis are providing intelligence that permits us to kill or capture the enemy and preempt attacks. We are focusing our efforts in five areas: improving intelligence, developing Iraqi security forces, internationalizing our security effort, protecting the infrastructure, and helping to communicate our aims, plans, and successes to the Iraqi people. We have also repositioned forces to concentrate our efforts in problem areas and estab- lish a higher degree of control over Iraq’s borders. In areas in which we achieve sta- bility, we will disengage our forces and turn over security responsibilities to Iraqis while maintaining the capability to anticipate and respond rapidly to any changes in the situation. Later, as the new Iraq expands its security capacity, we intend to move our forces to less visible locations from which we can react to external threats and prepare to relinquish national defense responsibilities to the new Iraqi army. Violence, of course, is not the only obstacle to progress in Iraq. We must maintain the consent of the Iraqi people. Popular disaffection sets conditions for instability. Disaffection stems from many sources including high expectations, high unemploy- ment, a lack of essential services, suspicion of coalition motivations for liberating Iraq, residual fear of the Baath Party, and the sudden end to the former regime’s patronage system. Our efforts to rebuild Iraq are connected to the security situation because general disaffection among the populace provides available manpower to those who are inciting (and paying for) attacks against Iraqis, the infrastructure and Coalition Forces. We recognize that economic development, political development, and security are interdependent. Combined Joint Task Force–7 and CENTCOM are supporting fully the CPA’s efforts in all areas. In addition to securing critical infrastructure along- side our Iraqi partners, two U.S. Army task forces, Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil and Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity, are accelerating progress in restoring Iraq’s failed oil economy—the financial engine to move Iraq forward—and providing the key enabler for all economic functions and public needs—electricity. Brigade com- manders have partnered with Iraqis to complete over 8,000 reconstruction projects. Also, our commanders and civil affairs personnel worked with Iraqis to establish local and provincial councils as a foundation for regional and national governance. Over the past 4 months, we have improved our understanding of the situation and identified what more needs to be done. We know what is working well and what areas require additional attention and resources. CENTCOM, Combined Joint Task Force–7, CPA, and our coalition partners are working together in accordance with our plans. We must remember, however, that the situation in Iraq is complex and dynamic; we are certain to encounter unforeseen difficulties and opportunities and we must remember that the future course of events depends not only on what we plan to do, but on enemy reactions and initiatives that are difficult to predict. We are resolved to reassess continually the situation, refine our plans, be prepared for contingencies, and refocus our efforts whenever necessary. Our commanders and troops are optimistic and feel that we now have before us an opportunity to gain tremendous momentum. In the short term, we believe that if we and our partners commit resources to accomplish three things—restore basic services (especially power), build Iraqi security capacity, and improve our ability to communicate our plans and successes to the Iraqi people—we will accelerate progress in the next months. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 20 AFGHANISTAN The next year in Afghanistan, with the constitutional Loya Jirga in December and elections scheduled for June 2004, will prove critical to achieving peace and stability there. We have achieved much in Afghanistan, but there is much work that we, the coalition, and the Afghans have yet to accomplish. As in Iraq, there is no purely military solution to the problems we face there. We must simultaneously defeat our enemies, support the effort to establish representative government and set condi- tions for economic growth and long-term stability. The enemy adjusted after the devastating losses inflicted on them since the initi- ation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Al Qaeda, Gulbiddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami (HIG) and Taliban forces are conducting low-level guerrilla and terror- ist attacks. Their attacks aim to obstruct reconstruction efforts and incite chaos. Al Qaeda and HIG terrorist activity pose the greatest threat in the northeast while Taliban remnants have shown signs of reorganization and continue anti-coalition/ anti-Afghan operations in the southeast. We continue to seek out and defeat Taliban and al Qaeda forces. Cooperation with the Pakistanis will disrupt further the enemy’s ability to reorganize and conduct op- erations. The formation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to be a suc- cess story as units demonstrate their professionalism and gain operational experi- ence. Our conventional force in Afghanistan is small in comparison to the force in Iraq, but it is very effective due to its ability to conduct joint and combined oper- ations. During a recent mission, Combined Joint Task Force–180 successfully brought together U.S. conventional, Special Operations Forces, air, Afghan National Army and Afghan Militia Forces against a long-known Taliban operational base. Because political and economic initiatives will prove most important in maintain- ing stability in Afghanistan, we must ensure that our operations support those ini- tiatives. The expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams from four to eight and the possibility that NATO might expand its security efforts beyond Kabul are par- ticularly promising. The most important person in Central Command is the young soldier, marine, sailor, or airman performing his or her mission on the frontline of freedom in the middle of the night. It goes without saying that our successes will continue to de- pend on the bright, talented, and courageous servicemen and women who are taking risks and making sacrifices to preserve liberty and protect our Nation. Our missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the global war on terror are bound to entail additional risks and sacrifices. However, our airmen, sailors, marines, and soldiers understand, as we all do, that a lack of perseverance in any of our vital missions would lead to even greater risk and loss. When I talk with them they invariably express to me their belief that we ‘‘will either have to fight terrorists over here or fight them at home.’’ I want to thank this committee for your support to our men and women and for your oversight of the vital operations we are undertaking in Central Command. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Colleagues, it would be the desire of the chair to try and achieve two rounds of questioning. We’ll start with 5 minutes each on the—— [Audience interruption] The committee will stand in recess until the Capitol Police can restore order. [Pause] For those who may be interested, a similar incident occurred with this individual yesterday at another hearing, so we were pre- pared for this possibility. I’d like to do 5 minutes a round, in the fervent hope that we can achieve two rounds for all of our members. I urge the clerk to start with the chair and make sure I stay within the 5 minutes. But I’d like not to be charged for that outburst. General ABIZAID. Actually, it makes the Ambassador and I feel right at home. [Laughter.] Chairman WARNER. Yes. First, Ambassador Bremer, each time I listen to you I develop a greater respect for your professionalism and the team that you’re VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 21 with, recognizing so many of them have been uprooted very quick- ly. Like the men and women of the Armed Forces, you’re all volun- teers. A well-done to you, and, indeed, those of the coalition with whom you work. On that point, I’d like to start off. The perception is given that this money will be under the control, if adopted by Congress, of yourself, but my understanding is that each day other departments and agencies of our Government and, indeed, the coalition part- ners, have a very strong voice in how these funds are utilized. Would you address that point? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, that’s correct, Mr. Chairman. I have on my coalition staff, now, representatives of 17 other countries. I have representatives from 15 executive branches here from Wash- ington, and there are more coming. It is very much an integrated effort by not only the United States Government, but also coalition governments. Chairman WARNER. Good. On the question of the discussion by many—and, I must say, well-intentioned—Members of Congress with regard to structuring some type of security for the $21.3 billion part of this budget re- quest, I don’t know that there’s a real precedent in history. I would hope that we could do further research on the comments made by my distinguished colleague here about the Marshall Plan and whether portions of that had some security interests. But what con- cerns me is, number one, you pointed out the first part, the debt now owed by Iraq, their total inability for the foreseeable future to do anything about that. There is no legal structure in Iraq by which there could be a borrowing authority, in my understanding, until the constitution is adopted, the election is held. But perhaps the most disturbing potential problem is that we would play into the hands of those who had repeated, since day one, ‘‘The Coalition Forces are not there for peace, they are not there to allow democ- racy to begin, they are there to seize the oil.’’ Do you share that view? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, I do. The oil revenues are a sensitive subject in Iraq, quite understandably. It is the major source of gov- ernment revenues. In the new foreign-direct investment law, which the Governing Council asked me to sign a week ago today, they have explicitly excluded foreign investment in the oil sector for now until they have an elected government which can decide how they want to proceed with oil. I think we have to be respectful of that political sensitivity. Chairman WARNER. Good. There’s been a unique partnership between your organization and that of the coalition military headed up by General Abizaid. Let’s just have a frank assessment. Is that working? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. It is unique because the challenge of stabilizing Iraq after the war is a challenge of bringing together the civilian capabilities and the ongoing military capabilities in a way that is really quite challenging. The commander of the Joint Task Force in Iraq, General Sanchez, has colocated his head- quarters with mine. Each of us have, as our first meeting of the day, a meeting together to discuss the plans for what happened overnight, what the plans for the day are. It is a totally integrated VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 22 operation. All of the public affairs people who work for the military, for example, work under my direction. Chairman WARNER. Do you share those views, General Abizaid? General ABIZAID. Sir, I was the person that said to General Sanchez, ‘‘Move your headquarters and colocate with Ambassador Bremer.’’ Chairman WARNER. Let me throw out an idea that, indeed, I’ve read a good deal about and done some of my own study. I see the presence of Dr. Walter Slocombe here, who has been before this committee many times. I commend him and his team for what they’re doing to try and restructure a security arrangement draw- ing upon former Iraqi military and the likewise. Are you giving consideration to perhaps utilizing this force earlier than antici- pated as a part of the integrated security to augment the police? The problems that I see, and others, are that our soldiers do not have the language capability. Maybe some have fragments. There’s always the presence of U.S. uniform facing the disparate elements that threaten them. Would it not be better if quickly you could put together, from the remnants of their former military and perhaps other sources, an Iraqi force to go out, and we’d change roles. Rath- er than the occasional Iraqi being an adjunct person to our military forces, that we are more or less the advisors to an Iraqi force. Is that achievable? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, it is. If you look at the President’s re- quest, $5.1 billion of it is directed at security. As part of that, we intend to raise four separate Iraqi forces. The new Iraqi army is one, which you mentioned. If this supplemental is approved, we’ll be able to produce an Iraqi army of 27 battalions by a year from now. Chairman WARNER. The point is that, can it be now used to con- front the threats. So this is a new concept in this plan. We want to bring that to the attention of all. A new initiative. Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. There is an Iraqi Civil De- fense Corps, which is also in this supplemental, also puts Iraqis in place of Americans. Chairman WARNER. My time is up. Senator Levin. Senator LEVIN. Thank you. General Abizaid, in your opening statement, on page 3, you point to a more dangerous threat from radical Islamist extremism than before. Just to quickly read this, because you did not in your oral presentation, ‘‘The enemy’s ideological-based financial networks and information networks remain strong. Indeed, the demographic and economic conditions that breed terrorists may be worsening, and those conditions are heightening the ideological fervor associ- ated with radical Islamist extremism.’’ In view of that assessment, what’s the strategy for dealing with this apparently worsening threat? General ABIZAID. Of course, Senator, what I was referring to there is not specifically Iraq, but the broader Middle East. I think, actually, if you look across the Muslim world, all the way from Mo- rocco to Indonesia, you see that there are ideological movements that are very anti-Western, that are very anti-American in particu- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 23 lar. While we are having good tactical success against this phe- nomenon, we are continuing to see growing strength in it. Now, having said that, I do believe that we have to continue to reevaluate the way that we will approach this internationally, and not only internationally, but also interagency. Senator LEVIN. Would it help if the governing council requested or endorsed foreign troop participation, in addition to what’s al- ready there, particularly from Muslim countries, in terms getting Muslim countries’ troops there? Would it help if the governing council went on record as endorsing it? General ABIZAID. As far as my point is concerned, yes, it would. Senator LEVIN. Have we asked the governing council, Ambas- sador, to do that? Ambassador BREMER. We’ve had some discussions with them, Senator. Senator LEVIN. Have we asked them to do that? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator LEVIN. Are they willing to do that? Ambassador BREMER. Let me try to be more precise. Some of the countries that have been talked about have expressed an interest in either having the U.N. resolution passed or in having a govern- ing council invitation, and we’ve discussed those two, in combina- tion, with the governing council. Senator LEVIN. What has been their response to requesting other countries to send foreign troops, including Muslim countries? Ambassador BREMER. Their response has been varied. Some of them are in favor of doing that, some of them are more reluctant. Senator LEVIN. Will they be taking a vote on this issue? Ambassador BREMER. They might. Senator LEVIN. Would you encourage that? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. But I don’t run it. Senator LEVIN. Of course. You would encourage it, though. Ambassador BREMER. Of course. Absolutely. Senator LEVIN. You will ask them then to—— Ambassador BREMER. I have encouraged it. Senator LEVIN. One other question about the council, and that has to do with the seven steps which you’ve outlined. Have they formally endorsed those seven steps? Ambassador BREMER. The majority of the governing council en- dorses those steps. Senator LEVIN. Have they taken a formal action to endorse them? Ambassador BREMER. No, but they’ve acted in conjunction with it, because they’re following it. Senator LEVIN. I think it would be very helpful if you asked the governing council, since you’ve appointed it and it’s supposed to represent the people of Iraq, if they formally endorse the seven steps which you have laid out as what you believe to be the correct path. It makes sense to me, but I don’t live there. It would be very helpful, it seems to me—to avoid this impression that somehow or other we are laying down the law, and we are laying down the path, and we are doing this, and we’re doing that—if you ask the governing council to formally endorse those seven steps. I’m just asking you simply, would you do that? VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 24 Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator LEVIN. Now, on the question of Iraqi oil, we were told by Secretary Wolfowitz, a number of months ago, that Iraqi oil would be used in the reconstruction, I believe he said, in a matter of months. Why should not we ask the governing council to pledge some of their future surplus now to collateralize it? We want them to control their oil, right? We don’t want to control their oil. They control it. Now, the only answer that I have heard to that is, there’s no government there that can technically make that pledge to collateralize that oil. Ambassador BREMER. That’s correct. Senator LEVIN. But there is a government that is being asked to put up $20 billion that could guarantee that pledge. That’s us. If the governing council were asked to pledge a portion of its future oil surplus, it would be up to them. But if they were asked to make that commitment to show just how badly they want to contribute financially to their reconstruction, which would help, it seems to us here—in terms of persuading the American people, ‘‘Hey, we’re not alone in this. The Iraqi people are pledging their own oil surplus’’— we could then, if we simply guaranteed that pledge, help to collateralize that and produce current funds for reconstruction. Will you at least consider that possibility? Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Senator. Yes, I will consider it. Let me just clarify one point. Effectively, oil revenues will be used for reconstruction next year, because oil revenues are funding the 2004 Iraqi budget. We may have a couple of hundred million dollars in revenues from taxes, but effectively oil revenue is what we have. In the Iraqi budget for next year, ap- proved by the Iraqi Ministers and the governing council, there are some reconstruction projects. If I remember correctly, it’s on the order of a billion-and-a-half dollars. It’s not a lot of money. So the question of what you’ve called ‘‘excess revenues’’ really doesn’t arise—— Senator LEVIN. I said future—— Ambassador BREMER. Right that’s—no, I know. I understand. I just wanted to put some numbers around it. It doesn’t really arise until 2005, by which time we hope that the revenues will generate about $5 billion a year more than are needed for expenses. So the question arises in a couple of years. Senator LEVIN. I think you missed my point, but my time is up. Thank you. Ambassador BREMER. I’m sorry. Maybe we can—— Chairman WARNER. Senator McCain. Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid for the outstanding work they are doing. I know that they share our sor- row and regret over the murder of Aquila Hashimi, who served her nation and the cause of freedom with valor and distinction. Her name will go down, I think, as an Iraqi hero. We regret her loss. With only 5 minutes, I’d like to try to get in two questions real quick. One is that we had an interesting poll this morning. Seven out of 10 Iraqis say they expect their country and their personal lives to be better 5 years from now; 66 percent to 27 percent do not want an Islamic government; 74 to 18 percent, Saddam’s henchmen VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 25 should be punished; and two thirds of the Iraqis say that the coali- tion troops should stick around for at least another year. I think that helps us put into perspective—that’s the first signifi- cant poll I’ve seen of the Iraqi people. I think that’s an indicator of great success and a testimony to the magnificent job that is being accomplished. But my first question, Ambassador Bremer, suppose that, in the very unlikely situation, we decided not to extend this reconstruc- tion aid. My distinct view is that the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people are still up for grabs. What would be the implications, as briefly as possible, of our failure to approve not just the military aid, but, most importantly, the reconstruction aid, which impacts the Iraqi people most significantly? Ambassador BREMER. It would be directly contrary to America’s interest. Obviously, it would be contrary to the Iraqi people’s inter- est. But it would be contrary to our interest because it would create a situation of much greater insecurity. I think we would find more of the population turning against us. I think we would find more attacks on Coalition Forces. Eventually, Iraq would, as I suggested in my opening statement, recede into a situation of chaos, not dis- similar from what was experienced in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s. We would find another breeding ground for terrorists. So I think it’s a rather grim outlook. Senator MCCAIN. Do you share that view, General Abizaid? General ABIZAID. Sir, I do. I think it’s very important that we move together on all this simultaneously and quickly. Senator MCCAIN. Time is not on our side. Is that correct? General ABIZAID. I agree. Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. I’m a little concerned to see an article today, ‘‘Pentagon May Call Up Additional Reservists.’’ Quote, ‘‘ ‘We’ve had one piece of bad news after another to share with families this year, and at some point it’s got to take a toll,’ said one senior Army National Guard official who spoke on the condition that his name not be used.’’ Quote, ‘‘ ‘Our people don’t sign up to be full-time soldiers. If they did, they would join the regular Army.’ ’’ [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 26 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 27 Senator MCCAIN. General Abizaid, in Sunday’s New York Times, Tom Friedman wrote, ‘‘The resistance from the Saddamists in Iraq is getting stronger, not weaker. It is becoming so strong . . . that a new war needs to be mounted against the Saddamist forces in the Sunni triangle near Baghdad.’’ Friedman also wrote that an Iraqi internal security force is the only way to fully root out the Baathist threat. I think we both agree on that. [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 28 Senator MCCAIN. When do you expect to deploy such an Iraqi force in sufficient numbers to go on the offensive against the Baathists? Until that time, don’t you think we need more American forces, in addition to better intelligence from Iraqis and aggressive training of an Iraqi security force? General ABIZAID. Thank you, Senator. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 29 Actually, we are on the offensive in the Ar Ramadi-Fallujah area, and we just moved in the 82nd Airborne Division into that area. We’ve moved them in there along with one brigade from the 82nd plus a brigade from the 1st Infantry Division. You will see an up- turn in combat in the Ar Ramadi-Fallujah area, no doubt about it, and you probably already have. There are many Iraqis in what we call the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps that are with them. They are not fully capable yet. In about 4 months, we’ll have about 20 battalions that are fairly capable serving alongside our forces. I believe that the offensive action that we are undertaking, the increase that we’ve had over time with Iraqi forces, of both police forces, the Iraqi Civil Defense forces, and others, gives us the op- portunity to maintain a stable environment to the best of our abil- ity, and also conduct combat operations. I am confident that we have enough troops at the right time right now. I talk to my commanders in the field about this all the time, and I think we’re okay, Senator. Senator MCCAIN. My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Senator Kennedy. