4TH Battalion Advisor Support Team, CPA-CMATT, Taji Base

4TH Battalion Advisor Support Team, CPA-CMATT, Taji Base APO AE 09378 18 April 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, CMATT-C2 CELL, Taji Base, APO AE 09378 SUBJECT: In-Process After–Action Review, 30 days Training Operations OBSERVATION: Advisor Support Team (AST) does not know the level of training of its Iraqi supported unit when link-up for training begins. Discussion: To better assist the supported unit, advisors should be aware of the training curriculum provided to the unit while in basic training and officer or NCO professional schools. Recommendation. C2 brief school curriculums when AST’s arrive at TMTB Done – Major Lewis C2 Cell OBSERVATION: Laptop Computers with Arabic/English capability are in short supply. Discussion: To better assist the supported unit, advisors should bring or be issued an Arabic/ English capable laptop with which interpreters and AST may prepare documents and training plans. Iraqi units would also benefit from the use of the same system to produce accurate and timely reports and databases in the interim period between standing-up the battalions and the issue of unit equipment. AST’s should provide copies of translated documents to C-2 for cross-level. At least one AST member spends 90% of his time managing various rosters and reports which come from hand-written Arabic to the Base Support Unit (or not) and made into Arabic electronic copy then given back to the AST where he sits with an interpreter and enters the English data. (ID Card Rosters, AWOL rosters, Payrolls, Special Pay rosters). The CMATT FWD has 1-2 systems with this capability which are already overused for other purposes. Recommendation. CENTCOM task all deploying AST teams with providing Laptops and one printer per 10 PAX and one person with administrator privileges, C2 obtain Arabic/English software for AST/Interpreter/IA battalion use. Cross-level previously translated material. Working, all supplies on order – Major Lewis C2 Cell OBSERVATION: Mail service is poor. Discussion: Mail delivery to the AST is spotty at best. C2 Cell does not have this responsibility. Personnel must be mail-handler certified. Base Post Office keeps bankers hours and is closed on Sundays. Considering tactical operations causing several days of delay, it is hard to understand the post office being closed on Sunday. CMATT main (C3) and Forward sit on mail for several (up to three) weeks before getting it forwarded. Recommendation. Every base must have a CMATT mail-handler to take responsibility of this function. Make regular mail runs. Do not miss pick-ups, forward mail using actual forwarding addresses via the post office (verify mail does not get routed back to CONUS as rumored). Reasons/Fix, members were giving the incorrect address, no longer attempting to sift through mail for AST members in different locations. All mail incorrectly addressed will be returned to sender. – Major Lewis C2 Cell OBSERVATION: Casualty Procedures need improvement. Discussion: This team suffered one casualty due to enemy action. This WIA was sent to another base for treatment. It is difficult to track casualties in theater. AST does not have a cell or SAT phone. No DNVT is available to CMATT. Tracking is difficult. Purple Hearts should be issued in a reasonable time period (more than a week has passed since injury) while the other tenant units on base issue them within 24 hours. Recommendation. C2 must issue AST’s SAT phones upon arrival for emergency use. Each team member should have team SAT phone number taped to his ID Tags. C2 S-1 must track casualties for the AST and coordinate pick up. Done – Major Lewis C2 Cell OBSERVATION: Quality of Interpreters is good. Discussion: 4th Battalion AST received 8 Interpreters. Due to attrition from current pay rate and possible loyalty issue, the team is down to 6 interpreters. The AST must be cautious when using these persons as they are not vetted with a background check. Their skills range from good to excellent with two being particularly outstanding. There is concern if the unit deploys there will be no support at these interpreters were hired to stay at Taji Base. Only a few are willing to deploy with the unit on operations. Recommendation: Vet the interpreters with a background check before hiring them. We would rather do without than have a suspect interpreter. Identify the Interpreters to deploy with the unit and ensure permission from the hiring authority is obtained before removing them from the base-specific mission they were hired to perform. OBSERVATION: There is inadequate space for Weapons training at TMTB. Discussion: The design of the ranges limit use to AK-47 and pistol only. Some reports of machine-gun range ricochets into the local neighborhoods are being investigated. This will hamper readiness of the units with the inability to train and qualify machinegun crews while at TMTB. Night fire will also be limited and hamper readiness. Recommendation. TMTB is unsuitable for training newly stood-up Infantry units destined for combat operations in a short time. Use TMTB for Basic and other military schools. Done, TMTB has surveyed and made changes – Major Lewis C2 Cell OBSERVATION: Iraqi Army uniforms and equipment are training detractors. The current uniform issued to the 4th IA Infantry Battalion, the boots, and canteens are of such poor quality, the Commander limits training time due to this unserviceable equipment. This limitation to training hours in the hotter parts of the day is due to the uniform (only one is issued) which is very heavy, shrinks, and falls apart easily. The ratty boots are not available in large sizes and don’t support long training hours. Canteens emanate an unacceptable flavor and odor when filled with water. Immediately procure and issue quality military uniforms and equipment. Done – Major Lewis C2 Cell OBSERVATION: Mess Operations for AST’s take up too much time. Discussion: Mess facilities for the AST’s remain on the US side of TMTB. The CMATT FWD initiated noon meal delivery to the CMATT barracks saving over an hour a day in transportaion to and from lunch. While this support is commendable, no breakfast or dinner meal is available and AST’s have the option to eat in the Iraqi Army Dining Facilities or travel to the US Base and back. About two hours per day are still lost to transport to those meals and back. MRE’s are available and used when on training operations. Some meals are consumed in Iraqi Dining Facilities. Recommendation. Provide hot breakfast, MRE lunch, and hot dinner meals. Use current staffing/Details to support dining operations. Reduce shuttle bus requirements to US Base and back to PX/Laundry/MWR purposes. Occasional trips to US Dining Facilities are supportable (Fridays). Working – Major Lewis C2 Cell OBSERVATION: Placing newly stood up battalions into garrisons before Life Support and Base Operations are in place affects the training mission. Discussion: In addition to training a newly formed unit in a combat environment (mortar attacks, insurgent threats), much time is lost dealing with life support issues (food service, no laundry, intermittent power, water, and faulty wiring, plumbing, and construction), non-existent base operations procedures (CIF SOP, no cleaning supplies in place, garrison policies (access control to battalion areas, PX use, mess hall, uniform), that such a level of disorganization exists upon arrival the unit leaders spend an inordinate amount of time retaining soldiers, explaining why conditions are worse than the training bases they just arrived from. Recommendation. Prepare leaders of units up-front to explain to their soldiers what the true conditions are and don’t make unrealistic promises of when services will be delivered. Otherwise, don’t stand-up units at a base until the base is ready. Training continues regardless, but retention and attention suffers because life support issues are great. OBSERVATION: Chain-of-Command for AST is unclear. Discussion: The CMATT Forward has a daily meeting where AST as a base tenant is required to attend. CMATT FWD tasks the AST. AST data is tracked and reported on CMATT-FWD SITREP to CMATT. C2 requires reports daily from the AST and has ADCON of the team. There is a brigade AST advising the IA higher headquarters also requiring SITREP from the AST and has tasking authority. This does not include the CJTF units the IA battalion and supporting AST will work for when OPCON. Recommendation. Chain-of-Command must be clear and go to one place. AST to C2 when not under CJTF. Then AST to CJTF only. AST data only to C2 and higher Bde when under CJTF. AST’s should have a rep at CMATT FWD “Base Meetings” until Iraqi’s take over. It is a difficult chain, but workable. Done – Major Lewis C2 Cell OBSERVATION: Evaluations of OPCON AST Soldiers and Marines should be done with a Letter of Continuity. Discussion: The OPCON relationship of the AST’s to CENTCOM merits a Letter of Continuity for each leader/Soldier/Marine/Sailor/Airman/Australian/British member of an AST. To use each services’ official rating/evaluation form and counseling process is unmanageable due to the nature of the mission, rotation of the various AST’s, (both Brigade and Battalion). This would definitely result in performance gaps of many leaders. The OPCON relationship each team is under for CENTCOM means ADCON (promotion, rating and such) is still in the ASTs’ organic headquarters. C2 has ADCON for the mission in theater and should be the central point for managing the Letters of Continuity. The letters should focus on the evaluation criteria of each member’s service or branch and be hand-carried back to their units if possible. Otherwise, Each AST must provide an address and e-mail of the Organic Unit Administrative Officers. CMATT members who are in a TCS/TTAD status may have different evaluation criteria and require formal evaluations. Recommendation. Unless specific regulations can be cited showing Officer and Non-Commisioned Officer Evaluation Reports and supporting forms must be done for each person in CMATT. The Letter of Continuity memorandum should be the medium carried back to provide the Servicemembers’ normal supervisor input for their annual performance. (Ref Army FM 101-5). Done – Major Lewis C2 Cell POC for this memorandum is the undersigned. //////SIGNED/////// DAVID J. COLLVER MAJ, EN, USAR Team Chief CMATT Coalition Military Assistance Training Team