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. To Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid, we all want to con- gratulate you and are very aware that your lives are at risk, those you represent, and we have enormous admiration and respect for those individuals. That’s why we believe it’s so important to get it right. Part of the trouble, I think, for many of us, not only as Members, but also our constituents, is to hear the rosy picture that you’re de- scribing, Ambassador Bremer, which is very similar to what the Secretary of Defense has described, and also read about what is happening on the ground, and try to understand the difference. We read in The New York Times, September 17, ‘‘New intelligence as- sessments are warning that the United States’ most formidable foe in Iraq in the months ahead may be the resentment of ordinary Iraqis increasingly hostile to the American military occupation.’’ Goodwill is wearing thin. Indications are that hostility is going ‘‘well beyond the Sunni heartland of Iraq, which has been the main setting.’’ [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 30 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 31 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 32 Senator KENNEDY. Just 2 days ago, The New York Times said Ambassador Bremer came to tell the President, among others, that the ‘‘situation was bleak in Baghdad.’’ [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 33 Senator KENNEDY. We hear one rosy story from you, we read something else. We look at the newspapers this morning, and this is, I think, the indictment of the administration’s current policy. First of all, in The Washington Post, ‘‘Bush Fails to Gain Pledges on Troops or Funds for Iraq.’’ [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 34 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 35 Senator KENNEDY. We look at the front page of The New York Times here, ‘‘The American leading the hunt for banned weapons in Iraq says his team has not found any of the unconventional VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 36 weapons cited by the Bush administration as a principal reason for going to war.’’ [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 37 Senator KENNEDY. Though it’s on the—look at the front page, again, of The Washington Post, ‘‘Crossed wires deprived Iraqis of electric power. War plans ignored worn infracture.’’ VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 38 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 39 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 40 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 41 Senator KENNEDY. Many of us who are concerned about the rush to war by this administration anticipated the challenges that you were going to find, such as the worn-out infrastructure. Now you’re saying to us, ‘‘Unless we do this, it’s going to be more and more of a breeding ground for terrorists.’’ Welcome to the fact that we’re finding that out now, because many of us believed that that was going to be the case previously. Then, if you read in The New York Times, as has been men- tioned, ‘‘Stretched Pentagon says it may need to call up thousands more reservists to serve in Iraq.’’ [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 42 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 43 Senator KENNEDY. You wonder why there’s concern that we don’t have a plan? This is what we have as the plan from the adminis- tration that was provided to us. It’s 28 pages. It’s in draft form, ‘‘Working Document,’’ July 23. [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 44 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 45 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 46 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 47 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 48 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 49 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 50 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 51 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 52 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 53 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 54 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 55 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 56 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 57 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 58 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 59 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 60 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 61 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 62 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 63 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 64 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 65 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 66 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 67 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 68 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 69 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 70 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 71 Senator KENNEDY. This is an insult to the troops and an insult to Congress. We want to know where the policy is. Where the pol- icy is. You could just review some of these items in security. August 1 through October 3, locate and secure and eliminate WMD. Novem- ber 3 to January 1, continue to locate and secure WMD. February 4 onward, continue to locate and secure, eliminate WMD. Is this the best that this administration can do in terms of devel- oping a plan that is going to have, not only the support of the American people, but also the international community, and that VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 72 offers us the best hope to provide some relief to our troops, and to bring democracy to Iraq and hopefully bring our troops home with honor? Mr. Ambassador? Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Senator. First, just let me react to one of those citations, which I some- where missed, about I was coming back to say the situation was bleak. I don’t know where that came from. It certainly was not—— Senator KENNEDY. That—— Ambassador BREMER.—certainly was not—— Senator KENNEDY. That was in The New York Times. Ambassador BREMER. Well—— Senator KENNEDY. Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times. Ambassador BREMER. Okay. Senator KENNEDY. I believe it’s September 22. Ambassador BREMER. All I’m saying is, that’s not my message. Senator KENNEDY. All right. Well—— Ambassador BREMER. Anybody who—— Senator KENNEDY. If I can—— Ambassador BREMER.—quotes me—— Senator KENNEDY. All right, let me just—— Ambassador BREMER.—as saying that the situation is bleak—— Senator KENNEDY. In fairness to you—— Ambassador BREMER.—is inaccurate. Senator KENNEDY.—just indicate the—and I’ll ask that this be in the record [see previously inserted article]—‘‘Iraq and Ailing Econ- omy, Bush Aides on Edge.’’ Then it says, ‘‘A new concern began this summer, one official said, when Bremer, the American, traveled to Washington to tell Mr. Bush, among others, the situation was bleak in Baghdad, he needed billions of additional dollars for the kind of security and reconstruction—administration began a troop withdrawal within a year. Although no administration official says so explicitly, the White House goal is to show substantial improve- ment in Iraq before next fall’s elections.’’ Next fall’s elections. That bothers a lot of us. That’s inaccurate? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. That bothers me as much as it bothers you. Senator KENNEDY. Okay. You’re saying that you didn’t talk—— Ambassador BREMER. It was not part of our conversation. Senator KENNEDY.—you didn’t have the conversation with the President? Ambassador BREMER. I never said the situation in Baghdad was bleak. I’ve had many conversations with the President. I’m just ob- jecting to somebody else characterizing how I report to the Presi- dent. We have difficulties in Iraq. If we didn’t have difficulties, I wouldn’t be here before you asking the American taxpayer to put another $20 billion up. We’ve heard some citations from some polls. I do not believe it is accurate to say that resentment is growing. I think it is correct to say that we need to move urgently now to head off a problem of not being able to have essential services and security for Iraq. The main thrust of this request, Senator, as you have pointed out, is for security, to get the Iraqis to take more of the security VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 73 onboard, and to restore essential services. That’s the main thrust. I believe it’s urgent. I believe we must do it. In answer to the previous question from Senator McCain, I said I think if we don’t do it, the consequences for American troops and American interests will be severe. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Senator Inhofe. Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator McCain talked about the poll that was out yesterday, and I wasn’t at all surprised when I read this morning that 74 percent of the people believe that they (Saddam Hussein and his close advisors) should be punished. They appreciate our presence there and getting them out from under tyranny, and this is consistent with informal polls that we heard about when you and I were together, all of us were together over in Baghdad. I suspect that the majority of the Mem- bers sitting before you in the United States Senate here at this table have been to Iraq, and I would suggest that the senior Sen- ator from Massachusetts pay Iraq a visit, talk to the troops, talk to the people, talk to the citizens who come up to us in the street thanking us for what we’ve done in this liberation. It disturbs me a little bit when we have a hearing like this—and we’ve had many. I agree with the chairman; I appreciate so much your making yourselves available, both of you. But people are watching, and when you hear the term which has been mentioned three times so far since we started this hearing, ‘‘cut and run,’’ I just hope that the American people know that probably I would suspect the majority of us up here would say that if there’s one thing that should be taken off the table, it would be cut and run. Senator Akaka and I started the Army Caucus a couple of years ago, and yesterday morning we had General Schoomaker, the new Chief of Staff. He made a statement. He said, ‘‘This war is about the will of the American people.’’ He said that those attacking our troops are attacking our will and we cannot afford to cut and run. I strongly suspect that now the American people, after having seen the results of cutting and running, which is essentially what happened in 1991, realize, after looking at the mass graves, after knowing about the 328 kids under 12 years old lined up and exe- cuted summarily, about the school buses where the kids were bur- ied alive. I can recall that first freedom flight in 1991 after the war was over. Several of us, about five of us went over there. In fact, they didn’t even know the war was over, but seeing the torture chambers, seeing a little boy with his ear cut off for carrying around an American flag, I don’t think any American should ever think about cutting and running. Ambassador Bremer, when we met, you provided us with a rough time line, and it happened coincidentally that while we were there they had the bombing of the U.N. facility. Of course, obviously that changes time lines. I applaud you for your event-driven time line and would encourage you not to come up and be forced into any kind of a time-driven time line, because that’s not the way it works over there. This has to happen and it has to happen right. General Abizaid, I’ve read some things in some of the news- papers about the 101st Airborne in the north and the 1st Marine VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 74 Division in the south and perhaps some kind of a lack of coordina- tion with the CPA. Do you have any comments to make about that? General ABIZAID. Sir, I think that the 1st Marine Division, of course, just recently left and 101st has been up in the north in Mosul for a long time. In the early days, it was clear that we had the capacity to do a lot of work and so I wouldn’t call it lack of co- ordination, I would say that before Ambassador Bremer got there that they were essentially moving out on their own azimuth to achieve what they thought was the right thing to do. Over time, Ambassador Bremer has set the policies, and we’ve had to bring the policies in-line. Sometimes that necessarily hasn’t been in the interest of what some of the commanders up there wanted to do, but they know whose policy line they follow. I think today coordination is good. Ambassador Bremer visits up there all the time with all the commanders, as do I. What the com- manders want more than anything else is Ambassador Bremer’s money. Senator INHOFE. Thank you, General. Ambassador Bremer, there was some discussion over there when we were there about whether or not the CPA has the adequate organizational infrastructure to accomplish your goals and missions. Do you have any comments to make about that? Ambassador BREMER. I think it is the case that the buildup of the civilian part of the coalition authority was somewhat slow in the May/June time frame, but since the visit of, for example, John Hamre, who was over doing a study on behalf of Secretary Rums- feld—he was there in late June and noted that we didn’t have enough people in the CPA—I now have six times as many people working for me as I did on July 1. Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. Then, lastly, my time has expired, but, General Abizaid, Senator McCain talked about the force structure there in your area. I would like to have you, for the record, since there isn’t time in my time here, respond to my concern and the concern of many people at this table of the overall end strength and the overall force structure in terms of all the way around the world and other potential problems we might have, with specific emphasis on the Guard and Reserves. If you could give me your analysis of that for the record, I’d appreciate it very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The information referred to follows:] I can speak only for the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Unlike many other commands, CENTCOM does not have assigned forces. When the situa- tion in our area of responsibility (AOR) requires action necessitating the use of United States forces, we identify capabilities needed to accomplish the mission. The Joint Staff in turn asks the Services to meet these capabilities. We are concerned with whether we are able to accomplish the mission with the capabilities the Serv- ices have provided. Title 10 of the United States Code clearly places responsibility for organizing and equipping (force structure) on the Services. The essential require- ment is that we properly and clearly identify capabilities in long-term planning so the Services may build force structure to meet future mission needs. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much for asking that ques- tion to be put into the record, Senator Inhofe. I appreciate the co- operation of all members. We will be able to get to a second round. Senator Akaka. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 75 Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to add my thanks to Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid for your great service to our country and I want to tell you that we owe both of you a debt of gratitude for your efforts under very dif- ficult circumstances. I want to ask that my statement be included in the record, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my thanks to the witnesses here today for their great service to our country. The Nation owes them both a debt of gratitude for their efforts under very difficult circumstances. Thank you, General Abizaid, and thank you, Ambassador Bremer. Mr. Chairman, I will support additional funding for our troops in Iraq. This com- mittee has a tremendous record of supporting our military both in peace and in war. We want to do all we can to ensure that our troops are the best prepared, the best supported, and the best led in the world. Seeing General Abizaid before us today is a telling example that the American military is the finest. But we would not be doing our job of supporting our American fighting men and women in Iraq if we did not raise in today’s hearing key questions about our post- war strategy in Iraq. I have concerns about the lack of information regarding the funding in the admin- istration’s proposal for reconstruction. We need to know what our reconstruction plans are, how much they will cost, how long will they take, how many more troops will be required, and when will troops leave. These are the same questions our serv- icemen and women, their families, and other Americans are asking. They deserve answers. I opposed going to war with Iraq because I believed that we needed to take more time to prepare for the postwar situation and I saw no imminent and direct threat to American interests by Iraqi WMD. As chairman of the International Security and Proliferation Subcommittee of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I had chaired some of the first hearings into Iraq’s WMD program. As a result, I believed then and I still believe that Iraq’s WMD programs did not pose such an immediate threat to the United States that we could not take the time to prepare adequately for war and the postwar situation. Now the President is requesting an additional $87 billion in supplemental funding for our military and reconstruction efforts. Again, I fully support the funding for the troops. I have difficulties with the approximately $20 billion which is included under the category of reconstruction or infrastructure. We need to take the time to discuss thoroughly our postwar strategy and to scrutinize the administration’s proposal. For example, the President proposes to spend $100 million on a witness protection program for 100 families in a country where the annual per capita income before the war was only equivalent to $2,400. The same program in the U.S. last year cov- ered 250 witnesses and their families for a cost of $31.5 million. There is a request for $150 million to start construction on a $700 million new children’s hospital. Is a new hospital needed? Wouldn’t investment in the current Iraqi health service produce more immediate and lasting effects? Do we need to spend this much money to address health care in Iraq when additional resources are needed to meet the rising health care needs of our communities and reinforce our health care safety net? The proposal includes $19 million to build a wireless Internet network for the Iraqi post office and $150 million to create a national 911 emergency service. What is the development strategy behind these proposals? Is there a 1-year, 2- year, or even a 5-year plan in which these programs fit so that at the end of the term Iraq is self-sufficient? We have been told that there are timetables but plans need to be flexible. Plans do need to be flexible, but they must start by being coherent. A key question is, how soon do the President’s proposals make it possible for American soldiers to leave Iraq? The President’s deadline is unclear and the propos- als for improving security inside Iraq are controversial. Comparisons have been made to the Marshall Plan and rebuilding Europe. How- ever, in Europe, we had the support of a people who had a tradition of democracy and free enterprise who were not attacking our troops. That is not the situation in Iraq. In addition, there were many hearings held on the Marshall Plan, and Con- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 76 gress took the time it needed to thoroughly review the plan prior to its implementa- tion. I want to again state that I fully support the funding of our troops; however we need more time and information regarding the administration’s proposal for recon- struction. I look forward to the testimony and once again thank our witnesses for being here today. Senator AKAKA. General Abizaid, I understand that the supple- mental request assumes that there will be a continued presence of already committed two multinational divisions and possible con- tributions of up to two additional divisions, from other nations. What are your expectations about the rotation base for the inter- national forces, and are the coalition members expected to continue their future rotations at the same level? If so, how realistic are these expectations to be? General ABIZAID. Thank you, Senator. The two multinational di- visions that are currently serving, the British multinational divi- sion in the South and the Polish multinational division in the cen- tral South, are both expected to continue to source forces over time. Certainly the British will continue as long as the mission contin- ues. I’ve been assured by British military leaders at the highest level, and they also assured me that the members of their coalition will continue to bring troops in as part of the British force. The Polish force is a little bit harder to say, although it’s clear that the Poles are committed. I talked to the Polish commander a couple of days ago down in Al Hillah. He told me that his nation is committed for the long run. It’s hard for me to say exactly what that means, but I believe certainly the Polish part of that contin- gent. That is a very large mixed contingent. There’s a brigade of Spanish troops, a brigade of Ukrainian troops that form the core of the division. I could not say for sure that they are here beyond a year, but I believe that most of the nations that are part of the Polish division are committed. As far as a third division is concerned, I have been hopeful that we can get a third division, and, as I’ve said to the committee be- fore, I have been hopeful that we could get a third Muslim division, led by either Turks, Pakistanis, Moroccans, or another major Is- lamic country that has a large degree of military capacity. We could certainly use them in a lot of different places, and we’re hopeful that over time we will be able to include a third multi- national division on the force. As of now, we don’t have that com- mitment, which is one of the reasons you see CENTCOM saying to the Joint Staff that we need to maintain our commitment of forces, of total brigades, which has then caused them to go to the National Guard and Reserve component to look for how they’re going to source. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, I also want to indicate that I will certainly support additional funding for troops in Iraq and wher- ever it’s necessary. General Abizaid, we have not received very many details about the level of effort—and I’m shifting a little bit— involved in Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. Can you provide a brief description of the mission there, its relationship to operations elsewhere in the theater, and how many people are involved? Ac- knowledging that, of course, you cannot predict the future, do you VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 77 expect that this mission will remain at about the same level of ef- fort during fiscal year 2004 or will it be growing? General ABIZAID. Senator, it will be my recommendation to the Department that Joint Task Force Horn of Africa continues its mis- sion. There’s about 1,400 people in that task force. They’re based in Djibouti. They primarily work with the local nations in the Horn of Africa to increase their capacity against terrorism. For example, the other day I was in Yemen visiting with our Special Forces trainers that are working with the Yemeni army to increase their Special Forces’ capacity. I’ve also seen them do civil military projects and training projects with the Ethiopians and the Kenyans. It is a small task force that doesn’t have a direct combat role as yet. They do have the capacity to execute a combat mission should a terrorist target appear in their region, but for the most part, they are designed to increase the confidence and capacity of those nations in the Horn of Africa that are beginning to see the influx of some foreign fighters. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, my time, I think, expired, but I want to clarify, Mr. Chairman, that I have the utmost respect for my colleague, Senator Inhofe, who is co-chair with me of the Senate Army Caucus. In response to his comment about members suggest- ing we ‘‘cut and run,’’ I have not heard that sentiment on this side. I believe we have been very thoughtful on how best to support our troops. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Roberts. Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a former news- paper publisher and editor and as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I would make the observation that while The New York Times and The Washington Post are very re- spected newspapers and fountains of self-assertive knowledge in this city, they are not 100 percent accurate in terms of actionable intelligence. We don’t rely on the Times and the Post for intel- ligence in terms of the decisions that are being made. Let me say that I think the key to this hearing is something called staying power and resolve, and I’m going to quote Winston Churchill, who said something after Pearl Harbor—we call Septem- ber 11 the Pearl Harbor on the global war on terrorism—I think that’s accurate. He said, ‘‘Silly people, that was the description many gave in discounting the force of the United States. Some said they were soft, others that they would never be united, that they would never come to grips, they would never stand blood-letting, that their system of government and democracy would paralyze their war effort. Now we will see the weakness of this numerous but remote, wealthy, and very talkative people. But I had studied the American Civil War fought out to the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins. I thought of a remark made to me years before. The United States is like a gigantic boiler. Once the fire of freedom is lighted, under it there is no limit to the power it can generate. It is a matter of resolve.’’ I am just wondering in terms of the criticism—not wondering, I’m very concerned that if the criticism is so harsh as to create the impression of lack of resolve, I wonder what goes through the minds of President Karzai, President Musharraf, Prince Saud, King VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 78 Abdullah, and President Mubarak. Not only are men and women serving in uniform, but the very terrorists who are killing our troops and their fellow Iraqis. It concerns me a great deal in that I think we have a leaky boil- er, and I think we better fix that leaky boiler real quick, and, as Senator Akaka has pointed out, make dog-gone sure what we’re saying is interpreted in the right way in regards to the global war on terrorism. General Abizaid, I think you put the Iraqi challenge into perspec- tive when you said, ‘‘If we can’t be successful here, we won’t be suc- cessful in the global war on terrorism.’’ Based on your expertise and experience, can you give us a sense of how the Baathists and the foreign fighter terrorists in particular would benefit from the adoption of a mere timetable? We’ve heard a lot about a timetable here for the coalition departure, as opposed to a set of milestones, such as outlined in the much-criticized Ambassador Bremer’s CPA strategy that did come to Members over 2 months ago? What would be the effect on the global war on terrorism? General ABIZAID. I believe that you always run the risk when you set a timetable to send the wrong signals. We need to have a conditions-based strategy that allows us to get at our objectives in a coherent and a synchronized fashion, and I believe with regard to Iraq that militarily and politically we are probably lashed out better there than any place I’ve been before. With regard to the broader war on terrorism, I think we have to continue to look at the various movements throughout the theater that shows the danger continues to grow and we need to develop a more unified, international, and interagency strategy to deal with the broader problem. Ambassador BREMER. Senator, may I pick up on something you just said? Senator ROBERTS. Certainly. Ambassador BREMER. The fires of freedom are lighted in Iraq, and we have newspapers today. There are 186 new newspapers since liberation. These are two of them. This particular one hap- pens to be very critical of me and the CPA. That’s freedom of the press. This particular one happens to support us, but there are 184 other newspapers being produced in Iraq today. There are 85 new radio stations. There are more than 20 television stations. The fire of freedom that Churchill talked about have been lighted in Iraq, and we need to nurture it forward to democracy. General ABIZAID. Senator, if I just might add one thing. This no- tion of will and how we’re seen in the theater—I talked to Presi- dent Karzai and President Musharraf and others, but the best manifestation of our will in the theater is the work that our young soldiers do out there, and when you see the work that a young cap- tain does on the Afghan/Pakistani border and you see the con- fidence in his eyes, you know there is no problem with understand- ing our will to get the job done, and I believe those leaders see that. Senator ROBERTS. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Pryor. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 79 Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Bremer, I’d like to follow up on a couple of statements that you made in your opening comments if I may. One was something to the effect that Iraq is the focal point of the global war on terrorism. I can’t remember the exact words that you used, but that was the gist of it. Tell the committee what you mean by that. Ambassador BREMER. I think the term I used, or anyway meant to use, was it has really become the main front in the war on ter- rorism. What has happened, Senator, is that Saddam Hussein sup- ported terrorism. He was identified as a state sponsor of terrorism for almost 20 years. He played hosts to terrorists like Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas. There were connections with al Qaeda over the last decade. There was particularly a strong connection with an al Qaeda-related group called Ansar al-Islam. You may recall in the early days of the war we attacked a camp in the Northeast of Iraq. We killed quite a few of the terrorists, unfortunately not enough of them. Several hundred of them escaped into Iran, and what we found was they reconstituted themselves and started to reintegrate back into Iraq in roughly early July. We now estimate that there are several hundred of these trained professional al Qaeda-type terrorists in Ansar al-Islam back in Iraq. We have captured several dozen Ansar al-Islam and al Qaeda terrorists in our military operations, so we have a serious terrorist threat in Iraq. Senator PRYOR. Now has that terrorist activity increased since U.S. troops have been present there? Ambassador BREMER. I would say it has increased, as I sug- gested, since they reconstituted and came back in. The reconstitu- tion seems to have taken them a couple of months, and they start- ed coming back in in July. Senator PRYOR. What were the terrorists doing before we came into Iraq, because apparently they were not attacking the Saddam Hussein regime. What were they doing there? Ambassador BREMER. They were supported by the Saddam Hus- sein regime. What they were doing was killing Kurds. Senator PRYOR. Okay, so it’s terrorism mostly against the Kurds? Ambassador BREMER. It was. It is now a very serious threat to not only us, but we’ve seen attacks against the U.N., we’ve seen at- tacks against religious leaders. We don’t know at this time who conducted those attacks, but we certainly have seen an increase in terrorism. Senator PRYOR. Have you seen an influx of new individual terror- ists and new terrorist organizations in Iraq since we’ve been there? Ambassador BREMER. It’s a bit hard to parse it. We know that during the war a number of countries sent what they said were vol- unteers to fight alongside Saddam, foreign fighters. We have cap- tured 278 of these people since the war. Most of them are Syrians. We have seen crossing points established across the Syrian border where we have more of these people coming in, foreign terrorists and foreign fighters. Senator PRYOR. Let me switch gears to another thing you men- tioned—I believe it was in your opening statement, it may have been in response to a question—and that was you wanted to have transparency in the money allocated to rebuild Iraq. You said VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 80 something to the effect—again, not trying to quote you exactly, but pretty close here—that all the contracts in the future will be about competitive bid. Is that right? Ambassador BREMER. That’s correct. Senator PRYOR. My question for you is, have all the contracts in the past been by competitive bid? Ambassador BREMER. Senator, my understanding is that 95 per- cent of the contracts that we have let have been by what is called a full and fair open competitive bid. Senator PRYOR. Okay, 95 percent of the contracts or 95 percent of the dollar amount? Ambassador BREMER. Contracts. Senator PRYOR. Of the contracts. Do you routinely meet with the private companies who are operating in Iraq today? Ambassador BREMER. Do you mean the American? Senator PRYOR. Yes, the American. Ambassador BREMER. Yes, I do. Senator PRYOR. You do? How routine are those meetings? Do you have them weekly, daily? Ambassador BREMER. One of the major contractors is heavily re- sponsible for our efforts on restoring power, and I meet with them every morning. Senator PRYOR. Okay. Which contractor is that? Ambassador BREMER. Bechtel. Senator PRYOR. Bechtel. Do other members of your staff meet with contractors as well? Ambassador BREMER. Oh, yes, sure. Senator PRYOR. How, in your view, have the contractors been performing in Iraq to date? Ambassador BREMER. I think they’ve been performing very well. One must remember it’s not an easy environment. There are secu- rity concerns. But given everything, we expected to see these big contracts begin to really develop some momentum towards the end of August. It takes months to get a big contract going, and, in fact, that happened. We’re really seeing a build-up here in the last cou- ple of weeks. Senator PRYOR. Specifically—and I’m out of time here—but spe- cifically there have been a lot of questions asked in the U.S. about Halliburton being in Iraq. I was just curious about what they’re doing over there, how large of a contract they have, and whether it was offered by competitive bid. Ambassador BREMER. My understanding is that there is a Halli- burton contract. I think the amount in that contract is $1.2 billion, but I may be off a bit, and their main job is working with the Army Corps of Engineers to restore the oil field productions. Senator PRYOR. Was that by competitive bid? Ambassador BREMER. No, I think that was not by competitive bid. I believe that was a contract that was let even before the war. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Sessions. Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I too am concerned about the nature of some of the criticism that we’ve had from people who opposed the war from the beginning, even though we voted over three-fourths to support it. The President supports it. The American people have supported it. We are committed as VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 81 a Nation, and it is important that we have staying power and go through it. I just want to take a minute to say how much I appre- ciate Chairman Warner’s leadership. He has been a person who puts America first. When President Clinton was in office, he sup- ported him on every single foreign policy matter that came up that I know of because he puts America first. He served in the Navy as a young sailor in World War II, in Korea. He was in the Depart- ment of Defense in Vietnam, and Secretary of the Navy, but I think he sets the example—and the Marine Corps, too, marine Pat Rob- erts says. He set an example for us that politics ought to stop at the water’s edge, and legitimate criticism is fine but some of this criticism, in my view, has gone beyond legitimate to destructive comments. I want to be on the record about that. I want to ask you quickly, General Abizaid, I think Alabama has one of the highest numbers of reservists and guardsmen in Iraq. I’ve met with two of those units directly. There’s an article that has been out quoting General Pace, I believe, as saying that we may call up additional reservists. There is one thing I’d like for you to clarify. It suggests in those headlines that we’re going to be having an increased number of American troops in Iraq and those would be National Guard and reservists. As I understand it, it’s saying in the future that to replace existing troops, we may need to call up more guardsmen and reservists. Can you clarify that? General ABIZAID. Sir, in order to rotate the troops that are there we will call up additional Guard and Reserves. It will not increase the overall number of troops. Senator SESSIONS. So the headline that suggests we are calling up more National Guard and reservists because we’re having a ter- rible time in Iraq and we have to increase our troop strength is not accurate? General ABIZAID. That is not accurate, but, Senator, we cannot do the job without the National Guard and the Reserve. Senator SESSIONS. You are certainly correct, and I was so proud of the troops that I met with, in active duty too, but I particularly had the opportunity to be with some National Guard units that are performing superbly. With regard to this supplemental and the need for it, Ambas- sador Bremer, you suggested to me when I was in Iraq the critical need of speed. Is it your view that if we delay stepping forward with this infrastructure improvement, particularly electricity, that it jeopardizes General Abizaid’s soldiers, among other risks that we undertake? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, as I said earlier, Senator, I think it will increase the security threat to our men and women in the Armed Forces and to the Iraqi people. Senator SESSIONS. In other words, it could undermine confidence of the Iraqi people and the ability of the coalition leadership to be effective? Ambassador BREMER. I believe that’s correct. Senator SESSIONS. That could be destructive in a number of dif- ferent ways? Ambassador BREMER. It will be destructive and it would be basi- cally, as I said in my opening statement, leaving the job that we’ve started unfinished. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 82 Senator SESSIONS. Now I know you’ve about gotten electricity back up to prewar levels, but there’s still a 2,000 megawatt short- age? Ambassador BREMER. Exactly. Senator SESSIONS. Are those the right words? Ambassador BREMER. You remembered the briefing. Senator SESSIONS. Ambassador Bremer, our main contract to Bechtel has received a lot of money on this. I’m not sure they un- derstand that this is life and death for American soldiers. People in this area right now are up in arms because electricity in some areas has been off 8 days. Are you confident that this corporation is interested in moving quickly and would you be prepared to ter- minate their involvement if they don’t show the sufficient intensity of interest in bringing this electricity online? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Let me just make three points. I am convinced that they’re moving very quickly; it is the major part of their contract. Second, we have a group brought in at General Abizaid’s request and with his assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers to undertake an urgent, additional effort on power over the next 3 months. Of course, in the supplemental we have almost $6 billion for power generation. That will be done in a free and open bid. We’ll see who bids on it. That will be an open contract. But, of course, if Bechtel or any contractor were not performing up to the standards of the contract, we would not hesitate to take the appropriate action. Senator SESSIONS. I thank you for your service and leadership. I believe we need to keep the heat on everybody on that issue, and, if they don’t perform, they ought to be out of there. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Ben Nelson. Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We appreciate very much the op- portunity to discuss these critical issues with you. One of the con- cerns that my colleague from Alabama just mentioned was the fur- ther call-up of Guard and/or Reserve units. During their reappoint- ment hearing in July, I mentioned to Generals Myers and Pace the concern that I have about rotation deployment and not knowing a date when the deployment is to end. With these future call-ups, can we be assured that there will be a termination date that will be communicated to the Guard and Reserve units so that they know how long the deployment will be, even if it is extended? Thus far, the criticisms that have come from the family more than from the troops is that they don’t know and that they can’t plan accord- ingly. Their lives are on hold, their jobs are on hold, their potential advancements are on hold. Can we assure them with these future call-ups that we can communicate to them when the deployment will end, even if extended? General ABIZAID. Thanks very much for that, Senator. One of the most important things for any soldier to know is when are they coming home. They need to know that, and, unfortunately, I can report to you that not all of them know that. Senator BEN NELSON. That’s the problem. General ABIZAID. It is a problem. I was out talking to reservists just the other day, not only in Baghdad, but also around the coun- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 83 try and also in Qatar and other places. There is a problem that the reservists do not understand when they’re coming home because of the 1-year boots-on-the-ground policy. I’ve talked to the Army, our Active Forces. They know when they’re coming home. Everybody that’s there needs to know when they’re coming home. I take it as my responsibility. I will work it and I will ensure that the new guys coming in know when they’re coming home, nothing more im- portant. It is not right now and it needs to be fixed. Senator BEN NELSON. As much as I appreciate it, I know they’ll appreciate it a lot more, so I thank you very much. Ambassador Bremer, there has been more than a slight amount of criticism and major inquiry into what the cost of reconstruction might be and who’s going to pay for it. Can you tell me if there’s been any consideration of securitizing the oil revenues from Iraq over a period of time, subordinating the debt of the other countries that have not participated with us to date, to be able to make sure that the revenues pay for the Iraqi reconstruction, don’t come to the United States for other offsets, but go to the reconstruction of Iraq? Because if we’re able to do something with that construct, it seems to me that we can avoid paying as much as we would other- wise pay out of American taxpayers’ pockets for the reconstruction of Iraq. Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Senator. We had a brief con- versation with Senator Levin about that earlier. On the face of it, the $200 billion or so which Iraq has in debt and reparations hang- ing over it could be colored as odious debt. If you look at it—— Senator BEN NELSON. Well, at least that. Ambassador BREMER. Well, but it’s a legal term. Senator BEN NELSON. I know. Ambassador BREMER. I’m not an attorney, but apparently it al- lows some possibilities for what you do with that debt. Senator BEN NELSON. Exactly. Ambassador BREMER. With the American Government’s lead, we have an agreement from the group of seven and, therefore, through most of the large creditors of the government debt, an agreement to suspend the debt servicing until the end of 2004. The intention is to try to come up with some kind of an agreement on a substan- tial reduction of Iraq’s government debt by the end of next year. That is going to be a very, as it always is, complicated negotia- tion. The reparations, which represent about $100 billion of the $200 billion, maybe a little less, are essentially a political issue that the Iraqi Government is going to have to address at some point with its neighbors, because these reparations, of course, were incurred because of Saddam’s aggressive wars against his neigh- bors. Mostly the reparations are owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, particularly Kuwait. The governing council has already begun to be seized of this issue because it is so important, and has encouraged us, and we have encouraged them. We agreed to start looking at a major effort to get rid of the reparations overhang. But both of these efforts, Senator, which are laudable and which we support, are going to take time. They’re going to take probably a year and a half, maybe even longer. The history of debt renegotiations is fraught with great delays, and we don’t have a year and a half to wait. Until VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 84 that happens, in my view, it is not wise to seek to put any more debt onto the Iraqis, even if it’s in the form of collateralizing future oil revenues, which also has the disadvantages—I think Senator McCain may have mentioned—of making it look as if we, no matter how you do it, are in some way taking a lien against oil revenues and, therefore, that’s why we fought the war. So there’s a political problem and there is most of all a timing problem. Senator BEN NELSON. But there’s a political problem here at home of—— Ambassador BREMER. I understand. Senator BEN NELSON.—paying American money to reconstruct Iraq in light of loans to other countries but no loan to the United States. I have a real difficult time—I don’t want to load them with debt, but they’re already loaded with debt. I don’t want to also un- load the potential for debt by gifts from the American people in the form of taxes to reconstruct Iraq if we can avoid doing that through debt. It seems to me that there is a threshold here for subordina- tion of the other debt if we want to push it hard to get reconstruc- tion accomplished today in the midst of the turmoil that exists at the present time. Subordination is a common practice in the invest- ment world. This looks to me like if we’re going to make an invest- ment for Iraq, we can invest their money in this way, and it’s not money coming to America, but it’s not outflowing from America in that process. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator, very much. Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. My time has expired. Chairman WARNER. Senator Collins. Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, General, let me begin my questions by thanking you for your ex- traordinary service. Your leadership and courage are inspiring, and I do want you to know that we do very much appreciate your ef- forts and your leadership. I’m going to begin my questioning, Mr. Ambassador, by following up on the questions just raised by Sen- ator Nelson. I do not contest at all the urgent need for the supple- mental and in the amount that you have recommended, but I think that it is appropriate for us to raise questions and look to see if there is a way to lessen the impact on the American taxpayer. The American taxpayer is very generous. We understand that in the short term Iraq clearly cannot repay the money that is nec- essary to help construct the infrastructure that’s needed to boost the economy, but, in the long run, Iraq will be a prosperous coun- try. Therefore, it seems logical to many of us to come up with a way to structure part of the construction costs as a long-term loan. One of the arguments that you put forth this morning and pre- viously is that Iraq is already burdened with an estimated $200 bil- lion in debt and reparations from Saddam Hussein’s regime, but what is often left out is that the largest holders of that debt are Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, and Russia. If the leaders of three of those nations had had their way, the Iraqi people would still be suffering under Saddam Hussein’s regime. The American people will be justifiably outraged if a dime of their money is essentially used to finance the repayment of debt to those nations. I am very concerned that at a time when we’re ask- ing the American taxpayer to invest billions of dollars in the infra- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 85 structure of Iraq, these countries will be repaid part of the debt that they’re owed, so how are we going to prevent that situation from occurring? Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Senator. I was going to answer this. Effectively, the debt is already subordinated because I said yesterday in testimony that not a penny of this money will be going to repaying those debts. Senator COLLINS. But money is fungible. Ambassador BREMER. It isn’t going to happen. In effect, no. First of all, you have to remember, let’s look at the timing. The debt servicing has been tolled until the end of 2004, so Iraq is under no pressure to pay any debt servicing or any debt repayments before the end of next year. In the supplemental we will be asking for, all of the money will be obligated and most of it will, in fact, be spent before we even get to the end of 2004. Senator COLLINS. When I was in Iraq, I was struck by how little damage there really was from the war. What we’re talking about is not really rebuilding Iraq; we’re talking about an infrastructure that has been looted by Saddam for decades and that now is often the target of sabotage. Wouldn’t it give the Iraqi people more of an investment in their own infrastructure for us to structure at least part of the supplemental—just that part that is being used to re- build the infrastructure—as a long-term loan? I just don’t see why the administration is opposed to that. I’m not talking about a short-term loan. I’m talking about after Iraq is back on its feet and producing oil revenues and, once again, a prosperous, democratic country. Ambassador BREMER. The part you identified is not a small mat- ter. It’s $15 billion out of the $20 billion. It’s not a small loan. I think it’s important to remember that—I said, I think, in answer to an earlier question—the Iraqi people are already paying for their reconstruction through, somewhat, the 2003 budget but a lot in the 2004 budget. As I suggested earlier, by 2005 they will be generat- ing excess revenues, which will help fill the gap between the $60 billion the World Bank says is needed over the next 4 to 5 years and the $20 billion that we are asking for over the next 12 to 18 months. The Iraqi people will, in fact, be paying that money, but if you then say, ‘‘No, instead of that, you’re going to have to use that $5 billion to pay back the American loan,’’ then necessary in- vestments that the Iraqis should be making in their country will not happen and we will not be closing the gap. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Ambassador BREMER. The facts here are rather compelling, I think. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Clinton. Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with my col- leagues in thanking each of you for your service. Ambassador, when you appeared before the Democratic Caucus on Tuesday, you were specifically asked whether there would be any further requests for funding beyond the $20 billion that has been requested now. Your answer was ‘‘No, this is it.’’ Is that still your answer? VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 86 Ambassador BREMER. Yes. What I said was we will not ask for a supplemental like this. If there is any further need I would an- ticipate—and I made this a point to the Appropriations Committee yesterday—any further requests will be done through the normal appropriations process. In other words, it will come forward as part of the regular appropriations process, the 2005 budget presumably early next year. Senator CLINTON. In other words, what many of us heard in the Caucus, which is that the $20 billion was the end of the requests with respect to financial resources, means somewhat differently today that it was to be construed as not a request for additional supplementals, but there may be additional money for reconstruc- tion and related costs that would come through the regular budget system? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, Senator, and I’m not trying to be cute here. There are a lot of unknowns. We know there’s a big gap; we know that the World Bank says there’s going to be a need of $60 billion over the next 4 to 5 years. We are asking for $20 billion here. We’re hoping we’ll get a substantial amount from the donors conference, but that’s an unknown. The Iraqi Government is going to have to do its own 2005 budget, which hasn’t yet been started; we just finished the 2004 budget. There are a number of moving parts here that will have to be pinned down in the next 4 to 5 months before the administration puts together its regular 2005 budget request, but I would anticipate if we need any more money, it would come through the regular appropriations process. Senator CLINTON. Ambassador, I join with both Senator Collins and Senator Nelson in urging the administration to look for a way that there can be some assurance to the American people that we will be in line at least to receive payments from a future Iraqi Gov- ernment, and, given all the talk about the Marshall Plan, I think it is instructive that President Truman required a dollar-for-dollar match from beneficiary countries. We would hope that you would be more open to such a possibility than we’ve heard thus far. I just want to ask a few specific questions. Also, at the Demo- cratic Caucus, you said that 535 copies of this CPA plan were sent to Members of Congress in July. I can only speak for myself; I didn’t see it until this week. But in looking at it, with respect to the security section and the specific points that are included—to defeat internal armed threats; undermine support for para- militaries; deter external aggression; locate, secure, eliminate WMD; eliminate munitions caches—we need more specific informa- tion. Those are all very laudable goals. We all want to do all of those things and we know that you are working very hard to achieve those, but let me just try to get on the record so that I have some benchmark against which to judge this. First, how many members of the Iraqi army are there at this moment? Ambassador BREMER. The Iraqi army has one battalion, which is about 750. Senator CLINTON. Seven hundred and fifty? How many troops do you plan to train for the Iraqi army in the next year? Ambassador BREMER. You won’t find it in that plan because we’ve updated it. We plan to have 27 battalions ready by August next year. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 87 Senator CLINTON. For the purpose of the record, how many peo- ple are we talking about? General ABIZAID. Forty thousand. Senator CLINTON. Forty thousand within the next year? General ABIZAID. That’s correct, Senator. Senator CLINTON. Now, in May or June, I know that there were press reports that while Members of Congress were visiting Iraq a previous estimate was that you were to have 7,000 trained. How have you increased that number so dramatically? Ambassador BREMER. Because, Senator, one of the things we are trying to do now is get the Iraqis more responsible more quickly for their own security. That’s why you find the large number of $2 billion in the supplemental to train the army. We want to do what we were planning to do in 2 years in 1 year. The same is true for the police. If you looked at our planning back in June, July, we were planning to train a police force of about 75,000 to 80,000, but I was told it was going to take almost 6 years. I said that’s simply too long; we have to do it faster. The plan now is to do it in the next 18 to 24 months, and you have another $2 billion in the sup- plemental to make that happen. Senator CLINTON. The goal for the number of police is what? Ambassador BREMER. About 75,000 to 80,000 in the next 18 to 24 months. Senator CLINTON. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. That’s an important question. It follows in the Warner-McCain issue about the use of these troops ahead of time for internal security. Not on my time, but address it when you can. Thank you. Senator Dole. Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ve regarded the war against Saddam Hussein as a righteous cause. This man thumbed his nose at the world community. He violated 17 U.N. resolutions over a period of 12 years. He gassed 5,000 men, women, and chil- dren, his own people. As you’ve said so poignantly, Ambassador Bremer—and I’ve quoted you many times on this—‘‘Gone are Sad- dam Hussein’s torture chambers, gone are the mass graves and his rape rooms, gone is his threat to the United States and to the international community.’’ I certainly want to take this opportunity to express my admiration to you both, my tremendous respect for the job that you are doing and our young men and women who are serving around the world. Earlier this week a proud grandmother handed me a letter from her grandson who is currently stationed in Baghdad. Different points of view have been expressed in this hearing, and I’d like to just read a couple of lines from what this soldier on the front lines had to say. He says, ‘‘I was invited to meet with a local Iraqi who works the engineering for our building’s electricity. He graduated from the Baghdad University in engineering and showed me his class picture from 1979. We talked about what it was like then and the difference now. You could see the suffering in his eyes as he talked about the years of terror that people lived with while Sad- dam was in power. I felt the same emotions of sadness for these people when I first rolled up here from Kuwait, to see their cheer- ing faces of relief. Many a soldier’s eyes were filled with tears that day. I pray that we finish the job we started.’’ VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 88 Defeating terrorism is more than removing the leaders of an evil regime from power. Terrorism must be torn out by its roots so that there is no toehold for its sponsors to reestablish their violent ways. More than words, more than negotiations, the President’s significant spending request sends an unmistakable signal to these sponsors of terror, to the liberated Iraqi citizens, and to the world that the United States is staying the course, lest the fight again return to American soil. Failure to follow through in our mission could leave a lethal void, a void that would rapidly be filled with terror and its supporters. Of course, the American people must know how this money will be expended, and I’d like to ask several questions. General, as part of the Department of Defense supplemental request, military per- sonnel costs come in at approximately $18 billion. The specific de- tails mentioned call for enhanced special pay, imminent danger pay, family separation allowances, and hardship duty pay that come in above the standard expected personnel costs for a typical budget year. In the 2004 Defense Appropriations conference, $128 million was provided to continue the rate increase for imminent danger pay and family separation pay. Was this rate increase fig- ured into this request? The $18 billion also includes salaries for service members retained on active duty through stop loss. Does it include salaries for activated Guard and Reserve members, and has an additional call-up also been calculated in this figure? General ABIZAID. I know that in terms of the calculation for Re- serve and Guard call-ups, yes, I believe it is included. In terms of the additional danger pays, et cetera, I can’t answer that question and I’ll have to get back to you on the record, and the reason is because there is some debate within the administration as to how that will be paid for. With regard to your other questions, the an- swer is yes, it was factored in. With regard to danger pay, I’ll have to get back to you. [The information referred to follows:] OSD has assured me that the $128 million was provided to continue the rate in- crease for imminent danger pay and family separation pay through the first quarter of fiscal year 2004. Senator DOLE. Thank you. Within the Department of Defense’s military construction request, over $100 million is requested for air field ramps at Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Are these governments providing any matching funds for these projects? General ABIZAID. I can’t answer specifically whether they’re pro- viding matching funds for those projects, but they provide substan- tial funds for other projects that we have been very anxious to get done. For example, we moved our forces from Saudi Arabia that were in a combined air operations center to Qatar and put them in the combined air operations center there, and the Qatari’s paid a great portion of that cost. The same in the UAE, they have paid for substantial costs to upgrade the facilities. I can’t answer as to whether or not there are matching funds on these projects, and I’ll have to get the answer to you. [The information referred to follows:] The Governments of UAE and Qatar have both contributed greatly to U.S. facility projects in their respective countries and we expect this support to continue. UAE VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 89 agreed to provide almost $60 million in facility construction at Al Minhad and Al Dhafra Airfields to address critical CENTCOM airfield and force protection con- cerns. At Al Udeid, Qatar is funding an estimated $145 million in construction projects that directly support U.S. and coalition operations. CENTCOM’s approach toward permanent construction funding in our AOR has been, and will continue to be, to first seek host nation support and funding for our long-term facility requirements. Historically, host nations have funded over 50 per- cent of these type projects. Background: Matching funds can be viewed as directly or indirectly contributing to U.S. facility requirements. Direct support—funding portions of a specific requirement—e.g. splitting costs. Indirect support—funding other projects that enhance and support U.S. presence. UAE UAE Investment—$60 million: Minhad Air Base development ($20 mil- lion)—Expand runway and construct support facilities. Al Dhafra Air Base (∼$40 million)—Relocate AF cantonment area and replace tentage with ‘‘hard’’ facilities to meet force protection requirements. U.S. Government Investment—$62.3 million: Al Dhafra ramp and fuel system and temporary cantonment facilities. Qatar Government of Qatar Investment—$145 million: Al Udeid development— Base operational support facilities. U.S. Investments—$180 million: Life support facilities (Millennium Vil- lage) and aircraft ramps. Senator DOLE. I think my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Bayh. Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your service. Regardless of where any of us were on the com- mencement of hostilities in Iraq, we have no choice but to be suc- cessful now. I think there is unanimity of opinion with regard to that. I think the American people share that sentiment and are willing to be both patient and generous as we pursue this, but there are limits to both the patience and the generosity of our peo- ple. The patience will be tested, Ambassador, by the existence of a strategy that is coherent, detailed, and persuasive in terms of bringing an end to this eventually. As a couple of my colleagues mentioned, I think that this still appears to be a work in progress and that more progress needs to be forthcoming; otherwise, the pa- tience will wear thin. With regard to the generosity, I think it depends upon the equity of the program that you put forth. My guess is that the American people would support just about anything, would support anything for our troops, would support just about anything for the security of the Iraqi people. The economic assistance is another matter. My back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that the value of proven or potential Iraqi oil reserves is between $5.5 trillion and $2.8 tril- lion, clearly enabling them to bear part of this burden themselves. I want to follow up on Senator Nelson’s and Senator Collins’ line of inquiry, Ambassador, and I understand that—I’ve listened to your testimony today—a lack of a functioning government limits our ability somewhat in the existence of the $200 billion of debt, VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 90 although $100 billion of it is reparations, and it seems to me that ought to be waived, so we’re really dealing with $100 billion of other debts here. My question very simply is, how do I explain to my constituents that those who helped to prop up Saddam’s re- gime, the French, the Russians, and others, could potentially be re- paid, but those who financed the war to liberate the Iraqi people will not be repaid? How do we explain that? Ambassador BREMER. Senator, I appreciate the difficult situation this puts legislators in, but again it’s a question of timing. I agree. I’ve said—and I was the first in the administration to say it back in early July—that there must be a substantial reduction in Iraq’s debt. That is the position of this government; it is also the position of the group of seven when they met in Evian in June. There’s no contest there. We understand that there has to be a significant haircut, as they call it on Wall Street, and, incidentally, we’re into this game for about $4 billion ourselves. There is about $4 billion— $2 billion in principal, $2 billion in interest from the American tax- payers. There is going to have to be a very substantial reduction in debt—— Senator BAYH. I don’t want to interrupt, but could I ask about the question of timing. Maybe this gets to the heart of the matter somewhat. We’re expected to pony up the money while we continue to negotiate with the same people who diddled us around at the United Nations and elsewhere and expecting them to ultimately do the right thing. Can you understand why the American people would be a bit skeptical about that? Ambassador BREMER. I can, and I think we’re going to have to work with the Iraqis. It’s after all their debt; it’s their country we’re talking about here. We’re going to have to work with the Iraqis. Hopefully we will have before too long a legitimate Iraqi Government that in fact can enter into contracts and agreements, but, again, my problem is timing. We have an urgent need to get this reconstruction started. Senator BAYH. Let me ask about that, the legitimate Iraqi Gov- ernment. You can understand the position this puts you in, where we are potentially honoring the commitments that Saddam Hus- sein made, but are giving the current governing council no author- ity to make alternative choices. That is ironic to say the least. Ambassador BREMER. There are lots of ironies in the situation in Iraq. Senator BAYH. I must also say I agreed with Senator Collins, and I understand the timing issue here, Ambassador. But money to some extent is fungible. To the extent that we’re making grants today, that does increase the new Iraqi Government’s capacity to repay other obligations later, and it would be more than ironic. I agree with her characterization; it would be outrageous if the American taxpayers were indirectly repaying even a single franc or ruble to the French or to the Russians. Ambassador BREMER. I agree with that and I said so yesterday and I repeated it today. I agree. Senator BAYH. General, perhaps a question for you. Ambassador, I hope you’ll forgive me if I turn my attention elsewhere. Ambassador BREMER. Yes. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 91 Senator BAYH. Ansar al-Islam was on our radar screen for a long time. We knew that we were going to go in there and do something about them. We knew that they were located close to the border. The possibility of flight into Iran was an obvious possibility. How did so many of them escape? General ABIZAID. Senator, I’m not so sure how many of them es- caped. During the war, the strike that we had on their facilities up on the northeastern border with Iran was very devastating. A large number were killed there. Many of them that are currently operat- ing in the country are probably survivors that were in position in places such as Baghdad, elsewhere. Some of them went into Iran and moved up into the mountainous regions there and then figured a way to infiltrate back. We think that the number of Ansar al- Islam is somewhere between 200 and 400 perhaps within the coun- try. We remain concerned about the capacity of Ansar al-Islam. We remain concerned about their ties to al Qaeda. Certainly we should also have expected that some of their other people from abroad would have returned to join Ansar al-Islam as things have devel- oped in Iraq as well. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator BAYH. Thank you, Ambassador. Chairman WARNER. Senator Cornyn. Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make my prepared statement a part of the record. [The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN Ambassador Bremer, General Abizaid: I would first like to express my apprecia- tion for the excellent work that both of you have done in Iraq. All of our men and women working there—military and civilian—are doing a remarkable job. Unfortu- nately, much of the positive accomplishments in Iraq are drowned out here at home by the irresponsible rhetoric of those who are motivated by the politics of the mo- ment. This is the sad reality of the political season we are in. I am sure you have seen the recent Gallup Poll indicating that nearly two-thirds of individuals in Baghdad believe that ousting Sadddam Hussein was worth the hardships that they are experiencing today. I wish some of the politicians in our own country would share the same level of optimism as the Iraqi people. The fact is, the plan we have in place for Iraq is working, and we are indeed making progress. The American people are being asked to pay $87 billion for our work in Iraq and Afghanistan over the course of the next year. This is a tremendous sum of money by any measure, but we cannot simply walk away from Iraq as some are suggesting and allow another dictator to rise up. We have no other choice but to finish the job in Iraq. I am confident that the American people understand the importance of finishing the job in Iraq, and that the naysayers here in Washington will be proven wrong. Unfortunately, the constant and politically motivated criticism of our efforts only undermines the good work of our men and women in Iraq. Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid, for being here. I know you’ve been through several of these hearings this week. We appreciate your testimony and your service and your stamina. I just want to make sure I understand the choices that you’re telling us we have. Do we really have any alternative but to finish the job in Iraq? In other words, what is the alternative and what is the message that America would send to our enemies in the war on terror? VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 92 Ambassador BREMER. Senator, I don’t think we do have a choice, and I don’t think when the American people think it through they’ll decide not to finish the choice. I have said before: we are not a nation of quitters. In the 18th century, we didn’t quit until we got the British out of here. In the 19th century, we didn’t quit until we’d freed the slaves. In the 20th century, we twice didn’t quit until we had freed Europe. We will see this job through, I am con- fident. Senator CORNYN. General Abizaid, I know there are some who would like to separate the monies being requested in this total $87 billion supplemental between assistance to our troops in the field and economic assistance in the reconstruction of the Iraqi people. In your opinion, are the economic assistance and the reconstruction money that are being requested essential to the success and secu- rity of our troops in the field? General ABIZAID. Senator, I think that they are inextricably linked, and there is no doubt about it in my mind. First of all, you have the supplemental portion necessary for sustaining the Armed Forces over time, but just having that will only keep us the way it is. What we need is to have immediate improvement, and that requires the $5 billion in particular for security so we can build Iraqi security capacity. The many other parts that Ambassador Bremer has talked about are essential for the security environ- ment. After all, this mission is about achieving consent within the Iraqi populus that will allow them and us to work together to build a more prosperous and more representational Iraq, and I believe that this is absolutely essential to keep it together. Senator CORNYN. I share my colleagues’ concerns and their sense of fiscal responsibility when dealing with taxpayers’ dollars, and I know you share that concern as well. I just wish that concern per- vaded all aspects of our responsibilities in this Congress because, of course, spending continues to be a problem for the American tax- payer in terms of the deficit. But to put this in context, there was an article in USA Today just a couple of days ago that says that if the cost to defeat Saddam was less than half of a percent of America’s annual income measured as gross domestic product (GDP), if spending continues at the current pace, our involvement would cost us .4 percent of our income for the rest of the year. If President Bush’s request for $87 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan is approved, the cost on these two fronts will amount to about .8 percent of our income next year. Now, these numbers are hard to grasp, but to boil it down for the American taxpayer, the article concludes, ‘‘Each year American households spend about 1 percent of their income on alcoholic bev- erages and another 1 percent on tobacco products. We spend about .7 percent of our money on cosmetic products. In other words, our combined operations to combat terror in the Middle East cost a bit more than we spend on makeup and shampoo and a bit less than we spend on booze and tobacco.’’ [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 93 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 94 Senator CORNYN. I think it’s important for the American people to understand that we are talking about taxpayer money and we are the stewards of that trust that’s placed in us. But we really, in my opinion, have no alternative, and I think your testimony sup- ports that. Finally, let me just ask Ambassador Bremer, I know there was reference made to The New York Times and The Washington Post and the perhaps mischaracterization, if not misstatement, of cer- tainly Ambassador Bremer’s conversations with the President and testimony here today. But I do note that there are at least two other newspapers, in addition to the fact that now the oil minister of the Iraqi Governing Council has participated in OPEC proceed- ings recently, the foreign minister accepted at the Arab League. But The Los Angeles Times and USA Today both point out that the President’s efforts to—turn around perhaps is too strong a word— but to reach some rapprochement with the heads of the German and French Governments on Iraqi reconstruction have shown some signs of success, and I think in order to make this picture complete and to put it in proper context that we ought to talk about the great successes that we have seen. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Byrd. Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, and thank you, Gen- eral Abizaid, for being here and for the work that you are attempt- ing to do. I have been, I suppose, one of the fiercest opponents of our going to war in Iraq. I didn’t vote for, I believe it was, the Octo- ber 11 resolution that gave to the President the power to determine when and where and how to use the Armed Forces of the United States in dealing with Iraq. I’m just as fierce, if I may use the word that has been used, an opponent today as I was then. I do, however, try to be realistic. Our troops are in Iraq. I always support our troops and shall continue to do so. They don’t ask to go and we are responsible for getting them back home again and for meeting their needs while they are in war. Now, when it comes to the other part of the request that deals with infrastructure, I VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 95 think that’s an entirely different matter. I’m willing to listen. I’ve had a hard time, however, getting some other people to listen. Now, you, Dr. Bremer, earlier said something to this effect. I can’t write very well because I have benign essential tremor, but as I make out my own writing, the effort requires the cooperation of both parties in Congress, and I want to compliment you on that statement. The effort you’re talking about in which you caused me to write that down, I think, was this effort that’s going on here and that has been going on in the Appropriations Committee, of which I have been an active part. I think that you do need the cooperation of the minority. I think you have it. I think you get it, but we don’t agree with everything that’s being done, naturally. The American people—if they were asked to vote on some of these matters, I doubt that you’d get a majority. I wish that you would do whatever you can do to have the Republican leadership here slow down this train a bit. We were brought into hearings—it’s not your fault, Mr. Chairman. We were brought into hearings on Monday of this week. Members on our side were not, to my knowledge, informed that there would be a hearing on Monday morning. Now, the chairman of the committee reset the hearing to the afternoon because I couldn’t be there on Monday morning. But here we were on a Monday, when most Members of the Senate are else- where or coming from far points of the compass, and now we’re ex- pected to have a markup next Monday. It appears to me that my friends on the other side of the aisle are being a little too fast. I don’t think it works to the betterment of what you are trying to ac- complish here. It would seem that you’d have more goodwill on my side of the aisle. Now, I shouldn’t make this sound like this is per- sonal when I say ‘‘you,’’ but you’re asking for funds. You see my time has already expired, and I don’t complain about that except to say that’s the way it is, and yet the administration’s people here in the Senate, the administration’s party I should say, is pushing this matter to the extent that it will not get the atten- tion that it may deserve. I guess that leads me to this question. I believe you said that you didn’t need the money until January. I believe you said that in the Appropriations Committee or in the Democratic Caucus, whichever it was. Is that a fact? General ABIZAID. No, Senator. We need this money right away. I think there’s some confusion. I was asked a specific question, which was, ‘‘When does the Iraqi Government run out of money?’’ and I said, ‘‘Sometime in January.’’ That’s not the same as this. We have to get these reconstruction programs going right away, as quickly as possible. There’s nothing more urgent. Senator BYRD. It’s my understanding my time is up? Chairman WARNER. Yes, but that’s an important question that you raise. I had intended myself to raise it, so why don’t you finish it out because that should be clarified to give the Ambassador ade- quate opportunity to inform the Senate. Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I believe also that the House is not marking up this bill until next week, if next week, and their mark- up would be next week or later. It leads me to say, I just feel that it would be in your interest and the cause which you’re here to rep- resent to lend a good word to this administration to slow down. I VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 96 don’t remember seeing any measure so important as this one, im- portant because it has $87 billion in it on top of the $79 billion that we appropriated earlier this year. You would certainly help me to better understand the request if we had a little bit more time. Now, as I say, that portion of the request which deals with the troops, I intend to support that, but the other, I think there ought to be a lot of questions asked. I think we’re going down a long road when we start to establish a democracy in Iraq and from that to democratize the Middle East. The American people didn’t go into this war with that understanding. They weren’t told that, but I cer- tainly would hope that you’d use your good authorities to impress upon this administration the need to slow down this train. You don’t need that money, if you need it all, you don’t need that money all that fast. We should have time, Mr. Chairman, to ask questions. Thank you very much. Chairman WARNER. I thank you, Senator Byrd. I’m told that the leadership is trying to work out a schedule to accommodate that bi- partisanship as we are hearing today. Senator Reed. Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Bremer, do you have accurate expense reports for the expenditures you’ve already made in Iraq? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, we do. Senator REED. Who has custody of those reports? Ambassador BREMER. It depends on which funds we’re talking about. Senator REED. I’m talking about everything, since you’re the au- thority. Ambassador BREMER. No, I know, but there are different pools. There are the appropriated funds. There are frozen assets, there are seized assets. Senator REED. I’m talking about appropriated funds, Mr. Ambas- sador. Ambassador BREMER. Okay, yes, we do. The custodian of that is, I guess, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—the place you would go for the ultimate authority. Senator REED. OMB would have detailed reports of all the ex- penditures to date? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, it would. Senator REED. Thank you. One reason I raise that is, as you’re here in Washington, the Iraqi Governing Council has been in New York the past few days, and one of the members, in fact, speaking I think not just for himself but others, has complained that the Americans are spending money here to secure themselves at a rate that is two to three times what they are spending to secure the Iraqi people. It would be better for us if we would be in charge of how to spend this money, and, of course, they could monitor how it is spent. The article alludes to claims apparently that this gen- tleman made about $20,000 a day to feed Americans at the hotel, laundry being sent to Kuwait, overhead from supporting and pro- tecting the large American and British presence less efficient, fees that American contractors charge, premiums. [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 97 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 98 Senator REED. Is this Mr. Ahmad al-Barak inaccurate, irrespon- sible? Ambassador BREMER. The story is inaccurate. I don’t remember which part he was quoted on. I think I answered in testimony the other day that the spending amount for food is actually $17,500 a day. That feeds 3,000 people, therefore, at an average cost of about $5.50, which, as I pointed out to that committee, is $2.50 less than Meal, Ready-to-Eat (MRE) costs, and I might add is only margin- ally better than an MRE. Senator REED. Is he incorrect, though, in terms of his charges that they would be better prepared to spend the money? Ambassador BREMER. Oh, I’m sure there are plenty of people in Iraq who would like to spend $20 billion, but he is incorrect if he thinks that the Iraqi Government can spend it in a better and more responsible, more transparent and accountable way than we can do it, yes. Senator REED. Let me ask another question. Is any of the money in this supplemental for the oil industry in Iraq? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, there is $1.2 billion for reestablishing the infrastructure so that we can get the Iraqis to a point where they can generate oil revenues, which you’ll see in the supple- mental, $1.2 billion. Senator REED. As we’re here today talking, the Iraqi oil minister is in Vienna inviting foreign oil companies, international oil compa- nies to invest in Iraq. It seems to me that we are restoring the in- frastructure so that foreign oil companies can come in and essen- tially and probably securitize and do all the things you think are terrible, securitize this oil so they can invest and make a profit? Ambassador BREMER. I’m not sure what the ultimate policy will be on foreign investment in the oil industry. The foreign invest- ment law, which they asked me to sign a week ago today, explicitly VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 99 excludes investment by foreigners in the oil industry. This is an ex- tremely sensitive subject, as you can appreciate, and the governing council explicitly excluded the oil industry for the time being, so we’ll just have to see how that evolves. I honestly don’t know what they’ll do. I think they should allow foreigners to invest, but it’s a sensitive subject. Senator REED. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, the oil minister said that ‘‘Baghdad welcomes proposals from foreign oil companies about how to develop Iraq’s fields, and said he plans to talk with representatives from several international oil companies in coming days.’’ Apparently he has decided that. [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 100 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 101 Ambassador BREMER. Well, good. Senator REED. Good. So we will be preparing the infrastructure for foreign investment? Ambassador BREMER. If we’re lucky, if he is able to carry his gov- ernment, and I point out that he, as you read that, said he was in- viting proposals. He didn’t say they were going to invest. Let’s see what happens. I hope the government will. In fact, I think they should. I’ve told them that if they’re going to be successful economi- cally, they must at least double their oil productions, because even if they get back to the prewar level, which is where we hope they can get in a year, it means a per-capita income of less than $1,000 per Iraqi. That’s not very impressive for a country that should be wealthy, and the only way to substantially change that wealth is to greatly increase oil production. That’s going to cost them $30 bil- lion to $40 billion that they’re going to have to get, I presume, from foreign investment. But that is a decision that I think they have to make. Senator REED. But, Mr. Ambassador, we seem to be the only in- vestor that’s not taking any future receipts or future claims on the oil, because I can’t think of any international oil company that’s going to walk in and invest a nickel unless they are assured that they’re getting something back. Ambassador BREMER. As I said, they don’t have a policy of let- ting anybody invest in oil yet. That’s the policy. I signed the law. I know what’s in it, Senator. It does not allow investment in the oil industry. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 102 Senator REED. You picked the oil minister, also, and he wants to invest from foreign—— Ambassador BREMER. Actually, I didn’t pick him. The governing council did. Senator REED. Oh, you didn’t. You just picked the government who picked the oil minister. Ambassador BREMER. He is a very good man. He is a petroleum engineer. He’s another example of what I said to the chairman ear- lier about the competence of this government. They are extremely competent people. Chairman WARNER. Gentlemen and ladies of the committee, I certainly thank you for assisting me and Senator Levin in running this hearing on time. I’d like to acquaint you with the following in- formation. At 1:15, the Senate will be voting on the Defense Appro- priations conference report. We’ll all want to make that vote. We have two colleagues who have not had their opportunity for the first round, so we’ll proceed to recognize those two colleagues now with the understanding that I will return, and perhaps the distinguished ranking member, for such remnants as we have so that our witnesses are on their way at about 10 minutes to 1:00, because they have a 1:30 appearance before the House Armed Services Committee. Senator Bill Nelson. Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome gentlemen. Chairman WARNER. Excuse me, yes, 1:15 vote, so I guess we’re out of the opportunity for a second round. Well, we’ll go to 1:15 with these two colleagues. Senator LEVIN. What time is it now? Chairman WARNER. I think I have misspoken, you’re right, and I correct myself. We’ll recognize our two colleagues, and the note didn’t reflect the time. Senator Nelson. Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. General, you’re my home State Floridian, and we think that you’re doing a great job. You will have this Sen- ator’s support, and I support the judgment of the commanders on the ground, as well in your military structure. But I need to make you aware that I am receiving evidence of increasing fatigue in the units that participated in the major combat phase of the operation, evidence such as increased accident rates. This is one way that I receive that information; that’s all e-mails, e-mails from the troops that are there in Iraq as well as e-mails from the family. I have a couple of questions that I want to ask you if you could comment for the record, but I want to first give you one example. Company C, the 2nd battalion, the 124th infantry of the Florida National Guard, before the war actually dug by hand through the berm that marks the Jordanian/Iraqi border, and then they went into Iraq—this is before the 19th of March—in support of the 5th Special Forces group. Since then, in Iraq, Charlie Company has been passed around the theater from command to command about 10 times, from the 5th Special Forces group to Special Ops head- quarters to the 5th Corps headquarters to the 3rd Infantry Division to the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and now to the 1st Armored Division. Charlie Company is still there. They’ve suffered two fa- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 103 talities—one gunned down at the university in Baghdad, it was a Gainesville, Florida, National Guard soldier, another in a vehicle accident also from Gainesville, Florida, and a third has been wounded in the neck. Other companies of the three Florida National Guard battalions have been passed among headquarters all over the theater no less than 40 times since arriving in the area of operations. Now, I can tell you—and you probably know the reputation of our Florida Na- tional Guard—they are justifiably proud of their contribution to the war. We, in Florida, have the third highest number of Guard and Reserve soldiers mobilized and deployed globally. Florida has de- ployed the second highest number of Guard soldiers to the Iraq theater and is only exceeded by Alabama by 38 soldiers. Alabama and Florida among the Guard are in a class by themselves, mainly supplying those troops. No State has provided more infantry from its Guard than Florida. General, the sense that I’m getting is that they are fatigued, and, as the commander, you have to be concerned about fatigue and re- placing with fresh troops. Yet this new policy has come in, 12 months boots-on-the-ground, which is going to allow some Guard units to go back having been there 11 months, but is going to cause some Guard units such as Florida to be extended all the way out close to a year and a half. I would ask for your comment for the record. What is your assessment of fatigue in the current force, and when, in your judgment, do you have to have fresh troops? Let’s take that one first. General ABIZAID. First of all, let me comment on the 124th. One reason they’ve been passed around a lot is because they do a pretty good job; people want to have them. You know how it is, sometimes when you’re good, what happens to you. Fatigue in the force exists no doubt in those areas especially where there’s a lot of fighting going on, and the 124th has been in an area in the Baghdad/Ar Ramadi/Fallujah area, which is really one of the most geographi- cally hot areas that our troops experience. I know that we have to address the issue of fatigue, and we’re doing that in a couple of different ways. One way is we are allow- ing what we call the fighter pass management program to go ahead, which allows troops to go into the local area, for example, into Qatar for a few days, where they get away from the combat zone, they can relax, take a shower, and have a beer. We’re also getting ready to start a rest and recuperation program that will allow troops to get away for a couple of weeks, back into Europe and in some cases back as far as the States if the transportation system will support it. We are mindful of the fact that it is a tough mission, it is a fatiguing mission, and we’re also very mindful of the sacrifices of our soldiers, and God bless our soldiers that have given the full sacrifice. We do everything we can to be equitable. There’s no dif- ference in my mind between what the Guard and Reserve and the Active Forces do. They all have to serve their country. You weren’t here before, Senator, but I said clearly that I’m not satisfied that we have alerted our National Guard soldiers and Reserve soldiers to their go-home date, which is essential for every soldier to have, and I take responsibility for that and I will fix that. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 104 Let me close by saying thanks to them for their great service and all the National Guard and all the Reserve and all the active troops that are out there. This is a tough environment. It’s a deadly envi- ronment in some cases, but whenever I talk to the soldiers, and I talk to a lot of them, it’s clear to me that they know why they’re there, they know it’s going to be long, and they know they either fight there or they fight here. Senator BILL NELSON. I will be following this up privately, Mr. Chairman, on the question of the equity of some units less, others more, where this could be extended all the way to a year and a half. Chairman WARNER. Senator, you have been consistent in raising these important questions, not only on behalf of Florida but other Guard and Reserve units across the country. I thank you for that. Senator Dayton. Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, General, I want to thank you both for your very distinguished serv- ice. Mr. Ambassador, I’m respectful of what you said before our caucus the other day that you’d rather be with your family. You’re both making that sacrifice, as are our 138,000 Americans, many Minnesotans, who also miss their families, and I will support your request, the President’s request. I may join with my colleagues in trying to fine-tune the economic recovery part of it, but I believe that part is equally indispensable to getting our troops home as quickly as possible with a lasting victory secured, which ought to be our objective. That’s certainly my objective. When I was in Iraq the brief time with the chairman, I couldn’t keep up with him there. He wouldn’t take me to Liberia. He said I slowed him down in Iraq. But it was clear to me that the eco- nomic rehabilitation is essential. I guess I would say editorially that I think that much of what is in this request now for economic rehabilitation should have been in last spring’s request. It should have been anticipated, not every specific, but certainly the fact that we have been delayed in getting these projects fully underway is affecting our troops and their safety as well as the attitudes of that country toward our own. So I support it. I just have a couple of questions regarding it, and I’ll try to be brief in my questions and ask you to be concise in your answers so I can get through before my time is expired. Mr. Ambassador, bottom line, just elaborate here, how many Iraqis are we paying and out of what source of funds? It said here that 250,000 Iraqi officers will receive a monthly stipend, salaries that the authorities are paying teachers, health care workers, pen- sions, emergency payments, and 39,000 electrical workers. Another one here says that 92,000 Iraqis are receiving social security and benefits four times higher than they received under Saddam Hus- sein. Good, and 1.3 million Iraqi civil servants are drawing sala- ries. What does all this add up to? Ambassador BREMER. The total number of people that the Iraqis are paying, not the American taxpayer. These funds come from Iraqi funds. It’s about 1.5 million, and our monthly payroll is about $200 million. Senator DAYTON. We’re paying 1.5 million Iraqi citizens for var- ious duties or just survival? VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 105 Ambassador BREMER. The kinds of people you mentioned, right? Their salaries. Senator DAYTON. That money is entirely out of Iraqi revenues? Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator DAYTON. Okay. Presumably, if Iraqi revenues were used for something else, then there would be fewer dollars that would have to be drawn down the United States. I won’t quibble with you on that, but thank you. General, we get these different statements about what is really occurring over in Iraq. On September 6, Sec- retary Rumsfeld, being over there, said that the impact of contin- ued attacks against U.S. Forces have been overstated and likened them to ‘‘isolated terrorist violence in every country in the world.’’ Four days before that, September 2, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz said that the international extremists and terrorists are coming into Iraq to take part in something that they think will advance their cause. He said that in the last month more than 200 foreign terrorists who came to Iraq to kill Americans, do everything they can, have been killed, have been captured by the United States, so they must be defeated and they will be. Are we talking about something that’s just run-of-the-mill or are we talking about something that’s different from that? What is the extent of which there are foreign terrorists infiltrating Iraq now? I apologize if this question was asked before. General ABIZAID. No, Senator, I think it’s an excellent question for me to answer. There’s nothing run-of-the-mill about what we’re doing in Iraq with regard to fighting a low-intensity conflict. It is a very dangerous place, and I would summarize the various groups that we are fighting as first of all being the former regime loyalists, the Baathists that are primarily operating in the Tikrit/Ar Ramadi/ Baghdad area. Although over time we are isolating it geographi- cally more and more. I would characterize that threat as diminishing, primarily be- cause they understand that there’s no hope to bring Saddam back and there’s no hope to reestablish the Baath party. Nevertheless, it is a threat. The next threat which is growing is that of what I would call anti-American. I hate to use the word Islamists because they cer- tainly aren’t Islamists; they’re just the opposite. They’re anti-Is- lamic. But these extremists that are now starting to develop in the Sunni area are probably increasing in strength, although not at an alarming rate, but it is something that we have to watch. Senator DAYTON. I’m sorry, General, my time has expired. I’ll have to cut us both off here, but I did promise several constituents that I would ask, is combat pay being continued for both Afghani- stan and Iraq? General ABIZAID. Yes. Senator DAYTON. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Colleagues, we’ve now completed the first round. Again, our witnesses are due to testify before the House at about 1:30. As a courtesy to the other body of Congress, I would hope that we can release them here at 12:45 and I think that will enable us to have a second round. I per- sonally will take no more than 3 minutes. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 106 First, Ambassador Bremer, in response to Senator Byrd’s impor- tant question about the January issue, have you sufficient time to clarify that? If I could go a step beyond and say, to the extent Con- gress acts early on the decision on these funds, is the extent to which you can accelerate certain programs, which programs, be it electricity, water, are the most important of $5 billion for security? Then, General Abizaid, is there a correlation to that acceleration to your hypothesis that the two parts are integral and that we would hope there would be less threat and injury and harm to U.S. troops and Coalition Forces? General ABIZAID. Yes, Senator, the most important thing that is accelerated by this supplemental are the security parts, the part where we can speed up the training of the Iraqi army, instead of taking 2 years, take 1. We can’t do that without more money, speeding up in particular the training of the Iraqi police force, which will require almost $2 billion. Every month that goes by where we don’t start those projects is a month longer before those guys go out and potentially can relieve our troops of some of the duties that I’ve outlined in my statement. The same is true for the infrastructure projects. We need to start letting contracts. We have to have open bids. It’s going to take time. If we can start those bids now, quickly, we can get the re- pairs started more quickly. Chairman WARNER. Is there a correlation in your professional judgement, General Abizaid? General ABIZAID. Sir, there certainly is. The more Iraqis that are policing, that are patrolling, that are doing the security work to de- fend their own country, the sooner we’ll be able to draw down our forces and the sooner we’ll be able to turn over the country to the rightful owners, which are the Iraqis. Chairman WARNER. It has a correlation to the tragic situation of deaths, loss of life and limb by our forces and coalition, am I cor- rect? General ABIZAID. Sir, there is a correlation, but we should all make sure we understand that as long as American troops are in Iraq, there will be casualties. It is a violent place, and it will re- main violent for some time. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. My second goes back to the ear- lier question that I asked, that Senator McCain asked, and I think Senator Clinton was also trying to urge. In this $5 billion for secu- rity, and particularly the funds related to the national army, if you look at The Sunday New York Times, there’s a very interesting ar- ticle by Tom Friedman [article previously inserted] indicating that to the extent you can put forces in Iraqi army uniforms directly in confrontation with the threats faced by our forces and Coalition Forces, the less likelihood, because of the language barrier and other things, of casualties. Is this directed toward expediting that? General ABIZAID. Indeed it is, both in the respective police and army, and I would also add the Civil Defense Corps, where we hope to have 10 battalions by the end of the year. Chairman WARNER. But you said it’s a new initiative? General ABIZAID. Yes, it is. It’s a new and urgent initiative. Chairman WARNER. Fine. If you could further define it, I think it would be helpful. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 107 Senator Levin. Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Ambassador Bremer, I raised with you the question of collateralizing some of the future sales of Iraqi oil where they expect they will be in surplus to the needs to run the government on an ongoing basis. This is not a loan. This is a collateralization, which would be guaranteed by the United States, which is the opposite of our lending them money. As a matter of fact, we would be taking risk for them by guaranteeing that loan. Senators Collins and Clinton and Ben Nelson raised this same question, in a perhaps different form, but it’s essentially the same question. When I asked you that question, you indicated that you would be willing to think about the possibility of that pledge of fu- ture surplus oil to be sold now by collateralizing it, and with our guaranteeing that, so that even though there is no government there at the moment, it could be sold. Now, when I asked you would you give consideration to that ap- proach, you indicated you would. Did you mean it? Ambassador BREMER. Of course. Senator LEVIN. Because in answering to some of the other ques- tions that followed, it sounded as though you had already made up your mind. Ambassador BREMER. No, Senator. I’m perplexed as to how it would actually work. I’m concerned that if we are not careful we wind up with two problems. One, we wind up in effect taking a lien against the resources which we want the Iraqis to put into their reconstruction in the years ahead. You can’t spend it twice. Senator LEVIN. We’re not taking a lien. I didn’t make any ref- erence to a lien, Ambassador. Ambassador BREMER. Effectively, it is a lien if you collateralize it. Senator LEVIN. I said we would guarantee it. I didn’t say we’d take a lien on it. At any rate, are you willing to look into that? Ob- viously we’re troubled here. Ambassador BREMER. I understand. Senator LEVIN. Many of us are troubled here by the fact that we’re being asked to put up $15 billion for reconstruction funds and that the Iraqis have this huge asset. They’re going to have surplus oil sales in a few years. You could collateralize it now with our guarantee—not a loan, but our guarantee—which supports the Iraqi Government, which makes them contribute to their own re- construction. I’m not talking about ongoing operations. If you can at least openly address that deep concern that we have, it would be progress in terms of trying to see if we can’t get some ideas exchanged around here which address the concerns of the American people. Ambassador BREMER. I took your suggestion as a helpful one and I agreed to look at it. Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, General, I agree with almost ev- erything you’ve said. But one of the things you said troubles me, and that is that the mission of the $15 billion—okay, my time’s up. Senator DAYTON. I’ll cede my time, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. I accept that if you wish to continue. Senator LEVIN. I want to thank Senator Dayton. When you talked about the $5 billion of the $20 billion, I agree with you to- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 108 tally. That’s training and Army, that’s building police force, and I’m with you; I’d vote for that tomorrow. But then when you go to the other $15 billion, you said that its mission is to achieve the consent of Iraq’s people. That troubles me. We cannot buy that consent. That will, which we need, and by the way I share that, I think we need willpower here. This is a very difficult situation. We need willpower. But the Iraqi people need willpower as well. We can’t buy it. As I said in my opening statement, and here I’m going to just quote myself, which I don’t usually do, but I meant it so deeply I want to just repeat one line—‘‘that it is essential that the people of Iraq want to become a unified and secured nation badly enough that they’re willing to make that pledge and that financial commit- ment to raise funds now for their reconstruction.’’ That would be addressing a major concern which a lot of us have. We’ve given huge amounts in blood and treasure. We know the Iraqi people are sacrificing, in terms of their risk-taking, they’re at risk obviously, the terrorists and the Baathist remnants and so forth. But when they have an asset such as they have in future surplus of oil sales in the fairly near future, which can be collateralized, pledged, and sold now with our guarantee, I think it’s wrong to look at that $15 billion as a way of buying their con- sent or achieving their consent. I just think it’s wrong. I think we have it wrong. They have to want it badly like our fellow Ameri- cans wanted in 1776—to be independent, and to pledge their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor. That’s what is needed now and what they have to do. One way to do it is to work something out relative to that future oil surplus, again not necessarily a loan from us—even though I don’t think that would be so bad either be- cause I think we ought to subrogate the other loans—but in terms of our supporting that pledge, that sale. I just wanted to express that, General. You and I have had agreement, I think, on most things. I just think you’re doing an ab- solutely superb job and have a real command of the history of the region, which is essential, as well as language, which is so essential to our success. But on that one comment of yours, particularly, I wanted to just tell you I’m troubled by stating it that way, that $15 billion is part of the mission to ‘‘achieve consent of Iraq’s people.’’ Just to let you know I disagree and give you a chance to comment on it if you want. General ABIZAID. Thank you, Senator. First of all, I don’t believe we can buy the Iraqi people, and I do believe that in these difficult times, in these formative times, they need the help. Perhaps my choice of words didn’t convey what I really mean because I have great faith and great confidence in the Iraqi people to expend their own blood, sweat, and tears in this endeavor. They’re doing that, but when you look at the structures that exist to allow them to be able to organize themselves in this particular time, they don’t much exist. That is what Ambassador Bremer is building, and I don’t think that this needs to be an endless amount of money that flows into Iraq. I believe that this supplemental gives us a chance to get the security moving in the right direction, get reconstruction moving in the right direction, and give the Iraqis a chance to help themselves. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 109 Senator LEVIN. Thank you for that. I think they need our sup- port. We need to get the world involved much more deeply than they are. That’s going to take certain actions on our part, but we need the Iraqi Government such as it exists now to find that way that they can pay part of the reconstruction costs so it’s not just us delivering assistance to Iraq, but it’s them pledging their for- tune in the same endeavor, which is an important endeavor. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Talent, and thank you, even though this is your first round, for agreeing to the 3 minutes. Senator TALENT. That’s fine, Mr. Chairman. I had to step out al- though I was here for your statements earlier. I want to congratu- late you on the progress that you’re making. I agree. To do what we’ve done in 4 months is, I think, a testimony to the quality of the people we have on the ground and your leadership, and I’m grateful for that. A couple of points. First of all, I’m rather pleased, it seems to me, on the fairly broad range of consensus that I’ve heard in the com- mittee about this request. I mean, the difference really seems to be not over whether we ought to provide the money, but whether part of it ought not to be purely some kind of grant, and I think actually that bespeaks a rather great amount of unity. Now, as I under- stand what you’re saying, and certainly this is my understanding of the situation, we’re not spending this money for the electrical system and the other things. You’re not proposing that purely or even mostly out of a desire to be charitable to the Iraqis, however laudable that may be. We’re doing this because we think this helps protect American security and freedom because it’s going to help Iraq become a reliable and stable ally in the war against terror. Is that a fair statement to you? General ABIZAID. Yes, that’s right, Senator. When we spend American money, it should be in America’s interests, and that’s what this is. Senator TALENT. Yes, we do a lot as a Nation and privately and publicly for charitable reasons, but that’s not what we’re talking about. It does seem to me that if that’s a correct thing to do, which we all seem to agree that it is, we ought to do it in such a way that makes it most likely Iraq will indeed become an ally in the war against terror or not do it. To me, if we don’t think it’s nec- essary to accomplish that goal, then let’s not spend the money. If we do, let’s spend it in the way that makes it most likely that they’ll be a reliable ally. Another point I wanted to make, and I think you touched on this before, Iraq already has a lot of foreign debt. We’re asking other countries, are we not, to contribute directly in the form of grants to Iraq? It’s going to be hard to ask them to make outright grants to Iraq if we’re conditioning our money as a loan, isn’t it? General ABIZAID. Yes, that’s correct. There is a donors conference at the end of next month in Madrid where we’re hoping for sub- stantial grants from other countries. Senator TALENT. I hope we’re repairing our relationship with old Europe, but I don’t expect it to be at such a point where they’re VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 110 going to be willing to give money to Iraq if we’re loaning it to Iraq. I don’t think we can expect that much from the French. Finally, I’ll just close with this. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your patience. Would you restate again the urgency of this in your mind? I think that’s important. The reasons you’re trying to get this done as quickly as possible are because we want an ally in Iraq as quickly as possible and also because there are dangers if we don’t move quickly. Would you just restate that again? General ABIZAID. Every day that goes by where we are not speed- ing up the army, speeding up the Civil Defense Corps, speeding up the training of the police, is a day when our soldiers, men and women, are not being substituted for by Iraqis. That’s the security part of this supplemental, about $5 billion of the $20 billion. Every day that the Iraqis do not get power, do not get water, do not get sewage treatment, is a day when their quality of life is such that they’re less inclined to view us as liberators, more inclined to view us as occupiers, and that also increases the danger to our men and women. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Byrd. Senator BYRD. Mr. Ambassador, you said today that the CPA is better able than the Iraqi Government to spend this $20 billion re- quest in a manner that is ‘‘responsible, transparent, and account- able.’’ Yet, when asked for detailed expense reports for appro- priated funds, you referred this committee to the White House, in other words to OMB, and we’re not going to hear the OMB. I wish we would, especially in the Appropriations Committee. I think we should, but we’re not going to get any ‘‘outside’’ witnesses. Let me say that again. You referred this committee to the OMB for that information. If you’re so committed to transparency and ac- countability, why can’t you provide detailed information about your expenses directly to Congress? Can you do that? Ambassador BREMER. I believe these funds belong to the Execu- tive Office of the President. That’s how they were appropriated, Senator. I’m not an expert on reporting requirements, but my un- derstanding is the reporting requirements attached to the legisla- tion required the Executive Office of the President, in the form of the OMB, to be the channel, which these funds are reported to Congress. But I’m not an expert in these matters, sir. Senator BYRD. I’ll let the record stand as it is because I don’t have time to pursue it. In your opening statement, that every re- construction contract awarded using this $20 billion request will be competitively bid, does this mean that you will not exercise any na- tional security waivers to cut short the competition process? Ambassador BREMER. It is my intention not to exercise any such waivers. Senator BYRD. It is your intention not to do so. Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator BYRD. Will you also commit to providing this committee information about these contracts after they are awarded so that the committee can monitor the costs of reconstruction to make sure that taxpayers are not being fleeced by companies. Halliburton is very much in the news, very prominently displayed in the front pages and so on, so that’s what I’m driving at. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 111 Ambassador BREMER. Senator, we will follow whatever reporting requirements Congress puts in the legislation. Senator BYRD. Is my time up? Chairman WARNER. Yes, thank you, Senator Byrd. Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Byrd, would you like my time? I would yield it to you. Senator BYRD. That’s very nice of you. Mr. Chairman? Chairman WARNER. Yes, of course. Senator BYRD. The White House has stated that in your position as the Administrator of the CPA, you report directly to the Sec- retary of Defense. However, the administration has given you a very long leash with which to work, and the CPA appears to be ex- ercising its own independent authority and day-to-day operation. The first regulation you signed in Iraq contained the following statement, ‘‘The CPA is vested with all executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolu- tion 1483’’ and so on. ‘‘This authority shall be exercised by the CPA Administrator.’’ Now that’s a very powerful statement. Does this authority mean that, as CPA Administrator, you are the person who is ultimately accountable for the policy and spending decisions being made on the ground in Iraq? In other words, does the buck stop with you? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, it does. Senator BYRD. In answer to that first question, you are the per- son. What is the basis for the broad authority that you are claim- ing in this regulation? Ambassador BREMER. The basis for that authority, Senator, is international occupation law and the U.N. Resolution you cited, 1483. Senator BYRD. Did the President issue any specific order giving you this authority? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, that order relates to the international legal implications of being the occupying power in Iraq. My author- ity within the executive comes from a letter from the President, which is consistent with letters and legislation that are issued to every American ambassador overseas. Senator BYRD. Do I have any further time? Chairman WARNER. You have about half a minute, sir. Senator BYRD. Very well, thank you. General Abizaid, if we have contractors coming in to take over the jobs that our National Guard has been doing, does that mean that our guardsmen will be coming home sooner? General ABIZAID. Sir, we have contractors moving in to do var- ious things, and with regard to some of our logistic units, whether they be active or National Guard, if we contract out that function, those units will not stay. They will come home. Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. Chairman WARNER. Senator Byrd, I thank you very much for your cooperation and that of all Senators here. Senator Inhofe. Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was advised during my absence that one of the questions I was going to ask has al- ready been asked. For either one of you: There has been some criti- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 112 cism that there is too much concentration of authority in Baghdad and perhaps some of the areas in the north, in the south, might feel that there is too much centralized control. Do you have any thoughts about that? Ambassador BREMER. It’s a legitimate concern, Senator, and one of our broad political objectives as we move forward is to try to get away from an overly centralized government and try to devolve power to the governances, to the municipalities, and we’re doing that. Senator INHOFE. Lastly—and you can take whatever time you want to answer this—you have been attacked in many hearings about not having a plan, and you clearly do have a plan. In this plan that we have seen, it outlines four areas. I’ll read those: secu- rity, essential services, economy. Then when it gets down to gov- ernance, if I understand this correctly, that’s where your seven- point plan comes in. Is that correct? Ambassador BREMER. That’s correct. Senator INHOFE. All right. On the first three—not now, but for the record—I’d like to have maybe a percentage, for example, es- tablishing a secure and safe environment. Where are you along that road approximately? The same under essential services, and under services I hope that we’re not talking about putting a coun- try back into services it didn’t have before the liberation. I think that’s a very important part to keep reminding people. So perhaps where we are on that road, and then, lastly, creating the conditions for economic growth, where we are there. [The information referred to follows:] This question is hard to quantify exactly. The percentages within these categories vary at any moment, but we are making significant progress. I should emphasize that we are actively addressing each of these areas. The 2207 report provided to Congress in accordance with the Supplemental Appropriations Bill provides the out- line of how we are focusing our efforts. Our ministries and their advisers are push- ing forward in each respective area. Senator INHOFE. Now you mentioned under governance, you are into point four now? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator INHOFE. Do you feel that that is pretty much on schedule of where you thought you would be at this time? Ambassador BREMER. No, I think we’ve slipped about a month. Now at this point, the preparatory committee is due to report back to the governing council by Tuesday on their recommendations on how to convene the constitutional conference. I was hoping we would have that conference convened in September or October. I frankly just don’t know what the recommendations will be and, more importantly, how long it will take the governing council to make a decision. Senator INHOFE. I understand that, and if you’ll recall in my opening round I commented that we were there when the unfortu- nate thing happened to the U.N. building, so things like that are going to change, and even if you were in a position to say when four, five, six, and seven will be completed, that will change. Since I feel you have been unfairly challenged on the plan, is there any final comment you’d like to make in terms of the plan? VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 113 Ambassador BREMER. Let me just make one point on the plan be- cause Senators have been looking at it this morning and yesterday. The plan that was sent to the Hill on July 23 is obviously by defini- tion already 2 months out of date, and those of you who visited Baghdad know that Baghdad time is different than normal time; 2 months is a lifetime. We review this plan formally once a month, and it gets updated. To answer your question, how are we doing against the metrics? We change our targets from time to time. We are in a very fluid environment. I use the term when I talk to the President that I call a lot of audibles. I get up to my staff meeting in the morning and I look over at the defense and say, ‘‘We’re going off-tackle right today, not off-tackle left.’’ But we keep the strategy the same. Those four areas are the heart of our plan, and we will execute to that plan. Senator INHOFE. An excellent plan, thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Reed. Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Abizaid, if there is a terrorist attack upon the United States, is it more likely to emanate from Baghdad and Iraq or along the Pakistan/Afghani- stan border where bin Laden is hiding? General ABIZAID. Senator, if there is another attack on the United States, it would be organized, planned, and executed through a worldwide network of connections that are borderless. It would be difficult to say where its geographic center would be. There are certainly places on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border that are semi-havens for terrorists, in the Wazinstan area, that the Pakistanis are working to clean up. There are other ungoverned spaces where this is also possible. It is possible that a terrorist group working in Baghdad, or New York for that matter, could or- ganize the attack, so there is no geographic center that I would point to other than to say we have a lot of cells in a lot of locations that require careful, difficult work to uncover and destroy. Senator REED. It seems the President has clearly identified Iraq as the center of the war on terror, and my point of the question obviously was I concur with your vision that this is an inter- national phenomenon and, in fact, is less likely, I think, to emanate from Baghdad than it would to emanate from the Pakistani/ Afghani border regions, if anywhere. There’s a real concern here that underlies our overall strategy, not just what we’re doing in Iraq, but whether these $87 billion for Iraq might be missing the point. Afghanistan is deteriorating. They now have a drug culture and a drug industry that is refueling the rearming of the Taliban, and they’re reasserting themselves in that country and giving di- rect aid and comfort to the individual that attacked us. I commend the President for at least recognizing that the Saddam Hussein re- gime was not involved in the September 11 attacks. I think there are some strategic issues here as well as just the dollars. Thank you, General, for your answers, always very well-composed and very thoughtful. Mr. Ambassador, one final question. I understand from press re- ports that the U.N. staff is advising Secretary Kofi Annan to with- draw his presence or the presence of the U.N. from Baghdad. What do you propose to do to try to prevent that if you can? VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 114 Ambassador BREMER. I’ve seen those press reports. I don’t know whether they’re accurate or not. I would find it deeply regrettable if the U.N. chose to draw down the rest of its staff there. They’ve been extremely helpful to us in the period since the war. We’ve had a dozen U.N. specialized agencies who have been very actively sup- porting reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and so forth. I worked very closely with the Secretary General’s Special Rep- resentative, who was killed in the bombing, and I certainly hope the U.N. will continue to be present in Iraq and I would regret it if they left. Senator REED. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Roberts. Senator ROBERTS. General, I believe you said, after your last visit to Washington, words to the effect that after being in the U.S. a week and a half and listening to news reports on the conditions in Iraq, it was as if you would be going back to Iraq to ‘‘find some- one to surrender to.’’ What part of the Iraq picture do you worry the public is still not getting? Ambassador BREMER. Sir, it’s difficult to get the story here be- cause we concentrate on every bad incident and we don’t seem to get through the wonderful work that is being done, not only by the folks in the military, but also at the CPA. For every one combat operation, there’s probably 50 civic actions that are absolutely amazing in their organization and the good that they do, in the ca- pability that they provide a better life for the Iraqis. So it’s difficult for us to get the word out. We put out press re- leases that talk about the good work we do, but the nature of life in the States is to concentrate on the bad as opposed to the good. This cynicism does not help the troops. Senator ROBERTS. You mean that’s not in The New York Times and The Washington Post? I can’t understand that. Ambassador BREMER. Sir, I’m an optimist and I know what our troops are doing, and everybody around this table and in this con- ference room here knows what our troops are doing. We need to be optimistic for them and for the Iraqi people. There are tough times ahead, and I don’t want to ever mislead the committee that the war is necessarily over anytime soon. There will be more casual- ties. There will be more expenditure of treasure, but ultimately we will win. We will win because we can persevere in our very difficult tasks. Senator ROBERTS. Mr. Ambassador, in the very short time I have left, I’d like for you to connect the dots. That’s the euphemism we use in the intelligence community. We have an inquiry on regional stability, human rights, terrorist sanctuary, WMD, historical prece- dent, resolve to stay the course. You’re both with me at a town hall meeting in Dodge City, Kansas, and some old cowboy stands up and says, ‘‘Now, General and Mr. Ambassador, what the hell has this got to do with me? How does this affect my daily life and pock- etbook?’’ I know who would ask the question. I’d say, ‘‘Now, Kirby, just control your temper here a minute. Basically, if we allow the sanctuary to continue and the global war on terrorism continues, somebody may kill you.’’ He might understand that. Now, would you connect that final dot as to what that means to the individual VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 115 person in Nebraska, Minnesota, Alabama, or wherever? What does it mean to them? General ABIZAID. Sir, I’ll just tell you what all of our soldiers tell me when I talk to them. Fight them here or fight them at home. Senator ROBERTS. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Sessions, will you wrap it up? Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There have been some comments from this Congress, which I am very dubious about, that we need to have the U.N. more involved and maybe even taking a lead in this. I’m convinced that if we want it to take longer, to be less efficient, to be done with more corruption and at greater expense, we should turn it over to the U.N., but I was in fact particularly distressed that the U.N.—I’m looking at this little item here—Jan Egeland told 10 or 9 permanent Security Council members in a closed-door meeting today that they didn’t foresee coming back in significant numbers. Now, what that says to me is it’s another example of why, in a matter of this seriousness in which the United States has made such a significant commitment and is so important to the future of the world and to the United States foreign policy, if the U.N. is going to leave after one attack, it would be unwise for us to put our confidence and faith in them. Ambassador Bremer, would you comment on that? Ambassador BREMER. Let me first say, as the President has said not only Tuesday, but before, we think the U.N. can play a vital role in Iraq, and I for one certainly welcome it. I’ve already, in an- swer to Senator Reed’s question, pointed out how useful I think they can be, but it is true that there’s something of a contradiction behind the people who are anxious for the U.N. to play a leading role and the U.N.’s apparent decision—we don’t know if it is a deci- sion—to draw their people out of Iraq. The people of Iraq are still going to need electricity. They’re still going to need security. They’re still going to need water. They’re still going to need sewage in the next 2 to 3 months. They need it now. If the U.N. is going to spend some time out of the country thinking about whether they can go back, then that’s time that’s lost. That’s more dangerous for our soldiers. It’s a time when we are losing time getting Iraq reconstructed. Senator SESSIONS. I couldn’t agree more, and thank you. There’s a question about the commitment of the people of Iraq. I met the police chief there, who was personally leading raids and who had been shot in the leg the week before. An attempt was made on his life not long after I got back there. You lost the female cabinet member. The people that are leading your city councils, po- lice, are each one of them expressing courage and commitment to a new Iraq every day they go to work. Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. The fires of freedom have been lit, to use Winston Churchill’s quote. Senator SESSIONS. They are at risk, just as American soldiers are. Ambassador BREMER. Yes, they are. They’re a courageous group of people, like the woman who was killed last week. Senator SESSIONS. General Abizaid, I asked you when we were there about more up-armored Humvees for our personnel. I think VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 116 some steps have been taken to improve that situation to give them more protection as they do their patrolling and also the Stryker ve- hicle. Can you assure us that we are making progress with getting better armament for those troops and guardsmen that are there? General ABIZAID. Sir, we are making progress on individual pro- tection. For example, the protective vests: By November, every sol- dier in the theater will have the newest and latest version of that. We’re making progress on the number of Humvees, although that will take longer to fix with regard to the up-armored Humvees, but they are coming in at a rate that’s probably 100 or 200 vehicles a month. As far as the Stryker is concerned, I am looking forward to the arrival of the Stryker. I know the Army has looked at some difficulty with certain parts of the armor and I am confident when the Stryker arrives that it’ll be a great addition to the battlefield. Senator SESSIONS. Provide more safety for the soldiers? General ABIZAID. Absolutely. Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. When you referred to vests, it’s the flak vests, and you’ve addressed that problem, and I’m delighted that you have. Thank you. Senator Levin, I thank you and your colleagues. I thank my col- leagues. Senator LEVIN. Just a request, if we could, of Ambassador Bremer. Could you send us the August update of that July 21 or 23 plan? You say that you update it, or modify it, monthly. Could you send us the August update, plus can you send us each monthly update as you adopt them? Ambassador BREMER. Senator, many, not only in this committee, but other committees, have asked for more visibility. Let me make it a more general commitment to keep you informed. We may want to change the format. Actually, the August one, of course, is out- of-date. We’ve just completed the September one—— Senator LEVIN. I think we’d like to see it. Ambassador BREMER.—and we will have a major review of the quarter starting next week. I will keep you informed, but I want to reserve some latitude on how I do that. [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 117 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 118 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00121 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 119 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 120 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 121 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 122 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 123 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 124 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 125 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 126 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 127 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 128 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 129 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 130 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 131 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 132 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 133 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 134 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00137 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 135 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 136 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 137 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 138 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00141 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 139 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 140 Senator LEVIN. I think it is important that since the August and apparently September modifications have been made, that we get copies of those. Ambassador BREMER. I will keep you informed, but I’m going to keep my hands free as to how I do that. Senator LEVIN. There’s no reason that I can imagine why this Senate should not get a copy of your August and September modi- fications just the way you—— VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00143 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 141 Ambassador BREMER. Maybe you will, sir. I just want to go back and—— Senator LEVIN. Not a maybe. No, no, not maybe. I can’t think of a reason why—if it’s classified, send it to us in classified form. But there’s no reason why we’re not entitled to that. Ambassador BREMER. I will keep you informed, sir. Senator LEVIN. I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman, on that one, but that’s not good enough. Are you asserting some kind of a privilege in sending us that? Ambassador BREMER. I’m not, Senator. I just want to go back—— Senator LEVIN. There is no reason why we’re not entitled to a document which you have prepared. Ambassador BREMER. Senator, I just remind you that within a week, which is the time frame in which I can send you anything, I will have the first quarter reviewed, and that is more useful than going back to August, which is out-of-date. Even the September one is out-of-date now. The next one will be—— Senator LEVIN. You’ve sent us the July one. We finally got that a few weeks ago. Ambassador BREMER. No, Senator. Let’s not go over that again. Senator LEVIN. This is not a matter of argument. This is a mat- ter of whether we are entitled to those documents. Ambassador BREMER. You are entitled to be kept informed about our planning and our progress, and I will commit to do that. Senator LEVIN. I’m sorry, Ambassador. We are entitled to those documents. I thought that was a routine question. I did not intend that that was anything other than a routine question. Now it’s no longer a routine question. We are being asked to spend $20 billion of American taxpayers’ money. You said you had a plan. You point- ed to the July document, which most of us never got until a few days ago. If there were modifications, which you said there were, in that plan in August and you said recently in September, this Senate is entitled to those documents. Now if you want to get some legal ad- vice on that question, you can get it, but you can’t just say you’re going to keep us informed. That is not good enough. I don’t think anyone on this committee, Democrat or Republican, is going to ac- cept that from any member of the executive branch. Now, I would suggest you get advice on that before you stick to that position. Chairman WARNER. Senator, we will, and I will join you in trying to reconcile what appears to be some difference, which I’m not sure what it is, and we’ll give you adequate—— Ambassador BREMER. We can resolve it. Chairman WARNER. We can resolve it. I wish to have this hear- ing concluded on what I perceive has been a very thorough, in- depth and tempered exchange of viewpoints. That’s what the Amer- ican public expects from Congress, working with the executive branch, particularly when it relates to matters of our national secu- rity and the life and the limb of our brave soldiers and their fami- lies here at home. I think I can speak for this committee that each of you are discharging your duties as public servants, consistent with the finest traditions of our country. Thank you. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 142 Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, there’s a markup on Monday. I think we’re entitled to those documents before that markup in the Appropriations Committee and I think we need a formal answer from the administration on that issue by tomorrow. Chairman WARNER. We are adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS IRAQI OIL CONTRACTS 1. Senator SESSIONS. Ambassador Bremer, the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) in Iraq has begun the process of trying to restart oil exports. I am told that SOMO has been dealing almost exclusively with oil companies with whom they dealt prior to the war. To the best of your knowledge, can American companies who did not deal with the Saddam regime participate in future contract bidding? Ambassador BREMER. Contrary to the latter years of the Saddam regime, Amer- ican companies are not barred from bidding for and purchasing Iraqi crude oil. In fact, large buyers of Iraqi crude oil include Exxon-Mobil, Marathon Oil, Koch, and Chevron/Texaco, and the United States has received the majority of the exported Iraqi crude oil. As of the beginning of October 2003, 53 million barrels of crude oil (66 percent of the total) left free Iraq, destined for the United States. 2. Senator SESSIONS. Ambassador Bremer, if SOMO is accepting bids from Amer- ican companies, are you aware of a procedure through which an American company can request a meeting with SOMO officials, and, if so, could you outline that proce- dure? Ambassador BREMER. Any American company wishing to do business with SOMO may contact them directly via fax at 00873 763 705020 or via email at SOMO@uruklink.net. SOMO’s contact information has been in industry press since June. Correspondence should be directed to the Director General. 3. Senator SESSIONS. Ambassador Bremer, I have been told that it was common practice during the Saddam era for SOMO to add special ‘‘surcharges’’ to the price of oil sold under the U.N. oil-for-food program. I am also told that these funds were effectively skimmed off the top by SOMO and placed in secret bank accounts for the exclusive use of the Iraqi Government in a manner totally outside U.N. supervision. Are you aware of any steps by SOMO to put an end to this practice? Ambassador BREMER. SOMO specifically targets clientele that are highly reputa- ble, world-class oil companies. This policy is designed to restore SOMO’s reputation as a leading oil export organization, but this also helps to prevent improprieties in the crude oil transactions. The standard procedure for crude oil sales is designed to prevent improprieties. Iraqi crude oil is sold on the basis of official selling prices announced during the beginning of the month preceding month of loading. Buyers submit letters of credit to the New York branch of the Federal Reserve Bank. Payment is made within 30 days after loading. The CPA monitors the quantity of oil exported, its price, SOMO’s clientele, and deposits into the Development Fund for Iraq. As for secret accounts, the entire Iraqi banking system collapsed with the fall of the Saddam regime; therefore, accounts internal to Iraq no longer exist. Accounts external to Iraq are being identified, and we are working to return the assets they contain to the people of Iraq. SOMO employees have been and continue to be of great assistance in locating and returning these assets to the people of Iraq. QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS RESERVISTS 4. Senator COLLINS. General Abizaid, last Saturday I had the opportunity to meet with some of the family members of reservists serving in the 94th Military Police Company. They expressed to me their disappointment that their loved ones will be in Iraq longer than expected and their frustration over the poor communication about rotation schedules. Previously, these reservists were led to believe that their entire activation would only be for a year, which includes training and travel. Ear- lier this week, I learned that the husband of one of the women I met with was wounded in an ambush in Iraq. Sergeant Curtis Mills sustained a compound arm fracture and took shrapnel in his back. We need to continue to have a significant VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00145 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 143 military presence in Iraq, and I believe that most of our reservists also understand that. However, I am concerned that the demand on our Reserve and Guard mem- bers is approaching the commitment that we expect of our regular troops. How long do you anticipate we will need to sustain the current troop levels in Iraq? General ABIZAID. The number of U.S. troops required in Iraq depends mainly on three factors: the level of enemy activity, our ability to build Iraqi security capacity, and the number of international troops who join us. While we must be prepared for a range of contingencies, it seems likely that we will be able to reduce the numbers of U.S. troops and numbers of reservists deployed in the coming year. The increas- ing size and effectiveness of Iraqi security forces is particularly promising in that connection. We greatly appreciate the distinguished service of our reservists. The inherent un- certainties of war led to a change in policy that committed reservists to 1 year in theater rather than 1 year of activation. Because we recognize the strain that the mission is placing on reservists in particular, we are determined to first ensure that every reservist understands his or her return date. We are also doing everything possible to reduce the numbers of Reserve units deployed after force rotation. We are, for example, contracting out many of our transportation requirements. Addi- tionally, our servicemen and women now have the opportunity to participate in mid- tour leave and rest-and-relaxation programs. I share your admiration for the selfless service of Sergeant Curtis Mills and all our reservists. I, along with the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense, am committed to doing all we can to lessen the burden on these great Americans who are contributing immeasurably to the important mission in Iraq. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN SOMO 5. Senator CORNYN. Ambassador Bremer, I believe it is in America’s and Iraq’s interests that all competitive oil refiners be allowed an opportunity to bid in the re- emerging Iraqi oil industry. Please explain how the CPA is working with Iraq’s SOMO to ensure that SOMO follows an open, fair, and competitive process in solicit- ing and awarding these contracts. Ambassador BREMER. The CPA has monitored SOMO’s general business policies and practices, which are widely accepted within the petroleum industry. Its tenders were open and published in Reuters, Platts, Dow Jones, Argus, Bloomberg, and the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES). SOMO’s medium-term contracts were by in- vitation; however, this is customary for many oil producers. The significant majority of these term contracts were awarded to large, well-known, reputable ‘‘end users’’ of crude oil (i.e., refiners), and the volume of each contract is based on the buyer’s size and capacity. This fits SOMO policy, which is designed to minimize risk, to maximize Iraqi exports, and to restore Iraq’s standing in the petroleum industry. 6. Senator CORNYN. Ambassador Bremer, what is your evaluation of the openness, competitiveness, and transparency with which SOMO has publicized and solicited bids on crude export tenders? How can this process be improved? Ambassador BREMER. SOMO tenders were open and published in Reuters, Platts, Dow Jones, Argus, Bloomberg, and the MEES. SOMO’s medium-term contracts were by invitation only, but the preponderance of these were awarded to large, well- known, reputable companies. SOMO is following practices widely accepted within the petroleum industry. SOMO’s practices and polices, which are reviewed and approved by CPA, are de- signed to minimize risk, to maximize Iraqi exports, and to restore Iraq’s standing in the petroleum industry. SOMO, the Ministry of Oil, and CPA are always striving to improve SOMO’s practices and processes. SOMO’s operations are monitored. If improvement or more transparency is necessary, changes will be made; however, currently, no specific improvements have been identified or are pending. MOBILE PHONE LICENSES 7. Senator CORNYN. Ambassador Bremer, as I understand, the CPA issued a ten- der in August for the issuance of three mobile phone licenses in Iraq. Please provide an update on the status on this tender. Will U.S. companies be evaluated for this award under the same selection criteria as other companies in the region? Ambassador BREMER. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00146 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 144 Status of Tender: On 6 October, the Iraqi Ministry of Communications announced its selection of three consortia to provide initial wireless service in Iraq. Evaluation Criteria: After the submission of bids closed on August 21, a team of experts drawn from Iraq, the U.S., and the U.K. analyzed and compared proposals. A majority of that team was made up of Iraqis, and a panel consisting of two Iraqis and two officials of the CPA made the final recommendation. Proposals were received from some 35 companies that submitted a total of over 100 bids for the 3 licenses that had been offered. In line with best international practice, the bids were assessed against a list of criteria, including technical capability, management ability, and cost of use to the subscriber that had been prepared before the bids were received. The criteria were designed to ensure an objective and fair assessment of the merits and failings of each bid. It is this open and transparent process that has led to the selection of the three consortia. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN CPA REQUEST TO REHABILITATE AND RECONSTRUCT IRAQ 8. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, describe the process of developing the CPA Request to Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq for the fiscal year 2004 supple- mental request. Who drafted the plan? Ambassador BREMER. CPA drafted the plan in consultation and collaboration with the Iraqi ministries. The plan was further coordinated within CPA, OSD, and OMB. 9. Senator LEVIN. Ambassaor Bremer, what input, if any, did you receive from pri- vate companies or individuals working for private companies in deriving the esti- mates for the cost of the various items described in the plan? Ambassador BREMER. We did not solicit any input from private companies or indi- viduals. We believe that private involvement in the crafting of this request would have been inappropriate and have unfairly advantaged any company with firsthand knowledge of the plan. 10. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, did personnel from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and/or others from the State Department par- ticipate in drafting recommendations and discussing priorities for funding and project development? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, USAID and State Department representatives pro- vided recommendations and identified their priorities prior to finalization of CPA’s supplemental request. 11. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, did you seek the input of World Bank or U.N. experts or officials in developing the programs and cost estimates? Ambassador BREMER. The Iraqi Ministries, in determining their estimated re- quirements, considered all relevant sources of information including known World Bank estimates of need. However, because the supplemental request was an inher- ently governmental process, we do not believe it would have been appropriate to in- volve international organizations in the final review of our recommended programs and estimates. 12. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, at a press briefing on Iraq in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, World Bank officials stated that they had been working on a needs assessment for Iraq since early July. They took a look at 14 different sec- tors, such as health, education, agriculture, water supply, sanitation, electricity, and so forth, starting with the 2004 budget. They also stated that they ‘‘would hope to have numbers in another 2 or 3 weeks time’’ in time for the Madrid conference at the end of October. They also mentioned that they needed to discuss their findings with the Iraqi authorities, which was an essential step in their process. How were you able to come up with your assessment of Iraq’s needs and to come up with a figure that would be required when the World Bank had not even com- pleted its work—did you use a similar methodology to that used by the World Bank? Ambassador BREMER. Our supplemental request focuses predominately on secu- rity and infrastructure needs. The World Bank did not assess security requirements although all recognize that reconstruction cannot proceed without a stable Iraq. Fur- ther, although the World Bank had not finalized its numbers at the time the supple- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00147 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 145 mental request was being prepared, it was already apparent that our plan would only address a fraction of the total needs. We do not believe it would have been pru- dent to wait for their numbers when the lack of security and infrastructure was painfully obvious. The supplemental request makes a large down payment on those needs. 13. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, did Iraq officials or senior experts par- ticipate in drafting the proposal? Ambassador BREMER. Each ministry with direct requirements in the supplemental participated in drafting the proposal. The ministries include Iraqi officials and coali- tion personnel, many of whom are experts in their field. 14. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, did the Iraqi Governing Council or mem- bers of the council have an opportunity to comment on the proposal, and, if so, how did you respond to any comments or recommendations from the council or from council members? Ambassador BREMER. We did not coordinate the request with the Iraqi Governing Council, but they fully concur that this supplemental request is essential to the re- construction and rehabilitation of Iraq. 15. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, was there an opportunity for the Iraqi public and media to learn about the contents of the plan before you presented it to the U.S. Congress? Ambassador BREMER. No. We believe presenting the plan to the Iraqi public and media prior to submission to the United States Congress would have been inappro- priate. However, subsequent to the release in the United States, I discussed the plan in several of my weekly broadcasts to the Iraqi people. While explaining what the supplemental would do for Iraq, I cautioned that the decision was subject to ap- proval from Congress . . . that in a democracy the leader cannot simply take fund- ing from their citizens as Saddam did. 16. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, what, if any, programs or components of programs were eliminated from the plan due to recommendations or comments from Iraqi officials or development experts? Ambassador BREMER. The final decisions on what remained in the supplemental request were mine alone. No programs were eliminated based on comments from Iraqi officials or development experts. BEYOND FISCAL YEAR 2004 17. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, roughly $20 billion of the supplemental appropriations request is intended to cover the costs of Iraqis providing their own security ($5 billion) and reconstruction ($15 billion) through the end of fiscal year 2004. What additional work and at what cost do you estimate will be required be- yond fiscal year 2004, and will that require an additional emergency supplemental request? If you do not have an estimate of the cost, do you have an estimate of the range of costs? Ambassador BREMER. For 2003 and 2004, Iraq will have a transitional economy and will require substantial international assistance to regain economic prosperity. In addition to the supplemental, we will utilize international donations stemming from the Madrid Donors Conference as well as limited international investment to bridge the investment gap and stimulate the local economy. We do not expect to re- quest further supplemental appropriations for reconstruction in Iraq. AUTHORITY OVER FINANCIAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS 18. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, are there any plans to give the Iraqi Gov- erning Council more authority over financial and security affairs? If not, why not? Ambassador BREMER. The Iraq Governing Council’s authority over security and financial matters is continually increasing. The most significant step was the recent appointment by the Iraq Governing Council of Interim Ministers in each Ministry. These ministers are responsible for the day-to-day operations of their ministries and are accountable to the Iraqi Governing Council. The 2004 Iraqi budget was devel- oped in close consultation with the ministries and approved by the governing coun- cil. We anticipate the Minister of Finance will assume significant responsibilities for managing the development fund for Iraq within the framework of the national budg- et; that Iraqis nominated by the governing council will sit on the International Advi- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 146 sory and Monitoring Board as observers; and that all ministries will be involved in administering international financial assistance. We are committed to transferring responsibility to the interim Iraqi administration in this area as quickly and effi- ciently as practicable. With respect to security, the Minster of Interior, who acts under the authority, direction and control of the governing council, is responsible for the reorganization of the Ministry of Interior. The governing council has formed a Joint Security Committee comprised of governing council and coalition representa- tives, who develop and coordinate security proposals. OIL INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS 19. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, the administration’s supplemental re- quest includes $2.1 billion to rehabilitate Iraq’s oil infrastructure. What steps will the administration take to ensure that all of this work is performed on a fully com- petitive basis, and that none is awarded on a sole-source basis to Halliburton or any other company? Ambassador BREMER. Under an acquisition strategy approved in June 2003, the Army Corps of Engineers is conducting a full and open competition which will result in the award of two contracts for the repair and continuity of operations of the Iraqi oil infrastructure—one for the north and one for the south. The Army issued a Re- quest for Proposals (DACA63–03–R–0021) on July 9, 2003. The Army is following formal source selection procedures applicable to major competitive procurements. On October 29, 2003, the Corps of Engineers announced it has amended the solici- tation to increase the maximum value of the two contracts. Award is expected to occur in 30 to 60 days to give offerors an opportunity to revise their proposals and allow the Corps to evaluate the revisions. We anticipate these awards in December. MANAGEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT 20. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, up until now, DOD has been responsible for the reconstruction of the Iraqi oil industry, while the Department of State has had responsibility for the balance of the reconstruction effort, including electricity, water, sewers, roads, schools, and ports. Under the supplemental request, recon- struction funds would be appropriated to the President, rather than to any specific agency, giving the administration complete flexibility to decide what agency will be responsible for executing the funds. I understand that DOD has now hired Admiral Dave Nash to set up a Program Management Office (PMO) in Iraq and that you have directed Admiral Nash to put in place a capability to execute the entire $15 billion requested for the Iraqi recon- struction effort. Admiral Nash’s office will have contractor employees working under the direction of DOD financial management officers and contracting officers. Does this mean that DOD will now have responsibility for the entire reconstruc- tion effort in Iraq? Ambassador BREMER. As CPA Administrator, I have established the PMO headed by retired Rear Admiral David Nash, to oversee the implementation of the supple- mental. The PMO will play the central role in supporting me as I identify, plan, and prioritize all of the reconstruction effort. This will be done in coordination with the Iraqi Ministries and Governing Council, as well as U.S. advisors, the Council for International Cooperation, International Donors, and the other organizations in- volved with the rebuilding of the infrastructure of Iraq. The management of the re- construction effort, funded with U.S. appropriated funds, will be assigned to various U.S. Government agencies for execution, including Department of State, USAID, and others, based on their capability and capacity to execute. This overall process of oversight and management will enable the CPA to harmonize efforts to execute the supplemental. The PMO will consist of a blended staff made up of Government employees, particularly in finance and acquisition, and contracted staff. The respon- sibility for the reconstruction effort in Iraq remains under the direction of the Ad- ministrator, CPA. 21. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, why was the decision made to exclude the Department of State and USAID from the central role that they have played up until now? Ambassador BREMER. There has not been a decision to exclude the Department of State, USAID, or others from a central role in establishing a secure, peaceful, democratic Iraq. These agencies and others have played, and will continue to play, a critical role in the Iraq reconstruction effort. Given the magnitude of the effort, more than seven times the previous appropriation, what is needed is a process to VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00149 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 147 systematically coordinate the efforts of all the organizations to ensure that priority requirements are being addressed, funding is being applied to accomplish the Presi- dent’s strategy, and that there be transparency. 22. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, how will you determine what part of the reconstruction effort should be conducted through Admiral Nash’s PMO and what part should be conducted under the myriad of contracts already in place under the auspices of DOD, USAID, and other Federal agencies? Ambassador BREMER. I have assigned managing the entire $18 billion reconstruc- tion effort to the PMO headed by retired Admiral David Nash. The PMO will be in charge of planning and prioritizing all the reconstruction effort using information from many sources—Department of State, USAID, and others currently involved in the rebuilding efforts. All reconstruction work performed under the fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriation for reconstruction will comply with the requirements set forth in the legislation for reporting, as well as full and open competition. The serv- ices of USAID, the Department of State, and other U.S. Government entities will be utilized wherever their capability and capacity allow. IRAQI POLICE FORCE 23. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, things have been rough for the Iraqi po- lice. Recently, 10 policemen in Fallujah were killed in a firefight with U.S. forces, the Khaldiya chief of police was assassinated, and earlier in July, 7 other Fallujah policemen were killed returning from their graduation exercises after U.S. training. How would you characterize the state of training and equipping of the Iraqi police forces? What more do we have to do in that regard? Ambassador BREMER. Iraqis are eager to participate in their own security, and re- cruitment of Iraqi police is proceeding apace. Some 50,000 Iraqi police officers are on board, and we are building up toward a professional force of 70,000-plus. Equip- ment and other vehicle shortages continue, and we are working to address them. International police trainers will also provide support and on-the-job training in technical skills and professionalism. 24. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid, what is the rela- tionship of U.S. forces, particularly the military police, to the Iraqi police? What is the state of cooperation and coordination between those forces? Ambassador BREMER. Coalition Forces and Iraqi police are conducting joint pa- trols, and our strategy emphasizes assisting Iraqis to provide for their own security. The relationship between U.S. forces and Iraqi forces is a positive one that empha- sizes building professionalism and rule of law. As we help build an effective Iraqi police force, we will relieve the burden on Coalition Forces and free them up further to pursue the enemies of progress. General ABIZAID. U.S. Military Police (MP) are in a supporting role to the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). They work side-by-side to provide a safe and secure environ- ment. In Baghdad, for example, the IPS, 1st Armored Division, and 18th MP Bri- gade all work together in a Joint Operation Center to coordinate their efforts. Across Iraq, all units have established similar procedures. There is tremendous co- operation not only between the IPS and MPs, but also between the IPS and our tac- tical units. They conduct joint patrols and share critical information. Over the past weeks, that level of cooperation has increased dramatically the availability of criti- cal information to Coalition Forces. For example, largely due to information that Iraqis give to local police, Coalition Forces have been able to detect over half of enemy explosive devices before detonation. 25. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid, what should be done to avoid such fratricide incidents in the future? Ambassador BREMER. We regret the tragic accidents that have occurred, and we are always looking to improve jointly our training and communication. Continued training and cooperative efforts, including joint patrols, will reduce the risk of fu- ture accidents. In addition, we have established a Joint Coordinating Center (JCC) in Baghdad. The purpose is to provide situational awareness of military and police deployments as well as information sharing and operational planning. The center, which is based at 1st Armored Division Headquarters, is staffed by 1st AD person- nel, U.S. MPs and U.K. civilians. It is being assessed for possible rollout to other areas of operation. General ABIZAID. Improve the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to optimize the Identification of Friendly Forces (IFF) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 148 and minimize fratricide. Currently at Combined Joint Task Force-7, there is an IFF working group to minimize these incidents. Incoming soldiers train according to the IFF SOP to ensure they recognize National Iraqi Security Force vehicle markings and uniforms. 26. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, are ordinary Iraqis beginning to identify the Iraqi police as stooges of the Americans and therefore enemies? Ambassador BREMER. Iraqis are eager to participate in their own security, and the success of our recruitment efforts attest to this. Across the country about 70,000 Iraqis now provide security to their fellow citizens, and some 50,000 Iraqi police offi- cers are on board. More and more Iraqis are also providing information to both Iraqi police and coalition authorities on those who have or who are planning to attack Iraqis and/or coalition targets, as well as pointing out caches of arms. 27. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, what can be done in locations such as Fallujah to bolster a police force that must feel embattled from all sides? Ambassador BREMER. Our successful recruitment of Iraqis to serve in security forces continues, and the President has requested $5 billion to help Iraqis assume increasing responsibility for the security of their own country. This will go toward, among other things, training and equipping Iraqi police. ANSAR AL-ISLAM 28. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Bremer, you said in response to an earlier ques- tion that the Saddam Hussein government was supporting Ansar al-Islam prior to the war. Could you please expand upon the nature of that relationship, and provide any classified or unclassified materials that indicate the types of support that ex- isted? Ambassador BREMER. In Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address to the U.N., he reported that Saddam’s government had an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam in the north of Iraq. [Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the committee adjourned.] Æ VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:06 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 5012 96500.071 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2